Like so many things in life and thought, many things have been called "philosophy" or "philosophies." Among academic philosophers, there remain several general approaches or "schools" of philosophy, and you're right to think that philosophers from different points of view might answer philosophical questions very differently. There are, as well, schools of thought outside of academia that are widely known as "philosophy" or "philosophical." Some of these are more or less extensions of academic philosophy. In other cases, non-academic "philosophies" are really very different enterprises. So I think if you put everything that is called "philosophy into a single container and then asked what is common to everything in that container...the best answer would probably be "nothing...other than they are all called 'philosophy' by someone or other. Even granting that, I think that one of the goals of academic philosophy is to try to guarantee some degree of "quality control" through our...

I am actually inclined to think your hypothesis is correct--though I also think that your question is really an empirical one, which would best be answered by the methods of the social sciences (e.g. with an appropriately designed public opinion poll). But to give just one example of what I suspect are many, I am inclined to think that younger people are more attracted to utopian thought and the more radical political theories--in part because such ways of thinking match well with a general youthful way of thinking according to which problems are supposed to have simpler solutions, whereas as we age, we become more convinced that life's problems are more complex and less likely to be amenable to very direct and simple solutions. Accordingly, I am inclined to think that undergraduates generally might not find Stoicism all that atractive--as so much of it looks like mechanisms for coping in a difficult or even hostile world. To people later in life, such philosophies may seem more attractive. But these...

I'm not planning to send this to Analysis , but it seems to me there might be such a case, at least under certain conceptions of knowledge (where I am not proposing the case as a counterexample to the conception). Suppose we think (as I actually do) that knowledge requires the application of appropriate epistemic virtues. Being fallible (at least for the most part, as far as we can tell), one such epistemic virtue is epistemic humility. The one with epistemic humility is a fallibilist, and accepts that she could be mistaken (but actually is not). But suppose she actually has a kind of knowledge about which she is, in fact, infallible. Even so, she thinks she could be mistaken about what she knows. But that is false, she cannot be mistaken. However, were she not to think she could be, she would be epistemically immodest, thus not virtuous, and thus wouldn't know. Might that be such a case?

I'm not sure why you think a teacher would put his or her students into prison by telling them the content of freedom. My puzzlement is this: Isn't the question of whether or not I am free or in prison an objective fact about me and my life? It may well be that a teacher can lead a student to recognize (perhaps for the very first time) just how constrained and unfree the student really is. But that is not the same as actually creating the constraints. In fact, I am inclined to think that the more we know about the limits on our freedom, the better equipped we will be to moderate or eliminate our limitations. Perhaps still the most important philosopher of education, especially in regard to the kind of question you are asking, is John Dewey.

I am uneasy with the phrase "absolutely prove...non-existence." It is difficult to imagine what sort of scientific discovery could "absolutely prove" the non-existence of something. I am inclined to think that scientific evidence just doesn't work that way. On the other hand, there have been a number of arguments offered for the claim that the very concept of God is logically incoherent. If something can be shown to be logically contradictory, then this does seem like a decisive proof of non-existence. A fairly extensive survey of such arguments appears in Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification , chapter 12. But I think it is fair to say that the philosophical world has not been completely won over by any of these arguments. Most philosophers who are atheists, I surmise, would say only that the evidence available to us strongly favors disbelief in God, rather than "absolutely proves" it. Of course, there remain a number philosophers who regard the weight of evidence...

I am not sure whether ownership is the right way to frame this question. It seems that it might be more perspicuous to think of the question in terms, perhaps, of duties we owe to one another, in terms of respect for other cultures (and others' cultures), or of virtue considerations such as being respectful of others. From these points of view, I think answers are easier to reach: It certainly seems like a kind of violation of a duty to respect others (for example, as an application of one of the ways Kant formulates what he calls the categorical imperative, which mandates treating others as ends only, and never as means), and also seems like the vice of disrespect for others to violate rituals in this way. Of course, it might also be more complicated, depending upon what motives apply to the apropriation (commencial? for the purposes of ridicule? out of a sense of shared reverence?).

Your question seems to bring to bear a number of important ethical notions. From what is called a "consequentialist" perspective, in which goodness is understood in terms of consequences, plainly the laziness of a genius will be more consequential than that of an ordinary person. One of the common criticisms of consequentialism is that it seems to mandate or require what is called "supererogation"--going above and beyond the call of duty, since each additional step beyond the call of duty would bring additional value into being. From what is called a deontological perspective, the question would be whether there is any moral duty (or, as you put it, imperative) to use one's natural gifts productively. So is there a "call to duty" involving adequate use of natural gifts? I think probably there would be some such duty, but since we also have the idea that supererogation cannot be required , presumably any such duty would be limited. From a virtue-theoretic standpoint, there are no "moral...

I think some philosophers would argue that there are good reasons not to have children, given population pressures. But I am inclined to take a rather different tack here, by asking you why you seem to suppose that self-interest is the same as the vice of selfishness. One of the things I found extraordinary in my own experience of having children was how much love I found I was capable of having and sharing. Did that bring value to my own life? Most certainly it did! Did it bring value to the lives of others? I think (and hope) so. Did I become a better person, all things considered? I think (and hope) so. And if I am doing a good job with my children (as I hope I am), then everyone with whom they come into contact is potentially better off. Plainly, not all parents are good people, and parenting does not always improve those who do it. But if you desire to have children, I think that is at least one indication that you could do something that is valuable not just for yourself...

Gnosticism was certainly influenced by Platonic philosophy, but the two are not the same thing. Rather than going into details here, I suggest that you go to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (advertised on the lower right of this page--just click on it) and look up "Gnosticism." There is a philosopher named May Sim at College of the Holy Cross who has done some work on comparisons between Asian philosophies and ancient Greek philosophy. You might try contacting her to find out more about that topic.

I think the passage you have in mind in one in which Socrates refutes Polemarchus, not Thrasymachus. But at any rate, I guess I don't share your confidence in our ability to judge the first and second questions much more accurately than we can the third. Of course, if we mean by "friend" simply "someone for whom we feel a certain kind of affection" then figuring out who our friends are will require only that we accurately recognize our own feelings of affection. But if the real answer to the first question naturally takes us to the second, I don't see why judgments of good and evil are going to be easier to answer than questions about what justice is.