Given how dense and how brief these passages are, it will not surprise you to find out that scholars debate virtually every aspect of them, so bear in mind that whatever I say is probably contradicted somewhere by someone else! But I think the answer to your question is that Plato is talking about both visible things, and also such things as the Form of the Good, as the part of the parable of the cave that takes place within the cave is supposed to represent the world of the sensibles. Plato intends to compare the two worlds, via the parable, to show not only how much more intelligible and reliable the things "outside the cave" of sensibles are, but also (somehow--scholars really debate this point) why and how it is that spending time outside the cave makes the ex-prisoner a better judge of things when he or she goes back inside the cave (though it takes some time for the returners to adjust again to the gloom). These "returners" will eventually be the philosopher-rulers of the state...

I think the only honest answer to your question one can give is this: Despite all efforts by scholars to determine the outlines and limits of "Plato's Theory of Forms," these continue to elude us, precisely because Plato never articulates them in a way that settles the matter. In some cases, this is because Plato only manages to allude to "the Forms" without filling in enough of the necessary theoretical details. But in other cases, he seems to supply different theoretical details in different works--in other words, what Plato tells us about the Forms does not always seem to be consistent. He does explicitly mention the things you call "abstract ideas" (though I think he would not be entirely comfortable with this description), such as beauty and justice. In Book X of the Republic , he also mentions a Form of Bed (or Couch), and other Forms for particular things in the world are also mentioned in various Platonic works. I am aware of no places where Plato explicitly mentions a Form for a...

For Aristotle, actions were indicative of virtue (or vice), but not right or wrong in themselves. That is why, as most sscholars say these days, Aristotle's was a virtue theory rather than a theory of ethical (or moral) action. So I think the answer to your question is that Aristotle would not count torturing babes as evil in itself. It is difficult to imagine any cases in which such an action would be compatible with a just soul, and so would certainly count as a reliable indicator of vice in the agent performing such actions. Aristotle also recognizes that not all good behavior flows from the virtuous condition of the soul, where the virtue is learned. There is also what he calls "natural virtue," which means something like the right sort of dispositions one has innately. Moreover, there are other conditions of humanity that would be regular and normal that would generall exclude things like torturning babies. Certainly refraining from torturing babies hardly counts as a virtue, and...

I am not aware of a scholarly argument of the sort you are seeking. In my view, Socrates got this from the inscription of the same words at the Shrine at Delphi. Another of these inscriptions at Delphi was also quite "Socratic": "Nothing in Excess."

Have a look at: http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=398104 The attribution to Socrates is spurious.

The list would be a very long one, I'm afraid! Nearly all of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers did; all of the early and medieval Christian philosophers, most of the early modern European philosophers, until perhaps the 20th Century. In the 20th and 21st centuries, probably most of the best-known philosophers have not believed in an afterlife. It is much easier to identify the best-known philosophers who have not believed in an afterlife. These would include: most or all of the Epicureans (among the Greek and Roman philosophers), and among the early moderns, Hobbes and Hume. I'm sure there are others, as well, some of which might also count as "major philosophers."

I believe the oldest expression of this injunction appeared as an inscription at the shrine at Delphi. The inscription itself is no longer extant, but it is referred to in ancient sources as having been one of the things displayed at the shrine. See Plato's Phaedrus 230a. Many subsequent authors liked to use this expression, and each may have meant something somewhat different by using it. Socrates' own use of it seemed to mean something like, "Be aware of your own ignorance!" We can only speculate about what thoe who inscribed the words at Delphi might have meant, but I would surmise it was something like this: "Know that you are merely a mortal, and do not presume to be in any way the equal of a god!"

I hope others will chime in on this one, but here is a partial answer. The problem that lies behind your question is na version of what is called the "problem of other minds." The truth, as you put it, is actually not "SCREAMING at you in the face." Even Descartes would not have denied that cats will struggle and make loud noises when you begin to cut them open. The screaming, as you put it, is something that happens when cats are vivisected. The question--on which you and Descartes differ--is whether that screaming should be understood as a decisive indicator of whether the cat actually feels pain . Consider even another human being. You witness them suffering some injury, and they cry out. You assume they are feeling pain, and that is why they cry out, because when you injure yourself in the same or similar ways, you feel pain, and that is what makes you cry out. But if you think about it, the only pain--indeed, the only consciousness of any kind that you...

In the Republic , Plato argues that there should be a ruling elite consisting entirely of philosophers. He never mentions that there must only be 7 of these, and I think it would also count as a serious misunderstanding (one often made in the scholarly literature, however) to say that these philosophers had to be "altruistic"; rather, they needed to understand well what is in everyone's interest, including their own, and they would have to (correctly) understand their own interests as including the interests of those with whom they lived, and upon whom they depended for goods and services. Plato was certainly no fan of democracy, as a form of government, and so he would not be much impressed with modern forms of government that were democractic by nature. He was also not at all in favor of oligarchy, or rule by the wealthiest citizens--which, I think it is fair to say, is how many present "democracies" end up. Plato counted tyranny as the worst possible form of government, moreover,...

Your questions seem to focus on how smart people were (or are), and thus on how you can become that smart. Maybe you mean something different than I do, when you use the word "smart," but I think the only honest answer one can give to many of your questions is "no one knows, and no one can know." But I can say that Socrates (and Plato, and Aristotle) would all agree on the best thing you can do to get the best education you can have: Find others who have that same interest, and those credibly reputed to be able to serve that interest, and follow the inquiries that follow where they may. This does happen at universities (and at colleges, in the US--a "college" is not post-secondary education most other places), and I would also pick your college or university in the same way that Aristotle probably did. He found out that the most famous thinkers and educators were at Plato's Academy, and so he wanted to work with--and to think alongside--the best minds. So my advice is: Find out...