In a democratic society, we are often called to vote. However, I don't believe there is a clear understanding of how one should vote. Are voters supposed to vote according to what they believe to be the best policy for everybody? Does democracy intend that everyone express some normative opinion about how society ought to function, and that the dominant opinion triumphs? Are voters supposed to vote according to what policy would be most beneficial to themselves? Does democracy intend that everyone express their personal interests, and that government builds a consensus or favors the dominant interests? Are voters supposed to vote strategically, in an attempt to maximize the likelihood of their desired policies being enacted? Does democracy intend for us to vote for options that don't necessarily represent something we believe in, if we believe that such a vote would best guarantee the success of the policies least abhorrent to us?

The point of voting in a democracy is that one votes in accordance with whatever principles one likes, or none. It is perfectly valid to vote for the best looking candidate, the candidate who has an attractive spouse or partner, the candidate who won when a coin was tossed, and so on. It is perfectly plausible to use any of the principles you mention, but far simpler and subjective impressions are fine too.

Given ever-increasing population compared with the fixed size of the Earth, is it ethical for me to want to raise my children in a house with a yard, when a handful of houses could make room for apartments that could house hundreds of people?

I don't see what is wrong with doing things that you want to do in a case like this. One is not perpetually obliged to think of whether one could be doing more for people. Right now instead of responding to this query I might be more suitably employed doling out food for the homeless and the computer on which I am now typing could be sold to provide water for villages in the developing world which require it. I could right now be doing things that save lives, yet here I am selfishly typing away unnecessarily and satisfying my desire to make my opinions public. To allow all my personal interests to be submerged under the interests of others, though, is to dissolve one's personality. For some of course taking this step is in fact a reflection of their personality, but in the example you say you want to bring your children up in a house with a yard. We are not under the obligation to be saints and there is no reason why you should feel guilty about the reasonable ambition to own a yard. ...

Some people say that you don't have to have faith to be in touch with a supernatural reality, rather you can have an intuitive access to that reality. Isn't that really just faith since it's not based on reason? I mean what is "intuition" anyways? I'm sure there are a lot of different definitions but I could use some of that "analytic" style of philosophy clarity on this concept of intuition. (even if that's by definition impossible)

I wonder if it is faith. There is an Islamic philosopher called Ibn al-Arabi who argued that for him there was no point in proving the existence of God since He is just so obviously all around us. Here he was thinking of one of the beautiful names for God, al-Muhit, the omnipresent. Suppose someone says that the presence of God is so evident to him that it is like believing that today is Thursday, or that the hands I see banging away on the keys of my computer are my hands. As Wittgenstein says, these are not claims that really one needs evidence for. Perhaps the same could be said for the knowledge that the world is infused with divinity?

If the market for certain entertainment media - films, video games, television, etc. - prefers to consume media that is sexist, racist, heteronormative, or otherwise prejudiced against certain groups, should the creators of such media nevertheless try to produce "fair" media? Why? As a consumer who wants fair depictions in media, what right do I have to demand that media be fair to minorities, if that means denying the majority what they want?

There are a few reasons to not just give people what they want. First, how do they know unless they are given alternatives? Secondly, what they want may have dangerous consequences for others and be incompatible with life in a civilized society. The demand for fairness is a basic moral demand and on occasion may well not be popular, but that is irrelevant to its rationale.

As it's the holiday season I've had a definite overdose of holiday mythology. The bit that got me thinking the most was re-encountering the character E. Scrooge, of Dickens' "A Christmas Carol", particularly in light of recent political/economic events in the US. How would a thoughtful philosopher characterize him and Dickens in this book? I'd not like to think that Dickens was engaging in mere sentimentality, that Scrooge is a character suitable merely for children, with no complexity to interest adults (though I'm aware "ACC" is mostly taught at the elementary school level). One of the talk-show hosts, I think it was Bill Maher, recently tried to cast Scrooge as simply a Republican, economically conservative. Is this a fair characterization? If we read the situation sentimentally, it's a moral tale against excessive greed. But the extent to which we should have a sentimental reaction to the economic plight of other people is an unanswered philosophical question, to my view. Is Dickens just being a...

I know exactly what you mean, I have always thought that poor old Scrooge got a rather bum deal from Dickens. The trouble with being uncharitable, though, which Dickens gets right is that it harms far more the potential giver rather than the recipient. Scrooge holds onto his money but is miserable and gets very little benefit from it, while those with little who are generous with it and their time also are much happier. In a sense, then, Scrooge sees the light and becomes generous not because he understands he ought to help others, but primarily because helping others helps him most of all.

I was combing through the recent questions and, although it has not yet been answered, noticed one about a person and his ex-philosophy-inclined-friend. This question in term led me to wonder about a more general question: the role of feelings in philosophy in general. Is philosophy just about reasoned argument, or would any credibility be given to a prominent philosopher who said something like: "I can't pinpoint what's wrong with this paper on the nature of friendship, but it just feels off to me". Or would a prominent philosopher not dare to say something like that? When a professional philosopher reads a paper, does s/he ever have an emotional response, is it suppressed, or, after years of training, does one learn simply to have no emotional response whatever. And, if there is one, does that in turn guide the thought process to any extent? At least as an impetus?

Emotion is very important in all human activities, philosophy included. Many arguments are fashioned as they are not in a disinterested desire to attain the truth but to get promoted, impress a potential partner, do down an enemy and so on. These might be regarded as cynical comments but then philosophers are usually human beings and they will then have human emotions. One does sometimes just not like a theory and then we look for reasons of a logical kind to disprove it. It could be something about it that raises our suspicions, like someone we dislike propounding it, for example. One thing I have noted is that few philosophers like to admit they have changed their minds on an issue, we normally stick to our guns throughout our careers. After all, consistency is supposed to be a logical virtue.

Is it philosophically possible to "be" a plant in the same way that it's possible to "be" a human being?

Why not? Both vegetables and us having being, albeit rather different. I recall a show many years ago which had a very human plant in it, but the trouble with it for our purposes here is that really it was a human being dressed up as a plant, as far as I could see from its behaviour, and so hardly expressive of a very different life form.

In some schools where I live, children are made to sing the national anthem every morning at school. Children who do not wish to do so can opt-out, in which case they are made to take their chairs outside the classroom, sit, and wait until the singing is over. Those working for the education board claim that the possibility of opting out means that nobody is being forced to do anything. Yet if the de facto situation is that children are made to sing the anthem, and that they are visibly segregated from the other students for their or their parents' choice, can that really be true? Is there no form of coercion going on whatsoever here? It seems that this situation is more coercive than an alternative, in which nobody sings the anthem at all. Is this perception correct?

I wonder, because it might be argued that in general people would be expected to know the national anthem, and while provision should be made for those who do not wish to, it would be a shame if no-one could sing it at school. After all, it is not as though singing it is likely to coerce one into patriotic feelings that one would be better without, or even better with, since as we know however people are brought up often has very little to do with how they eventually behave or what they believe. I used to teach in a school where a small group of students had to be removed from the classroom whenever Christmas was discussed, since it was held to be a largely secular holiday and they were the children of committed Christians who disapproved of this secularity. Should one have just not spoken about Christmas at all in order not to exclude them? How about if some parents object to music or sex education, should teachers not play music or provide sex education at all? Exclusion is not desirable,...

Literary theory often urges us to ignore what the author believes or says about his or her own work, and to look at the text itself. Yet many literary theorists (perhaps not necessarily good ones, but many nonetheless) couch their analyses in terms of agency - like commenting of a horror movie that "The fact that the black man dies first tells us that black people do not have a place in this society", or, to quote an example our professor gave us, "The buttons in a tram that signal for the driver to stop are intended to train you into behaving in an impersonal and instrumental way towards servants." If we are supposed to ignore what the author of these artifacts says about them (which is almost certainly at odds with the "analysis"), how can we then coherently speak about intention, suggestion, or other notions of agency? Who is telling or intending, if not the creator of an artefact?

There is a difference though between saying that the intentions the author evinces in writing his or her text are the meaning of the text, and saying that the text reveals a good deal about the intentional values held by the society that the text represents. Language is public and we do not control it, despite what Humpty Dumpty says. The author does not control the meaning of what is written, but that certainly does not mean we cannot investigate those meanings.

“The eyes of the Lord are in every place, watching the evil and the good.” (Proverbs 15:3) This implies to me that God is omnipresent, through time and space. With that premise, what argument can be made for free will? If he can see every action we make, he knew the actions that Adam and Eve would make before their creation. Thanks, James

Just because God knows what is going to happen does not mean it has to happen, in the sense that human beings have to do what they end up doing. For example, I always have sugar in my coffee, if sugar is available, but that does not mean that I am incapable of having coffee without sugar. I used to smoke after a cup of coffee, but no longer do so, and here again I did not have to give up smoking. God doubtless knew what I was going to do before I did it, but the decisions to use sugar, and discontinue smoking all belong to me.

Pages