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Philosophers

I'm a philosophy student, and like most philosophy students (and philosophers), I've been known to rhapsodize about Plato. Even if I don't agree with all of his views, he is 'the' philosopher, a great man, and so we put him up on a pedestal. But I've had a sort of crisis of consciousness. The Republic is, more or less, a fascist book, no? If I met anyone in real life who held the views Plato claims to in the Republic, I would be horribly disturbed-- I wouldn't devote my life to seriously considering her philosophy. I understand the merits of distancing yourself from emotions when doing philosophy, and just considering the ideas on their own merits. Isn't that what philosophy's all about, actually? But at the same time, I don't really want to seriously consider fascism, I don't think it deserves it. And why are people still seriously discussing Plato's ethics like they might have something useful to tell us? Shouldn't we stop at "Plato was a fascist"? And what does it say about philosophy that a fascist...

I'm not convinced that we should equate Plato's political philosophy with fascism, although certainly this claim has been made seriously and with rational argument. But let's put that to one side. It seems to me that there are two questions here. First, should we judge historical figures by the same moral standards that we hold today? And, second, in what sense can someone whose views we find repugnant ever be considered a 'great' philosopher? The first question paints one directly into a corner: it seems that either we should reject historical philosophers because of the views they held (in which case there would be not much of the history of philosophy left!) or, we are forced to take seriously, over and over again, morally and politically dubious positions. But what does it mean to 'take seriously'? One approach would be a broadly historicist one: Plato's political theory can be understood as rational only given the historical circumstances in which he lived; since those circumstances no...
Religion

Philosophy never seems to debate multiple Gods like the Vikings and the ancient Greeks had as well as Hinduism. These could be dismissed as silly, discredited ideas except Hinduism still has numerous believers. It seems no more ridiculous to me than the Father, Son and Holy Ghost scenario. Why is monotheism alone debated by religious Western philosophers? (Atheist ones will only consider a Prime Mover or Argument from Design creator but why is this? Is it because of over 2000 years of Abrahamic Gods, messiahs, and prophets with the attendant respectability these, believers would say, bestow?)

Two small additions to Prof. Stairs' answer. First, it is interesting to note that even the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, most of them anyway, although 'officially' polytheistic, generally just talk about one 'god'. That is, their philosophical inquiries push them towards monotheism, rather than monotheism pushing them towards a certain type of philosophy. Second, some recent philosophers have investigated the philosophical significance of ancient polytheism. Most famously, perhaps, Nietzsche, with the account of Apollo and Dionysus in his 'The Birth of Tragedy'. This is one example of a 19th and 20th Century trend (including Schelling, Bachelard and Heidegger) to interpret what we often now consider 'mythology', or the four substances of ancient science, as an embodiment, articulation and even exploration of philosophical ideas. The philosophical issues that arise in this way will be quitedifferent, of course. Arguments for the existence of gods, or problemsin the conception of...
Philosophers

What exactly does Kant mean when he says that we should never treat anyone as a means to an end? Surely there are many situations where I am trying to choose the lesser of two evils. Take a politician for example. He has a certain amount of money to spend on some people, so anything he does will be treating someone as a means to another end, as someone will always miss out at the benefit of someone else (though notice there is no element of selfishness here). I suppose my question is, does Kant mean we shouldn't cause suffering in another for our benefit, or we shouldn't cause suffering in another for ANY end such as for the benefit of another, or does he mean something else entirely? Thanks, Holly M. Fantastic site by the way, I'm addicted.

Please have a look at the question and especially the answer here: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/1476 It is interesting how economics in particular seems to offer the most obvious examples of how one's ends are always 'mixed'.
Justice

Is it right to make glib statements such as "You must vote"? My elderly mother took this statement to heart and voted in a referendum although she was uncertain at the time which way to vote. After she had voted she was very unsettled because she felt that she might have made the wrong decision - but she voted because she felt that it would be more wrong not to vote than to make the wrong selection when voting. ("You must vote" signs posted throughout the country - at the behest of the Government.)

This points to an interesting moral question concerning the formulation of moral rules. It seems to me that your question concerns over-simplified (you call them 'glib') moral rules. The assumption (by those who authorised the signs) must be that the rule holds good most of the time, or that if it is followed all the time that the result will be better than if it is not followed. Presumably there is a vaguely utilitarian calculation going on. However, when formulated in this over-simplified manner, there may result individual undesirable consequences -- your mother's situation may be an example. (Similarly, even 'Do not kill' is a good moral rule, but because over-simplified comes into conflict with the possibility of self-defense or just war.) The rule might be better formulated as 'You should vote, unless you genuinely do not understand the issue you are voting on'. However, even this may not cover all the possible objections. More importantly, it is not as forceful a piece of rhetoric as the...
Time

Is time simply movement? The physicist Brown said that all atoms are always moving. And all what happens simply happens because atoms move, doesn't it? So, if you could stop all atoms from moving, would there still be time?

Nice question. Is it not the case, however, that everything you say is compatible with the proposition 'Time is a dimension or framework within which things happen'? If all the atoms stopped moving then time would carry on, so to speak, but nothing would happen. Similarly, we could suggest that 'time is that which allows the measurement of movement'. If all the atoms stopped moving, there would have to be time for the statement 'they have stopped moving' to make sense.
Art

How is it that we are still able to enjoy works of art, especially literary works, produced hundreds and in some cases thousands of years ago? We can still enjoy, for example, The Epic of Gilgamesh or Homer or Beowulf, despite their having been produced in ancient societies with values and attitudes profoundly different to our own? Does this suggest they uphold certain values or beliefs which are of timeless and enduring importance to human beings?

An excellent question. One can imagine two very different types ofenjoyment that would lead to two very different answers to yourquestion. We might enjoy something because it is familiar, and thusserves to comfort or even reinforce our sense of who we are, and thevalue of who we are. (If I had a choice, I would call this the 'pizzaand beer' theory, after my personal paradigm of what is familiar andenjoyable.) This line of thinking would lend itself to theposition you express in your last question: human productions, evenfrom long ago or far away, rest on a baseline of distinctly humanbeliefs, values or modes of thought that make them in some way'familiar' and thus enjoyable. On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to argue thatsomething alien to me can be enjoyed precisely because it is alien,new, different, or challenging. This suggests that Gilgamesh isenjoyable because it is unfamiliar and continues to resistassimilation into the familiar. These two modes of enjoyment have a certain...
Ethics

Why do most philosophers assume that there is one manner of justifying ethics? Couldn't it be that some ethical principles or rules can be justified by a consequentialist approach, others by an evolutionary approach, still others by a deontological approach and some are just relative to specific cultures?

What a fine question! A few responses suggest themselves. 1. It is not just a case of justifying ethics, as if ethics is standing around waiting for someone to justify it. Rather, it's a case of asking what ethics is in the first place. Thus Plato's famous insistence that he's not after an example but rather the Idea. There are of course many rules we hold ourselves to, or virtues we pursue, that we call 'ethical'. The philosopher will ask 'Is this really what is meant by ethics?' Or is it just a cultural mannerism, an arbitrary law, a convention? 2. Now, in reasoning to an answer to the 'what is ethics?' question, it might be (and often is) that the answer includes a universality criterion. That is to say, part of the meaning of the ethical is that any other way of thinking about the ethical is nonsensical, or is even unethical. This might be the uniqueness of the form of the Good in Plato, the essential characterisation of human beings as rational in Aristotle, or the universalisation of the...
Philosophy

How do you read philosophical texts? Do you try to outline its structure and the parts of its argument from the beginning? Or do you first give the text a quick reading to get a general picture of the whole? Do you approach philosophical articles differently from philosophical books? Finally, if the work is a difficult one from the history of philosophy, do you rely heavily on secondary literature or do you try first to approach the work without the aid of others' interpretations?

My personal strategy, regardless of whether something is a short paper or a book or a difficult classic, is to sit down in a quiet, comfortable, brightly lit place with a large cup of tea, and read. But this may have to do with the fact that I like comfortable places and I like tea. Much more interesting than my personal preferences is whether there ought to be different strategies for approaching different kinds of philosophical texts. I suspect the most important determining factor is not the kind of text, but rather the kind of purposes you, the reader, have in your reading. Are you just trying to get an overview of a position, trying to answer a particular question, engaging in sustained research on a narrowly prescribed problem, or something else? Published philosophy is a resource to be put to work, but there are lots of different kinds of work. Please also see the following question and answers: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/1066
Profession

Is it emotionally difficult to be a professional philosopher? Sometimes philosophical questions and subject matter seem so disturbing and intense, that it must surely be taxing psychologically. Does non-philosophical subject matter become pale and boring in comparison? Are professional philosophers socially isolated because of boredom with the non-philosophical, concomitant with the disturbing nature of the philosophical (so that it may not be acceptable in non-philosophical company)? Thanks.

I'd like to add a comment to Allen Stairs' excellent answer: it is worth distinguishing between philosophers who write about 'angst', and the experience of angst. In existentialism, for example, the experience of anxiety is often considered to be philosophically interesting (the fact that anxiety is experienced shows something, or even that anxiety itself is a form of showing) but not yet philosophy. Moreover, the philosopher (like everyone else) must spend most of the time in a state of everydayness, false consciousness or whatever, enjoying a Gauloise and an espresso in a cafe in the sun -- or if gloomy, for perfectly ordinary reasons.

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