Much depends on what you mean by "the analysis of knowledge." I assume that you mean the attempt to explicate the respect in which knowledge is more than mere true belief, an enterprise that goes back to Plato's Meno . It seems to me that you think that discussion that attempts to fill whatever condition is necessary for knowledge besides mere true belief fails to make contact with what we care about when we care about knowledge. But even that discussion, I submit, seeks to capture the respect in which knowledge is valuable. Apparently the methodology by which this investigation has been conducted doesn't appeal to you--you seem to have doubts about the appeals to intuition in this context. While much ink has been spilled about the philosophical significance of intuitions, it does seem plausible that if one is to try to capture what is distinctive about knowledge, it is at least helpful to begin with clear-cut cases of the phenomenon as a starting point. And it seems to me that the ultimate aim...

Given that it is possible to think rationally, it must be possible also to think irrationally. An analogy with the concept of biological function may usefully illustrate why this is the case. If some part of the body has a function--so, for example, if the heart has the function of pumping blood--it must be possible for it to malfunction, for otherwise the ascription to the heart of the function of pumping blood would not have any normative force. Similarly, insofar as one aims to think in accordance with the norms of thought, it must be possible for one not to think in accordance with those norms, and hence to think irrationally.

You're absolutely right on in how you're thinking about the difference between Kant's approach to moral philosophy and that of his predecessors. Kant's predecessors took morality to be based on something external (such as, for example, God, or the achievement of some end), what Kant called 'heteronomous' conceptions of morality; Kant thought that morality consisted in autonomy , the capacity of rational agents to determine the rightness or wrongness of actions by a law that they gave themselves. (On the relation between Kant's ethics and that of his predecessors, I highly recommend J. B. Schneewind's magisterial The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy .) This law that agents gave themselves, Kant suggested in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals could be tested in particular cases by trying to determine whether one's intention--or, to use Kant's technical term, one's 'maxim'--could be universalized. (Note that there are various formulations of this...

The question of the relation between the judgments of professional critics and those of 'people on the street', as it were, especially with respect to works of mass culture such as movies and--albeit, I think, to a much lesser extent--pop songs, television, and also literature (which I think, even in its 'literary' as opposed to 'pulp' or 'genre' incarnations, is now properly considered part of mass culture)--is a very interesting question, which raises general issues about the reception of art (including 'high' art such as photography, painting, sculpture, theater, etc.), as well as about the relation between art and commerce. It is true that many 'well-received' films have not performed 'well' at the box office--if by 'well' here one means something like making the list of top-ten grossing films now widely referred to by media outlets (a relatively new phenomenon, I might add)--despite receiving considerable critical acclaim. Olivier Assayas's five-hour film, Carlos , which, if I remember...

This question raises a very deep metaphilosophical issue. Before treating it, however, I want to sharpen the question a bit, for you raise several issues that I think need to be distinguished. You might be taken to be asking whether, as a matter of empirical fact, some person who is a professional philosopher or who is now recognized by professional philosophers as a philosopher (but might not have been seen as a professional philosopher because s/he was not a part of the profession of philosophy or because the profession did not exist when the philosopher in question was active), could be an 'early adopter' of new moral beliefs; the third question that you raise might be seen as a corollary of this way of taking your question, asking for a prediction, based on an induction from the history of philosophy, as to whether it should be expected that a philosopher should be an early adopter of some new moral belief. An alternative way of taking your question is as raising the issue of whether philosophical...

I don't think that it is a dumb question either to ask a natural scientist who her favorite scientist is or to ask a philosopher who her favorite philosopher is, although I am inclined to think that there are very different bases for the answers that might be given that reflect differences between philosophy and natural science. To be sure, the question might be taken in different ways: it might be taken to mean, for example, which philosopher or natural scientist one most admires, or with whose work one feels the most affinity, or whom one takes as one's model in doing one's own work. All these forms of the question admit of answers both by the philosopher or the natural scientist. However, it seems to me that there is a sense in which the question could be taken by a philosopher that is not open to a natural scientist (unless the natural scientist is interested in work in the history of the natural science in which she works): the question could be taken to mean which philosopher's work one most...

You raise--in Sartrean terms--the excellent question of whether Sartre engages what contemporary philosophers call 'the problem of free will', the problem, that is, of how, if determinism, according to which every event is caused by some preceding event, is true, agents can be said to make free choices or determine themselves. Recent philosophical answers to this problem fall broadly into three classes: compatibilists believe that even if every event, including human choices, are determined by some preceding event, human beings are nevertheless free; incompatibilists believe that if every event is determined by some preceding event, then only if human choices are not determined by some preceding event can they be free: libertarian incompatibilists believe that human choices are not determined by preceding events, and therefore agents are free, while other incompatibilists believe that because human choices, like all other events, are caused by preceding events, human beings are not free. In light of...

The question 'What is art?' has the form of a classical philosophical question--questions of that form were raised by Socrates in 'early' dialogues such as the Euthyphro --and although this question has received considerable attention from philosophers, it's not universally accepted that this question is indeed well-formed. (It has been claimed, for example, that the concept 'art' is a 'family resemblance concept' that does not admit of a characterization in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under that concept and, hence, that much of traditional aesthetics, has rested on a mistake.) So the question of whether the question, 'What is art?' is indeed a genuine philosophical question is also a philosophical question!! Even if one were to conclude, however, that the question, 'What is art?' does indeed rest on a mistake, it should not therefore be concluded that reflection on the nature of art is not philosophically or artistically illuminating: it might well be argued that...

I take it that rudeness and other violations of social norms do sometimes lead to the one who is rude being sanctioned implicitly--as others avoid that person and tell others that he is rude and inconsiderate--or even explicitly, in cases when one is in a position actually to reprimand the person for this behavior. Depending on what one understands by 'punishment', that can certainly constitute punishment; however, to be sure, that punishment is not normally meted out by legal institutions, because the norms of polite behavior--at least in most twenty-first century industrialized democratic societies--do not have any legal status and so are not enforceable. But the big question is whether even the social punishment that is meted out to those who are rude and inconsiderate, the gradual withdrawal of goodwill from them, is justified: I myself think that rather than shunning the person who is rude or inconsiderate, one should do whatever one can to bring that person in line with social norms. To be sure,...

This is a very interesting nest of questions!! The relation between law and morality has received considerable discussion from philosophers and is a fascinating topic. I treat the first question that you raise, and then turn to the very different question with which you conclude. I myself am not inclined to think that being law abiding has anything to do with one's moral consciousness. In order to be law-abiding, one need only obey the laws. And in order to do this, one need only know the laws, one needn't even understand them. So even basic legal knowledge is not a condition for being a law-abiding citizen. Indeed, it may even be the case that law and morality can come into conflict, in which case moral consciousness would not only not be a sufficient condition for being a law-abiding citizen, it might even lead one to break laws. (Cases of civil disobedience are relevant here. If you haven't read it already, I recommend that you take a look at Thoreau's "Resistance to Civil Government,"...