While on a treadmill at a fitness club, I noticed a woman reading a book with a chapter title, "God Is Everywhere." I asked her how she knew God was everywhere. She said that she knew because she had a strong sense of him. I said that I had the strongest sense imagionable of Santa Clause when I was 8. She said, THAT'S NOT THE SAME THING! However, it is the same thing, is it not? In both cases, the entities are supernatural. In both cases, we have been told by elders to believe in impossible magic with zero empirical evidence. Doesn't it follow then that, just like a child must grow up one day to accept there is no Santa Clause, adults need to come to terms with the truth about their imaginary friend in the sky? Thanks, Jeff

If the concept of God that you are considering is simply an adult version of Santa Claus, then you are correct that just as a child must one accept that there is no Santa Claus, so an adult needs to come to terms with the truth that their is no adult version of Santa Clause, what you call "their imaginary friend in the sky." However, there are concepts of God which are not simply adult versions of Santa Claus, and so even if adults should give up their belief in a God that is an adult version of Santa Claus, it does not follow that they should give up their belief in a different concept of God.

Why does Thomas Hobbes choose "Leviathan" as the model for his Commonwealth? It is, after all, an Old Testament sea-monster that God will slay at the end of conflict. It does not seem a very promising image for an argument in favor of civil society.

In the last paragraph of Chapter 28 of Leviathan, Hobbes explains why he chose "Leviathan" as the model for a commonwealth. "Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government, together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of Job, where God, having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud, 'There is nothing,' saith he, 'on earth to be compared with him, He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him, and is king of all the children of pride.'" [Job 41:33-34]. What is interesting about Hobbes choosing the name "Leviathan" for the reasons he says, is that it shows that Hobbes held that the govenor or sovereign needs so much power, not because man is self-interested or egoistic, but because he is proud. It is because each citizen holds that his own views about justice and...

It is often claimed that certain actions - usually in the field of medical and biological science - amount to 'playing God' insofar as the foundations of life are manipulated and synthesized artifically. However, isn't this merely a rhetorical claim given the impossibility of humans acting as gods? Also, what strength does such the 'playing God' claim have against the irrefutable claim that all knowledge demands risk, and an initial ignorance to provide the impetus for the research?

You are right that saying that someone is 'playing God' is merely a rhetorical claim made by those who oppose the kind of actions that the person is doing are contemplating doing. Since, "given the impossibility of humans acting as gods," as you say, it is a way of saying that you should not do the action because it is inappropriate for a mere human to act in a way that is appropriate only for a god. Insofar as the claim has any force, and it does not have much, it is a warning about making fundamental changes without very carefully considering all of the consequences, long term as well as short term, of making these changes. Many actions have massive unintended consequences, especially those that involve changing how we deal with life and death matters.

Is there a philosophical justification for democracy? It seems that it would have to be an argument from self-interest, but if we ask, "Whose self-interest?" then it would seem that a democracy isn't the best form of government for certain minority groups (e.g., a theocracy might be more in line with the interests of religious fundamentalists). And what if democracies are even downright harmful to, e.g., the elite? Also, a somewhat related question: is there a philosophical justification for taking from the rich and giving to the poor (which it seems is what socialism prescribes)? This question is 'somewhat related' to the previous question in that even if a democracy does benefit all, it certainly deprives certain groups of advantages they might otherwise have, and so, given a history, it cannot actually benefit all equally.

Democracy is a form of government in which the sovereign power is vested in the majority, rather than being vested in a smaller group, such as an aristocracy, or in one person, e.g., a monarchy. A democracy does not necessarily seek to benefit all, indeed Mill talks about the tyrrany of the majority. So a democracy must be limited in some way that prevents such tyranny. The United States seeks to limit democracy by means of the Constitution. I would prefer to say that a democracy must be limited by morality. Given that kind of limitation, a democracy decides among the morally acceptable alternatives by the votes of the majority, either directly or indirectly. One justification of this kind of democracy is that since all of the alternatives are morally acceptable, then it seems appropriate that the decision among these morally acceptable alternatives be made by a majority of the people, rather than by some smaller subclass.

I've been reading some encyclopedia articles on utilitarianism. As far as I can see, utilitarians have moved from (the defence of) the pursuit of happiness to the pursuit of preference satisfaction. A preference is satisfied, I suppose, when someone gets what she or he wants. Now, I think it's reasonable that we ought to try to make people happy, at least in most cases, but I don't think it as reasonable that we ought to try to give people what they want. And anyway, I think that these are two very different ethical theories. Should we call both "utilitarianism"?

There are different forms of utilitarianism, and they have different names. The view that we should aim at the best balance of happiness over unhappiness is often called hedonistic utilitarianism. The view that we should aim at the best balance of desires or preferences being satisfied over desires or preferences being unsatisfied is often called preference utilitarianism. They are both considered forms of utilitarianism because they claim that achieving the best balance of something, either happiness over unhappiness, or desires being satisfied over desires being unsatisfied, is the ultimate criterion for judging the moral rightness or wrongness of an action. Philosophers moved from hedonistic utilitarianism to preference utilitarianism because of the difficulty of coming up with an objective account of happiness, or even one that commanded anything close to universal assent. It was thought that desires or preferences being satisfied was a more objective criterion, and also one that was more tolerant...

Should the retrospective ideas, advice, and wisdom of a dying person be heeded and followed in our own lives? That is, if a dying person wishes they would have lived in a different way, or says that certain things were the most valuable, should we follow this advice, and even change our lives to suit?

There seems to be no more reason to heed the retrospective ideas, advice, and wisdom of a dying person than of that same person when he is not dying. If he is the sort of person who gave good advice previously, then what he says should be heeded; if he is the sort of person who did not give give good advice previously, then his advice shoud not be heeded. There is no reason to believe that dying makes anyone wiser than they were before.

Do you think a government that is becoming (or is) ineffective should be strongly reorganized ("overthrown" is a misleading word)?

Although Hobbes, more than any other political philosopher, takes obedience to the government to be the overriding duty of citizens, he claims that citizens do not have a duty to obey a government that is ineffective, that is, does not provide protection to its citizens. If that is what you mean by ineffective, then it seems clear that the government should be replaced, at least if this can be done without causing even more harm to the citizens of that country. However, if you mean by ineffective, that it does not provide anywhere near the kind of the services that could be provided by a country with that level of resources, then Hobbes would claim that it would be wrong to replace the government. By "replacing" I mean what you mean by "strongly reorganized" or "overthrown." I do not mean by "replacing" voting against the party in power. Citizens should vote against the party in power if it is ineffective in the sense that it does not provide anywhere near the kind of the services that could be provided...

Is it possible to suffer without knowing it? Is pain the only bad thing that can happen to people?

It is clear that pain is not the only bad thing (harm) that can happen to people. For one thing, they can be killed. They can also be disabled or deprived of freedom or pleasure. Being deprived of pleasure is not the same as being caused pain. Obviously, one can be killed in one's sleep and so never know it happened or even that it was going to happen. Generally people know when they are disabled, but people can lose a leg without knowing it right away, if they have been in an accident. If it is a mental disability, that can happen to someone without his knowing, and it may be that he never knows. People can also be deprived of freedom or pleasure with knowing, although usually they will find out about it. With regard to suffering pain, it seems as if people can be in pain without being conscious of it, at least for some period of time. If you mean by "to suffer," to "suffer a harm" and not merely to "suffer pain," then it is clearly possible to suffer without knowing it. And even if you mean by "to...

I have been thinking about the nature of "virtue" as it relates to culture and subcultures. My thought is that a clear way of defining a culture would be to identify the set of virtues that are respected. This would be appropriate with respect to understanding certain political leanings as well. For example, I suspect that many Repubicans would place the virtue of "Constancy" high on their lists, while many Democrats would place "Tolerance" highly. This leads to my question, Has any philosopher proposed a universal set of virtues? There are a couple of ways of looking at this. First, is there a set of virtues that is considered to be universal in that every culture recognizes and appreciates the same set? The second approach is whether there is a larger, yet still finite, set from which one could identify specific virtues that define a specific culture?

There seems to be a set of virtues that every culture recognizes and appreciates, but they may not rank these virtues in the same way. For example, given the appropriate account, it is hard to conceive of a functioning culture that does not regard prudence, temperance, and courage as personal virtues, that is, as virtues that every member of that society would like to have. However, different people in a society and different cultures might rank these three virtues differently, some ranking prudence higher than courage and some the reverse. Similarly, there also seems to be a set of moral virtues that every culture recognizes and appreciates, but they may not rank these virtues in the same way. For example, given the appropriate account, it is hard to conceive of a functioning culture that does not regard truthfulness, dependability, fairness, and kindness as moral virtues, that is, as virtues that every member of that society would like the other members of the society to have. However, different...

Is it wrong to share copyrighted songs and video over the internet? I think the law should be changed to take away the protection of copyright. What do you think?

If it is illegal to share copyrighted songs and video over the internet, then it is morally wrong to share copyrighted songs and video over the internet. Not that it is always wrong to do what is illegal, but in this case, it is rational to hold that the law is a justified law, and except in special circumstances, it is immoral to violate what some impartial rational persons take as justified law. Many people under 21 think it is not wrong for them to drink alcoholic beverages even though that is against the law. However, it is rational to hold that this law is justified, and so it is immoral to violate it. Although both the law against sharing copyrighted songs and video over the internet and prohibiting drinking by people under 21 are rationally regarded as justified laws, it is also rational to hold that these laws should be changed. Rational people, even when they have the same knowledge, do not always agree about what should be done. If one strongly believes the law is a bad one and should be...

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