In first year philosophy, I posed a thought experiment involving breakfast cereal that challenges concepts of God. I have since come across it in other forms, but this was the form in which I posed it. It is this: If God is omniscient, and omnipotent then man cannot have free will. The reason is this: If I have a choice of breakfast cereals to eat for breakfast tomorrow morning then God cannot tell me today which breakfast cereal I will eat, because then I may choose to eat the other breakfast cereal just to make a point. Either God does not know, and so is not omniscient; God cannot tell me, and so is not omnipotent; or I do not have the freedom to choose! I would appreciate your thoughts on this.

(Perhaps this is related to one of Nick's points.) God's knowing what I will choose is compatible with my choice being free. What God might know is what I will freely choose . Perhaps your thought is that if God knows this ahead of time, then I don't have the freedom to choose otherwise. But why not? If talk of God's knowledge is a colorful way of talking about what future tense statement it would have been true to utter in the past (namely, something like "He will choose Raisin Bran tomorrow"), then why think that that constrains one's freedom? Why not say that the future tense statemement that might have been uttered yesterday would have been true precisely because you did (freely) choose the Raisin Bran today? One last thing: if God does indeed know that you will choose the Raisin Bran and God tells you this, is it really possible for you to choose otherwise just to irritate God? Well, it sure seems possible, in the sense that the Special K is within arm's reach, etc. But it's not...

Hello philosophers, If it's acceptable for believers to try to convert people to their religion, is it equally acceptable for an atheist to try and convince people to give up their religious beliefs? Charlie Dunmore

I see no relevant difference. In both cases, it all depends on howpersistent, intrusive, and manipulative the trying is. In so far as theconverting/convincing is none of these, they sound like just the kindof fascinating conversations that contribute to life's interest.

How can the universe always be said to have existed, when there is nothing in the universe that always existed? People, plants, planets - all these things come into existence and then decay and disappear. In other words, every thing in the universe needs a cause for its existence. God, on the other hand, needs no such cause. This is not because he is "causa sui" or "self-caused"(an absurd notion, for how can something that has no being produce it own being?), but rather, he is "sine causa" or "WITHOUT a cause". Something, after all, always had to have existed. This is the Uncaused (call it God), not the Caused (Universe), which is inherently unstable and subject to flux. Scott from Ireland.

Shades of St. Thomas! Is this your thought (in your first twosentences): if everything failed to exist at some time, then at sometime everything failed to exist? (And, the argument might continue,that's impossible, because if at some time there was nothing, there'dbe nothing now, since nothing comes from nothing. Therefore, ourassumption must be mistaken: it must be that not everything fails toexist at some time. That is, there must be at least one thing thatalways exists.) But that's incorrect. Everyone at the United Nationsspeaks some language, but it's not true that there's some language that everyone at the U.N.speaks.

Why do many philosophers posit that there are no members in the set of necessary beings? There seem only two explanations if they are correct: 1) Necessary beings are logically possible, but none exist in this world or 2) Necessary beings are logically impossible. Explanation 1 seems untenable since if a necessary being exists in one world (is logically possible), then it must exist in all worlds (and thus this one) by virtue of its necessity. But explanation 2 (which seems likely the more preferred one) seems to do no better, since the set of necessary beings is made a subset of the set of impossible beings. While perhaps this is merely a trivial case, it still seems unsettling, if not contradictory. Is the existence of at least one necessary being necessary? Or is there some other explanation for how none could exist?

Just a quick comment on your remark about (2). If there are no necessary beings, then the set of necessary beings is empty. The empty set is a subset of every set. (Every element of the empty set is a member of any given set — since the empty set has no elements.) Hence, if there are no necessary beings, the set of necessary beings is indeed a subset of the set of impossible beings, just as it is a subset of any set. I'm not quite sure what an impossible being is, so I'm not quite sure what the set of impossible beings is. It sounds to me like it's another way of describing the empty set. But whatever the set of impossible beings is, we know that, if there are no necessary beings, then the set of necessary beings is a subset of it . I don't see any contradiction here.

The fact that we have eyes is proof that a consciousness was present, prior to our creation, which was aware of the existence of light. And while this truth does not confirm the existence of a God, doesn't it verify an intelligence older than our own?

No, our having eyes doesn't prove that at all. The theory of naturalselection provides an alternative explanation for how our visual systemdeveloped, an explanation that makes fewer assumptions than onethat appeals to a pre-existing "consciousness" (whose own existence andattributes don't require explaining?). For an entertaining expositionof this kind of explanation, you might read Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene .

Recent research seems to indicate that the religious sense is innate. If that is so, wouldn't it be likely to be true of animals as well?

If having a religious sense is innate in humans (and see here for more discussion on the obscurities of this notion), it doesn't follow that it's innate for non-human animals. Perhaps some song repertoires are innate in birds — but don't ask me to sing them.

I hear a lot of people say they believe in God because 'Who made us, the earth and the universe? It had to come from somewhere.' But if that's what you're basing your beliefs on, then shouldn't you want to know the answer to who made God? and who made who made God, and who made that? And shouldn't you be praying 'Oh all the things that made God and all the things that made them?' Ryan Gossger, Pottstown PA

You've made an important observation: explaining something bypostulating the existence of X doesn't take one far if the very samedemand for explanation can be raised about X. Philosophers like to tellthe story of the sage who was asked why the earth didn't fall throughthe heavens. He said: "Because it sits on the back of a giant turtle."His questioner was still a little puzzled and asked the sage what keptthe giant turtle from falling through the heavens. The sage answered:"Ah, you see it's turtles all the way down!" Obviously, turtles all theway down doesn't seem satisfactory. Of course, the sage might insteadhave replied: "This first giant turtle has no need of support!" But ifthat turtle has no need for support, then why not just say that theearth doesn't either? (This kind of argument is common in philosophy;for another application of it, see Question 127 .)

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