Hello. Thank you for reading this. I'm in grave need of philosophical counsel please. I cannot 'get' the distinction between 'a priori' and 'a posteriori'. It seems to me that anything that is known must be, in some way, related to experience. I'm troubled by this thought experiment: If a baby was born with a terrible genetic condition which excluded all the human senses, what would the child 'know'? Without the 'experience' of the senses, what could the child ever know? Not even syllogism would be possible; without experience, language would not be available to the unfortunate child. And I imagine that this would be true of numbers too. Yours truly, Blunderov.

To answer your good question, one needs to distinguish between the role experience plays in the acquisition of knowledge and the role it plays in the justification of knowledge. You're absolutely right that without experience humans would not be able to develop cognitively; they would not be able to acquire knowledge of anything at all. So experience, like oxygen, is needed in order for us to become knowers. But to say that some proposition is known a priori is not in conflict with this claim. To say that some proposition is knowable a priori means that one's justification of the claim need make no reference to information obtained through the senses. We can justify Pythagoras' Theorem without any information provided by our sense organs (take a look at any proof of it and you'll see that this is so). Hence, it is knowable a priori – even though no one could have known it unless they had had the experiences needed in order for their minds to develop.

Are there any great literary stylists in philosophy? Its analytical nature would seem to militate against this i.e., trying to express difficult ideas as intelligibly as possible. Some may have (but the only ones I can think of are in translation and far from what the panel go in for) and are usually aiming for a 'felt' response such as Nietzsche, Kierkergaard, Plato's account of the death of Socrates, and so on. Wittgenstein seemed to like portentous statements (again I only know him in translation and couldn't really understand him) such as 'The world is all that is the case' and 'Whereof we cannot speak thereof we must pass over in silence'. Was he trying to sound gnomic and literary while conducting philosophical analysis? I teach English and use Russell's lay writings as models of concision and eloquence in style. I also use extracts from Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' to show how not to write! Someone told me Sartre had had no training in logic hence his tedious verbosity. I also consider Martin...

Two mention just two further wonderful writers in English: J.L. Austin has a very powerful voice. And W.V. Quine has an extraordinary style about which much could be said. (And I would not call Wittgenstein's style "portentous". Pitch perfectly resonant, yes.)

I am stuck on a decision that I hope one of you can help me with. I am graduating in June (2006) and everyone is telling me to go to college. I am currently protesting college - thinking that if I self-teach myself (by reading many books), then I could possibly gain more knowledge than if I am sitting in a classroom with many other students. I am stubborn with this idea. I assume that with a teacher in a classroom full of students, (s)he is teaching the subject, not the people. (I hope that makes sense.) I am not too sure if my thinking is something I should go by, or if I should just grow up and go to college. Any opinion would be great.

Going to college isn't just being in a structured reading program. Ideally, at college, your reading will be guided and given an intelligent shape; it will be enhanced by background information, by probing questions and arguments, by stimulating alternative interpretations (from your teachers and your fellow students); your thoughts about your reading will be refined as you learn to express them to others, both orally and in writing; your ability to engage in critical evaluation will be sharpened by weighing your own thoughts against the proposals' of others (as will your sense of fallibility); and you will be exposed to subjects that you cannot readily teach yourself and no doubt to others whose existence you hadn't even suspected.

Consider the statement, "There exists at least one true statement." Is a demonstration of the truth of this statement possible, which does not assume the statement's truth? If so, what is that demonstration? If not, does it then follow that certain knowledge - that is, knowledge that is conscious of itself as knowledge - is impossible?

The truth of "There is at least one true statement" (*) follows logically from the claim that " S is a true statement" (**), where S is some particular statement. So if we could establish (**) without presupposing the truth of (*), we would have answered your first question affirmatively. Let S be the statement "There is a pen on my desk now." Observation tells me that S is true. It seems that I can know that S is true, i.e., that (**) is the case, without the need to assume that (*) is the case. Hence, I can establish the truth of (*) in a non-circular fashion.

I often find myself to be impatient, often frustrated, when people claim something to be 'obvious', and never more than when I think that they are using it incorrectly. An example of this might be "obviously, Hitler was an evil man", or "obviously, it's better to be poor and happy than rich and sad" - this is because I wish justification for their claim, and do not want to simply accept it (in these cases because of popular opinion). I realise that both of these examples are ethical, but is there anything that is understood by philosophers to be obvious (and by obvious I mean without need of qualification or justification)?

There is an old story told about the famous mathematician X [insert favorite famous mathematician's name]. X had just claimed in class that some result was obvious when a student raised her hand and expressed some uncertainty. X looked puzzled, then sat down and began to think. Minutes, then hours, went by while X was deep in thought. The class period was just about over when X raised his head and triumphantly proclaimed: "Yes, I was right: it is obvious!" The joke here is related to what makes your question a little peculiar. You want a justification for some claim that is being advanced as obvious? Its being so advanced presumably indicates that the speaker believes it to be in less need of justification than any premises he might offer in an argument for its justification. Furthermore, if justification consists of an argument, then it must have premises (or starting assumptions) that are not themselves argued for. And the justification will fail to be persuasive if the hearer does...

I read somewhere that, in her professional lifetime, Martha Nussbaum has averaged 3-5 published pages per day. This raises two questions: 1) Wouldn't that make her a great panelist candidate for this site (not exactly a philosophical question, I admit)? And 2) what is the relationship between prodigious output of thought and quality/clarity of thought? In trying to read Nussbaum on my own, I find that she has some really great nuggets, but there is a lot of sifting before I find them (_Upheavals_of_Thought_ as a case in point). This seems problematic. Moreover, does the process of publishing sometimes work to diminish originality of thought (generally) and/or dilute the acuminity of thought? I suppose this melds into a third question: how has philosophy changed in relation to the changing dynamic of publishing (from an emphasis on treatises like books to shorter journal articles - and THIS as an effect of 'publish or perish')? And what may we say of this change - is it a 'good' change; what does...

I sent this query to Martha Nussbaum, who was kind enough to reply: I work very hard, and I never never read blogs or write on them. (I'm answering this question through an e mail message, and I have no intention of ever reading a blog.) I also have been very lucky to have a lot of leave time, and wonderful students to whom I can present my work in progress. Nonetheless, the average figure you quote seems to me rather ridiculous, and I am sure it is simply invented. As for clarity versus quantity: Upheavals of Thought was the product of about fifteen years of work, so I suppose it ought to take a relatively long time to read and understand also. It is highly interdisciplinary, so that the reader has to take a serious interest in psychology, literature, music, and other relevant disciplines. I think most philosophers today are rather badly trained in the humanities: thus it is not surprising to me that the most incisive discussion of the book came from the late Richard Wollheim, a man of...

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