As for the first question, I do (as it happens) work on a college campus in which my office is in an ivory covered building with a tower, and there are some Greek sculpture here and there on my floor, though the most common things (except for other professors, students, books, furniture) in our department are dozens and dozens of owls (symbol or wisdom), owl statues or as dolls, etc. But speaking to the ivory tower as a metaphor, I think philosophers today and certainly at many points historically, very much engage the world and culture at large. Socrates did philosophy at the market place, and now there are many philosophers who seek to engage others through popular culture, their courses that involve very practical moral concerns (e.g. bio-medical ethics, environmental ethics, courses on just war theory and so on), and in publications that have a wide, educated readership (e.g. New York Review of Books, Times Literary Supplement, and so on). On the second point, I think it is rare to find a...

I believe that in some bookstores "metaphysics" is used to classify books that are "new age," but, technically, in philosophy or for most philosophers, the domain of metaphysics refers to theories of what exist. In this usage, metaphysics is hard to avoid. For a good defense of this outlook, see E.J. Lowe's The Possibility of Metaphysics. Some metaphysical systems accept what may be called the "supernatural" (God, the soul), other systems of metaphysics may be pretty materialistic, e.g. the view that the only thing that exists are matter and energy. Accounts of what can be demonstrated rationally concerns the domain of epistemology (theories about knowledge and what can be known or justifiably believed). I personally think there are good, rational reasons for accepting some forms of metaphysics and rejecting others. For a good book on this, see Lowe's follow up book Metaphysics or Michael Loux's Metaphysics, or the Routledge Companion to Metaphysics (which just came out in paperback).

Dear Pasquale, Yes, this is a question that exercised the earliest philosophers in Ancient Greece (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle). It is sometimes referred to as the problem of akrasia, which is the Greek term for weakness of will. Some of these early philosophers thought that ignorance is the key. People often do bad things because (basically) they don't know any better (or what counts as the good). A somewhat related view (taken up later by Augustine and Aquinas) is that when a person does something bad, he is actually (at least at the time of the act) pursuing something he believes (or he has deceived himself into believing) is actually justified or not wrong. So, on this view, a person might tell himself (and even tell the world) that he is only seeking justice, when in actuality he is a tyrant seeking revenge. Or, someone who in general thinks that adultery and stealing are wrong, gets himself to think that in these particular circumstances, the act is ok. Others, such as St. Paul in the New...

A great question! I believe (perhaps wrongly) that the question, especially the last one, does not have a single, general answer, however there are factors we can identify and find some agreement about. Some of these factors seem to involve loyalty, reasonable expectations, gratitude, fairness, and the availability of alternative employers and employees. So, in terms of loyalty: if a worker has faithful in executing her job and done so with integrity and then requests that, say, the uncomfortable temperature of a room be adjusted or that there be longer and more regular breaks in order to prevent injury due to tiredness, the burden would seem to be on the employer to change, whereas if the employer requested regular, fully paid trips to Disney world there would seem to be little reason to take this seriously. Matters of fairness might also rightly give reason for an employer to change; imagine an employee works with others who are free riders (not pulling their fair share) or, worse, what some call...

Great question. I suppose that the general assumption in liberal democracy is that there should be a presumption of liberty in most areas of life except in cases of harm or extreme offense or in some cases where there is a substantial risk of avoidable suffering. So, in most states in the USA I believe that motorcyclists do not have a choice about whether to wear a helmet, something that may reduce head injuries. And motorists are required to wear seat belts in order to cut down on harm. These do not appear to me to be cases of when the state is acting as a "nanny' --a metaphor (I take it) of treating adults as though they are children. These might be good cases of when the government rightly eases the burden of personal responsibility on citizens (to use your language). And perhaps the government rightly restricts the freedom of people to make some choices such as the choice of whether to sell organs or blood or (in an extreme case) their very freedom (slavery is illegal, even if an individual...

You certainly have asked THE big question! Many religious thinkers do believe that there is a meaning to life and a purpose as well. For a good representation of a broadly Christian point of view (but one that would be satisfying to traditional Jews, Muslims, and some Hindus) you might check out Mark Wynn's book God and Goodness. In this philosophy, you and the cosmos as a whole exist because it is good that you and the cosmos exist; moreover, it is created by an all good God whose purpose for creating was to being about goodness. I personally adopt such a position, but many fellow philosophers do not, either because they simply deny that there is a God or they are suspicious about objective values like goodness. But leaving aside religious concerns, if you simply recognize values like happiness (or flourishing) then you will find yourself among many philosophers (religious and secular) who think that a big part or the meaning of life (its point) is for there to be human flourishing, and going...

This is a deep question or set of questions! The history of the philosophy of motion is fascinating as is the general philosophy of space and time. There are historically significant arguments to the effect that to account for motion in the cosmos, one needs to posit an unmoved mover --God (as developed in the work of Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century). If you are interested in this line of reasoning, you may wish to take a look at more recent articulations of the cosmological argument: you can find these in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy under 'Cosmological Arguments' and in the entry 'Philosophy of Religion' --entries are free and available online (as this website makes clear). These entries will speak to your sense that something more is needed to account for space-time as currently conceived. There may be two things to keep in mind as you reflect on the philosophy of motion. First, while motion is not a thing in the sense that it is not a concrete individual object (a rock) it is not...

This is a great and complex matter. There are a few philosophers of art who come close to an "anything goes" approach to the meaning of a work of literature, but most of us think there are some boundaries in terms of historical context, the intentions of the artists, and most importantly the content of the work of art itself. You might consider a distinction that some find useful between the meaning of a work of art and the significance of a work of art. In terms of significance, a work of literature might have all sorts of features depending on how the work is experienced. Reading Jane Austin might lead me to become a Marxist and someone else to become a Hindu, and so on, but while the book could have such multiple, different significant effects, to get at the meaning of her work we would need to study the plot, characters, England and continental Europe at the time, the English style she used, and so on.... Once we take those factors into account we can see (or I wager we will see) that her work...

Wonderful question! There are some philosophers who are very committed to a form of determinism that rules out free agency and a thesis that seems quite contrary to common sense, namely that the self is an illusion or construct and not a real, substantial individual thing. For some of these philosophers, the idea that one might freely control one's body or one's agency is the equivalent of thinking we can do magic. I think Owen Flanagen believes that radical free will (in which a person could engage in libertarian free will) is like magic, and Daniel Dennett as well. But many of us are on the other side and believe that it is natural and plausible to think that we can act and have the power not to act in ways that are morally responsible or blameworthy. For a great book on this, check out Mawson's Free Will; A Guide for the Perplexed or Daniel Robinson's book On Praise and Blame. Going on a bit further on the themes in you question magic and control I suppose the concept of the magical today...

Great question that gets to the heart of a current debate! If you have a very narrow concept of logic (in which logic only refers to the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle) and if your notion of observation is again narrow perhaps only allowing in empirical data then perhaps it is neither logical nor illogical to mourn the death of someone. BUT, you may have a broader concept of observation. For example, in your question you refer to "a loved one." Can one observe the fact that a person is worthy of love or should be loved? I personally think one can. In that case, it would be quite logical (you would be acting with consistency) for you to act in a way that is appropriate when one's beloved one dies. On this expanded front, imagine you truly love Skippy and desire her or his happiness; that is, you believe it would be good for Skippy to be happy and bad if Skippy were to die before fulfilling the desires of his or her heart. Then, surely, it appears you should...