This is a central question in the philosophy of art! There is what is known as the institutional theory of art advanced by George Dickie, according to which a work of art is an artifact that is recognized as art by what he called the Artworld (a world that would definitely include museums and galleries). I suggest that the institutional theory is not the most promising, for it does not speak to what it is about artifacts that makes them interesting to museums. (For Dickie's views, see his book Art and the Aesthetic for an early version of the institutional account). But beyond that, I do think that settings such as a museum or gallery can make a difference to one's aesthetic experience of an object, partly because these institutions generate certain expectations and often convey information about the history of the objects. But there does not have to be a difference. Some works of art on a neighbor's wall might look just as beautiful or ugly, original or derivative, witty or flat footed, as they...

Interesting! I am not acquainted with the term "neoliberalism," but I think you are correct that Kant's notion of freedom was not developed with an eye to consumer / market choices. However, his view of freedom, autonomy in general, and both versions of the categorical imperative would have implications for one's behavior in the market, e.g. one would not have a healthy market if there was no promise-keeping, for example. For Kant's views on politics and markets and freedom, you might look at his work on history from a cosmopolitan point of view. You will find something like the liberalism of Adam Smith at work, the idea being that if persons are rational in their pursuit of interests the good of the whole will be served. FYI : Kant's work on history influenced President Wilson and his aim of spreading democracy throughout the world with the help of the League of Nations (a term that I believe was used by Kant). Perhaps a good counter-point to what you are calling "neoliberalism" may be...

Very interesting! I suspect that you are quite correct that the advent of birth control has done much to alter many people's assessment of the meaning of sex. And it may be that (depending on the kind of birth control used) some of the ethical implications of sex has changed. So, insofar as you can divorce sex and pregnancy, the ethics involving child-birth may be put to one side. But if you look at work on the philosophy of love from the medieval era (roughly from Augustine onward) to this day, there remains in place a tradition that sees what is called "lust" as a kind of degenerated passion. Someone who lusts after another may use the word "love," but in lust one largely seeks self-gratification and perhaps even a sort of possession over someone else rather than truly valuing the beloved for her or his own sake. For an excellent overview of the difference between love and lust, you might check out the book Love and Western Tradition by Denise de Rougemont. On the ethics of prostitution, I...

Great question! The journal Teaching Philosophy has been publishing for decades on different ways to best teach philosophy, and that journal might be a gold mine for you in terms of creative ideas. One of the latest developments is that a great deal of philosophers have been bringing philosophy into play with popular culture. William Irwin had done a great deal on this with Blackwell (now Wiley-Blackwell publishers) and he has an edited volume that brings together some of the best work on all this. I am not sure whether specific exercises are employed, but the major series he edits, and similar series with Open Court Publishers and the University Press of Kentucky might be excellent resources. OneWord Press (UK) has one, probably two books that offer philosophical puzzles to ponder: approximate title, Why is it wrong to eat people? Ted Honderich has a textbook on thought experiments with great questions for students. And you might even check out Gareth Matthews work on philosophy for children. I...

Not having the text in front of me, I may not be the best guide, but I believe that there are two parts to the argument. One is what might be called a reality principle. There cannot be more reality in the effect than in the cause; the idea of God is the idea of a perfect being and it is unreasonable to believe that the cause of this idea may be something less perfect (ourselves or, more specifically, our minds. Descartes also holds that the idea of existence and and the idea of God are inseparable --like the idea of a mountain and valley. God, then (if God exists) exists necessarily and not contingently. Given that God's existence is possible and hence not impossible, it follows that God exists necessarily. It may sound bizarre, but I actually think the later is a good argument and defend it several places, e.g. Evidence and Faith (Cambridge University Press) and Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide (UK: OneWorld Press).

That's a great question! I suppose the idea is that without death, there would be urgency or boundary to our lives. Perhaps people think that part of what makes relationships important is that they will end. Maybe, too, there is a general, biological point, it would be hard for anything to live without death even a vegetarian needs to live on plants that are no longer alive. But the question might be adjusted somewhat: granted there is (perhaps inevitably there has to be death, but is it inevitable or necessary that that there can be no afterlife (at least for persons)? Is an afterlife possible (as is believed by billions of people historically and today, certainly in some of the great world religions) and what impact would an afterlife have on our values in this life? There is a fascinating literature on this. Bernard Williams has a famous essay to the effect that an afterlife would be (ultimately boring and so it would be irrelevant to the values of this life. I have a less famous essay "Why we...

When you write about "who decides? who prioritizes?" it sounds as though you are referring to legal rights. While some ethical theories of rights do appeal to contracts and social agreements, much of the philosophy of rights appeals to nature, human nature specifically, or to duties, which are not a matter of convention. So, assuming that we human beings do have a right to life and this is foundational (it entails that others have a duty not to murder me, for example), this is not something normally thought of in terms of a person or group of people deciding we have such a right. In any case, whether legal or ethical, some rights are considered more fundamental because they explain more particular rights. So, it is natural to think that the right of self-expression is more fundamental than my right to write a letter about my beliefs, because the first right explains the latter. Your having a right to liberty (within constraints) is more foundational than your right to start walking toward the setting...

Yes, many philosophers have conducted investigations into different concepts or themes other than those investigated by Foucault. Lad Sessions, for example, has done a good book on the concept of faith, outlining philosophically significant different notions of faith and, more recently, he has looked at the concept of honor (the book is called Honor For Us and is published by Continuum), Douglas Hedley has done some great work on the idea of the imagination, and the like. I am in the midst of being the co-editor with Chad Meister, The History of Evil with Acumen Press, a six volume work involving about 100 scholars who will look at "the history and changes of a concept," namely the concept of evil. Alas, it will probably not come out to 2014, but this might be something of interest.

Good question and good suggestion! Beginning with the last point, there are philosophers who love self-refuting arguments, the most famous being the Cartesian (and Augustinian) proposal that claims such as "I do not exist" have a habit of self-destructing. But some philosophers (and not a few poets) have sometimes introduced a narrow conception of 'rationality' in contrast to the emotions or experiences that seem to defy easy rational analysis, e.g. experiences that are moral, aesthetic or religious. So, when Pascal claimed that "the heart has its reasons whereof reason knows nothing" he was still appealing to reason but in contrast with what you might call abstract, emotionless rationality. This is probably best seen, not as a philosopher recommending we be irrational, but that we not be restricted to a narrow concept of the rational. On this point, a follower of Pascal might be in the same company with romantic poets such as Wordsworth or Coleridge and Blake or even St. Thomas Aquinas. All these...

Excellent question or set of questions! The Ancient Greeks were especially vexed by this concern, some of them (like the Stoics) stressing happiness as something that is almost always an internal matter, but those influenced by Greek tragedy tended to take the opposite view (chance or fate can have a major impact). Probably the best book on this historically and as a substantial question on its own is The Fragility of Goodness; Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy by Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge University Press, 1986). I suspect that some kind of middle ground is the most reasonable: your flourishing or happiness cannot be entirely internal (it would be hard to be happy while being slowly tortured to death), but it cannot be entirely external (we can imagine a chap having the best conditions possible and yet responding with spiteful unhappiness). As for your general question on happiness, the current debate is quite interesting! Some philosophers are impressed by some empirical evidence...