There are a few points to consider: first, the challenge of understanding another's point of view. Second, knowing without any doubt whatsoever another's point of view. The later is sometimes connected with what philosophers call the problem of other minds or, more recently, it has been called the zombie problem. How do you know that all of those around you who appear to be thinking, feeling, conscious persons are actually mindful, conscious beings? Could they all be zombies? Few philosophers worry about this as a real possibility but there are philosophers who think that such a state of affairs is logically (or metaphysically) possible (however unlikely) and this leads them to certain conclusions in their philosophy of human nature (sometimes such thought experiments have been used to argue that consciousness is something more than anatomy and behavior). In any case, I suspect it would be quite rare to come across someone who could not understand the points of view of other people. If we were...

That is an excellent question that has fascinated philosphers from the beginning in the west. Socrates seems to have equated knowing an act is good with desiring it, and reasoning that if someone desires X they must (on some level) both think it good and do the act or try to do it (unless constrained internally by an injury, for example or some external constraint, e.g. chains). From a Socratic point of view, the person who seems to be in the situation of thinking jogging is good but electing not to jog (without good reason) must (on some level) think that jogging is not (or not always) good. For he or she to remain watching TV rather than go running, the person must think something like: in this case, it is ok because running can be dangerous and I might be hit by a car or [whatever]....and so it is perfectly fine for me to wait until tomorrow to go for a run. The greeks called this apparent liability for us not to do what we think we should akrasia, a term that is usually translated as "weakness of...

Actually philosophers have written quite a bit about love, and the different kinds of love. You can see this in Plato and Aristotle on up through Kierkegaard (who wrote an important book called Works of Love) to the present (I have a "popular" book called Love. Love. Love. And Other essays on Life, Love, and Death, with Cowley Press). And while you may not always see abundant uses of the word "love" in ethics, much of ethical inquiry in philosophy may be understood as an inquiry into what to love and what not to love. Among the many questions philosophers have wrestled with concerning love, they have considered: what is the difference between loving a person and loving her or his qualities? what is the difference between romantic and non-romantic love? can love create values (that is, can your loving a person or thing confer some additional value on the person or thing)? if a friendship ends (e.g. either through disagreement or lack of energy), was there ever a friendship in the first place? does...

What a wonderful question! It would be great to launch a social experiment in which this question was addressed, e.g. in certain parts of the world large sums could be made available for students to go on to do philosophy life-long and compare regions where there is less money in the offing. I suspect that if there was more money in philosophy, more people would practice the discipline and some people with native good philosophical skills who have chosen other fields due to monetary reasons might stick to philosophy. I believe Bertrand Russell observed that in his day many of the brightest, most promising philosophical students chose non-philosophy fields due to money and politics. More recently, John Searle remarked that the key to a movement in philosophy was youth and funding. That said, many of us in the field of philosophy are not in it for the money. I haven't met a philosopher (yet) who claimed they were in it for the money, but I don't think I have met many philosophers who would complain if...

HIstorically and today, most who practice aesthetics treat the aesthetic as involving more than works of art. The term "aesthetics" was introduced in the 19th cedntury to stand for sensory experience and only later came to be used in a way that was specific to works of art, but most of the important works in the field of aesthetics (like Kant's Critique of Judgment) think of (for example) treat the natural world in aesthetic terms. The definition of "aesthetic" is not air tight, however, but I suggest its most common usage denotes the emotive features of objects. An excellent book on the aesthetic in general, and works of art in particular, is Gary Iseminger's The Aesthetic Function of Art (Cornell University Press, 2004). While Dewey did a great job in highlighting the aesthetics of life outside the world of art (he was highly critical of some of the museum cultures of his day), some philosophers are swayed by what they see as non-aesthetic features of artwork. On this front, you might want to...

You have asked: who else writes about the mythical dimension of life from a philosophical vantage [point]? Ralph Harper would be good to check out (try his book Sleeping Beauty). He does some interesting philosophical and theological work on fairy tales, but his work does bear on what you might call the mythical (deep use of symbolism that resonates with the kinds of material you would find in the (highly recommended) The Oxford Companion to World Mythology (OUP, 2005)). Richard Wollheim might also be good. His writing is difficult (but not as challenging as Hegel!); you might check out The Thread of Life and The Mind and Its Depths. Jonathan Lear is also a contemporary philosopher who is sensitive to mythology (he combines philosophy and psychoanalysis). The philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch might also be interesting, as she defends a fairly optimistic, contemporary, secular form of Platonism which may be seen as anti-tragedy. Check out her books The Sovereignty of the Good (1970) and The Fire...

It is an honor to address this question as Nozick was one of my professors (and I must say he was an outstanding, funny, wise teacher). On my dear professor: You may be right about Nozick, though he did allow for a minimal state which would have required some (again, perhaps minimal) taxation and thus Nozick may have thought some forced labor is (as I think it is) sometimes quite justified. On the difference between slavery and forced labor and whether forced labor is always objectionable: I suggest that slavery and forced labor differ, as you could have a slave whom you do not compel to engage in labor / work and you could compel someone to work whom you do not claim as your personal property. There might be emergency conditions when, for example, you are on a boat in a storm and the captain requires everyone to work to save the ship (imagine any who refulse to work are thrown overboard). Many people believe that when a nation is under attack, that nation may (rightly) elect to compel its...

Great questions! First, I suggest that a person who feels compelled to use the term "dumb" to describe others may be doing so out of their own insecurity (why feel the need to put others down, unless perhaps to feel superior?), but more importantly using the term "dumb" in that way seems pretty insulting just by itself. Saying someone does not seem very bright is much better (I think) than calling someone dumb or stupid or an idiot or (even) slow. So, to begin to get to your last question, I suggest you might want to avoid thinking or saying that your aunt is dumb for thinking others are dumb! (This would involve simply trading insults.) But I think you might well be warranted in not respecting her being so judgmental, and this can be done while still respecting her as a person and as your aunt. I think there is a difference between making a judgment and being judgmental; the latter seems to involve excessive blaming or being condescending. Going out on a limb, I wonder if there is an indirect...

These are great questions! Some works of art seem quite anchored in the material world. Arguably, a marble statue like the David is in Florence. But poems, plays, novels, musical compositions, and so on do seem more elusive. Some philosophers who might be called Platonists tend to think that poems, plays, and the like are not themselves physical events or objects. On this view, the Iliad may be thought of as an abstract object that can be acted out, recited, written down, remembered, loved or hated, but the epic poem is not itself a physical thing. I am very much drawn to such a position and have defended it (in a short book called Aesthetics; A Beginner's Guide), but many philosophers resist recognizing abstract, non-physical objects. Such philosophers (who might be called nominalists or conceptualists) might have to identify the Iliad as a complex cultural object that has multiple linguistic and social dimensions. For them, the Iliad's status may depend upon an on-going social practice, but for...

Yes, this is very much an important philosophical matter. Inquiry into why one exists usually involves a combination of metaphysics (inquiry into what exists) and value theory. There are two major schools of thought about why you or the cosmos exists, and multiple alternatives in between. On the one hand there are teleological accounts of the cosmos, according to which you and the cosmos exist for some purpose or value. In many religions (e.g. Judaism, Christianity, Islam), this purpose or value is goodness itself. To put things a bit simply, the reason why the cosmos (including you) exist is because it is good (or, putting it differently, it is better that the cosmos exists rather than not exist). These relgions generally understand God as essentially good and thus beleive that the cosmos (despite its evil) is the result and is sustained by a good divine reality. On the other hand, there are non-teleological accounts of the cosmos, which claim that there is no purposive end or value as to why...