This is a tough matter. The classic paper on this you might cite is Thomas Nagel's "What is it Like to Be a Bat" PHilosophical Review 1974, reprinted in Mortal Questions, Cambridge 1979, 165-180. Nagel argued that a behavioral (and anatomical, third-person) analysis of bats would not disclose / capture / reveal the conscious state of what it is like to be a bat (the qualia involved). T.L.S. Sprigge came up with a similar line of reasoning at roughly the same time. I believe you may find his work in the OUP volume The Importance of Subjectivity. I actually think that behaviorists and their descendents (functionalists) do fail on this count to get at the intrinsic nature of subjective experience. Most of us (or so I believe) who take up this position hold that subjective states of consciousness are immediately apparent and (in a sense) require no argument on their behalf. Perhaps the best reply is the claim that those of us who appeal to qualia leave us with something entirely mysterious from...

Great question. According to most virtue theorists (in the tradition of Aristotle) and Kantians, the action is (at a minimum) tarnished, reflecting a serious impairment. It might be added, too, that in the tradition of some religious ethics, the act would not be praise-worthy if the motives are not praise-worthy. There is even a technical term in Christian ethics for this: good acts that are done for ill motives like the desire to avoid punishment are called acts of attrition as opposed to acts of contrition in which a person might reform or do some act or repentance for good reasons. Having said all that, I might add that if I was the elderly parent and there was no other way for me to receive care except from the likes of Goneril and Regan (two daughters who profess to love their father in Shakespeare's King Lear, when they only want his power) I might be tempted to accept the care gratefully. Perhaps the case is no different from imagining one is drowning and the only person who can and will rescue...

Great question! For years, I have worked with the following ideas. Simply to have some view of the world (its nature and values) is to have a philosophy. So, in a way, everyone who has some understanding of themselves and values has a philosophy. Beyond that, I suggest the practice of philosophy involves in critical exploration of one's worldview, taking into account the reasons behind it, comparing it with other views of reality, and the like. Leaving matters there, however, do not seem to go far enough because (as your question hints at) historically philosophers are supposed to be lovers of wisdom (the literal meaning of 'philo' and 'sophia'), and so what I think we need to add is that insofar as one's world view and investigation is colored by deceit, vanity, envy, merely the desire to impress others, one is failing to live up to the practice of philosophy which (I suggest) should involve humility, a commitment to think fairly (not mis-represent those you are arguing against, for example), to...

Very interesting! In the case you describe, the conclusion seems quite plausible. We might even think the firefighter worse than an "average person" or a gang member because we (perhaps rightly) think the firefighter should know and act better, especially given that he has in the past shown so much respect for human life. Still, there are cases in which we do sometimes overlook minor wrongs in the case of persons who have otherwise lived exemplary lives of virtue. I believe that Martin Luther King, Jr. was not always faithful to his wife and plagarized parts of his doctoral dissertation, but it would seem very small minded to hold these against the man who led such a radical movement on behalf of Black Americans and for the cause of fairness and integration. Gandhi, apparently, was not a good father (he was not abusive, per se, but not commendable), but this again seems very minor and of only minimal significance, given the greatness of Gandhi's achievement. If we imagine King and Gandhi did...

Thank you for your kind words about this site! And I congratulate you on taking on Parfit's work. It is not easy! Parfit is very keen to avoid confusing personal (even eccentric) likes and dislikes from an appeal to what he sees as objective, normative reasons that should appeal to all people. In his most recent work, a two volume book called On What Matters, he makes this (I find amusing) confession: "I hate the feeling of touching velvet, the sound of buzzing house-flies, and the flattening deadening effect of most overhead lights"! What he seeks to do (in the book you are working through, but especially in On What Matters) is to distinguish cases like smoking which he thinks all of us have a reason to avoid and these more personal dislikes. I think you have put your finger on a problem that vexes a range of moral theories that work with a concept of human flourishing and goodness. Some accounts allow for what might be considered moderate self-harm or at least not optimal living (e.g. I think...

Excellent set of concerns! The history of communitarianism is a bit complex; the term was first introduced by a German sociologist F. Tonnies (d1936), but the term did not really get a lot of philosophical attention until we get the mature work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. I suspect that the form of communitarianism is a very radical one that rules out appeal to concepts of human flourishing that may be used to critique or evaluate communities. Both MacIntyre and Taylor stress the vital importance of communities as philosophically significant contexts for moral, religious, and political reflection but both embrace moral theories that go beyond what a community happens to value. Although I am not positive, MacIntyre seems closest to an Aristotelian perspective in his latest work. Taylor may lean a little more toward the Platonic tradition, but for both of these figures who have promoted communitarianism, religious values (both philosophers are Roman Catholic) are viewed as having a great...

I wager that most philosophers would say 'no.' In fact, the term "genetic fallacy" is used when someone seeks to discredit a view due to its origin (or genesis) and if you were to say some professor's philosophy lacks merit because he assaults a student, you would probably be told that you are making an ad hominem argument (an argument against the person and not what the person argues or believes). A classic case in the 20th century has been to condemn Heidegger's philosophy because he was (at least for a while) a Nazi. Still, if someone is unfair and unjust in their action, I suggest that is one reason to raise a question about whether the person has been unjust or unfair in his thinking or beliefs. If I fail to respect my students--important people whom I am supposed to respect and honor-- I think that would be a good reason to question whether I have respected and honored the very practice of philosophy. It is also worth noting that there is a tradition in philosophy going back at least to...

There have been a number of philosophers in the Platonic tradition who have attended to sadness and the whole order of emotions in terms of proper pleasure and pain. You can find the latter in Aristotle, and more explicitly in Augustine's idea that there is an ideal order of love (ordo amoris), proper things we should feel delight or sadness in. In the modern era, one of the more fascinating philosophers to think systematically about values in the Platonic tradition (but he is no commentator on Plato, he is working out a novel ethic) is Max Scheler (1874-1928). You might find his book Formalism in Ethics and the Non-Formal Ethics of Value fascinating.

Interesting! There are significant numbers of self-identified "religious persons" throughout the world in different philosophy departments. You may find mostly Muslim philosophers in countries where the culture is Islamic, but that is not always true, as can be seen in the UK and USA. My own school includes a Hindu professor who shares a position with the religion and philosophy and you can find a guide to the many Christian philosophers working in the English-speaking world by looking at the Society of Christian Philosophers website. As for philosophy and spirituality, there are a few secular philosophers who have sought to promote a kind of spirituality without any religious affiliation or theistic framework (this was a project of Robert Solomon, for example). For a fascinating essay by one of the greatest living philosophers on the desire for some kind of spirituality, you should check out Thomas Nagel's essay "Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament." I think this is on his NYU ...

Looks very promising! You might want to adjust the first premise. First, you might want to refer to "some nonhuman animals." The notion of "critically interpret" seems a little awkward. Are you here asserting that some nonhuman exercise reason or that they involve higher order evaluations of some sort (e.g. they not only interpret situations but they critically do so)? I am on your side in this matter with respect to some nonhuman animals; great apes and dolphins seem to have higher order thoughts (they can recognize themselves in mirrors for example and have some powers of communication that is very close to language). If you are trying to reach P3, perhaps all you need in P1 is that some nonhuman animals suffer, and that thesis would seem to be supported on the grounds of analogy with humans --their brain and nervous system and ostensible pain-avoidance behavior is similar to our own. In P2 you might need to claim that it is not just morally unjustified to inflict pain (or suffering? some...