I want to define something which I'll call object X. I have to come up with a sentence, but how can I tell that the sentence will be right? I can't compare my attempt with the definition of X of course, because there is no definition of X - the definition of X is the very thing I'm trying to find out. It seems I have to know what X is in order to find out what X is - paradox?

I once asked a physics Q&A site, "Is physical reality possible without an observer?" They told me it was to broad of a question, and I got no answer. But from a philosophical or metaphysical stand point, is there an answer? I'm aware of the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM, and it's requirement of observation and measurement for existence of macroscopic structure to be. If, in philosophy, an observer is needed, then how did galaxies, stars, planets, and the Universe itself, come into being? Also, can other organisms other than human beings, make a measurement, and thereby effect their ambient reality? Sun Flowers, for instance, follow the moving sun as it traverses across the sky, via heliotropism. Can this be considered making a measurement?

I suppose it is very difficult do define "truth" in an informative way (without just giving a synonym or something like that). Can you explain why it is so? Or is it easy?

Is there really a strong distinction between understanding what a proposition means and believing or disbelieving it? It strikes me that if I believe a proposition while my opponent does not, one way to explain the disagreement is to say that he misunderstands either that proposition or some related proposition. And so if we really did both understand all of the propositions in question, we'd have to agree about them as well.

If something cannot be defined, can it exist?

Pre-reflexively, I find myself of the intuition that many matters in life simply fall outside the scope of moral concern, even if we can subject them to moral reasoning. For example, there doesn't seem to be any moral question to be had about the simple act of buying a cup of coffee in the morning, even if that money spent could've been donated to charity instead. On reflection of the particulars, some moral considerations might come to bear on that purchase or on a habit of purchases, but, ceteris paribus, morality just doesn't seem to bear on the mere act of buying coffee. Even describing the act as "morally permissible" sounds a little strange, as if permission were needed in the first place. Moral reasoning seems simply out of place here. My sense is that while some normative ethical theories (e.g., Kantianism) are relatively hospitable to this intuition, utilitarianism cannot be, at least in its traditional forms. After all, the utilitarian calculus can easily be applied to just about any human...

Consider a machine that generates numbers at random. Let's say it generates the number 12. Is there is a reason why 12 was selected rather than another random number?

Why do many, if not most contemporary philosophers (especially naturalist analytical ones à la Quine) believe in the existence of a set of unchanging natural laws despite the fact that this assertion has not, and probably cannot, be substantiated? By 'natural laws,' I mean laws like those associated with physics, etc. rather than laws dictating which sorts of inferential deductions are valid/invalid. Would this belief fare better when faced with a Russell's teacup-style argument than theism does?

Does an universal affirmative (A) premise entail a particular affirmative (I) one? I mean "All men are mortal" entails "Some men are mortal" or not? This is somehow confusing. Since, if you think that in a relation with set theory, it is impossible for (I) not to be entailed by (A). (A) intuitively entails (I). However, when looking at the opposition of square and applying, for example, tree method to prove the entailment, it results that (A) does not entail (I).

How is it clear that religious thought and philosophy were totally intertwined during the Middle Ages? Why was it this way?