I agree with my co-panelist: "q because p" implies that "q" and "p" are both true. And on more than one reading of "if.. then" sentences, it will follow that "if p than q" as well as "if q then p" are true. It may be worth noting, though: not everyone agrees that when "p" and "q" are both true, so are "if p then q" and "if q then p." There's a different sort of point that may be relevant to your worry. Suppose Peter's smoking caused his emphysema. We can't conclude that if Petra smokes, she'll develop emphysema. Causes needn't be fail-proof. A bit more formally: Qa because Pa (which says, more or less that a has property Q because a has property P) doesn't allow us to conclude ∀x(If Px then Qx) (that is, for every thing x, if x has property P then x has property Q.) The truth of a "because" statement doesn't require the truth of a generalized "if...then" statement.

Just a few further thoughts. Many philosophers of physics don't have the equivalent of a PhD in physics, though they do, of course, know a good deal about physics. And while these philosophers usually aren't doing experimental work in physics, what they do is sometimes published in physics journals and often in journals where physicists as well as philosophers publish. If you have your heart set on being a research scientist, employed by a science department or a scientific institution, then you'll almost certainly need a PhD in the relevant science. But if you want to do research that combines theoretical issues in science with your interest in philosophy, then it's quite possible to do that without a PhD in a science. In any case, I agree with my co-panelist's suggestion: study more science in your senior year if you have room for it in your schedule.

I think the simplest answer is this: empiricists think beliefs about matters of fact should be grounded in empirical evidence; they don't think the evidence always has to be direct. I've never been to New Zealand, but I have a considerable amount of indirect empirical evidence that it exists. To take just one bit of that evidence: people whom I know to be otherwise reliable and honest tell me they've been there. On the other hand, I don't even have indirect evidence that Middle Earth exists. What I have is evidence for is that J. R. R. Tolkien wrote stories about a fictional place called Middle Earth, which neither he nor anyone else claimed was real. The (small) larger point is this: the one-word name of a view is not always the best way to figure out what the view actually comes to. Very few, if any, self-described empiricists have said that evidence always has to be direct to be relevant.

Some good questions. One view is that if there is change, there is time. However, it doesn't follow from that that time has a "metric" -- that there is an answer to questions of the sort "how much time?" If all that existed were two solid spheres in relative motion, then someone might say that there's no answer to the question "What's the relative velocity?" (hence how much time has passed between varying degrees of separation) even though there is change going on, and hence there's time. More generally we can at least imagine a universe where time _order_ among events -- what happens before, after or simultaneously with what -- is definite, but without there being any correct answers to questions such as "How much time passed between event x and event y?" Insofar as that's right, it provides a way around your objection. Whether time requires change is yet another question. Not everyone agrees that it does. Sidney Shoemaker, in a paper from some years ago, argues that there could be...

As you may sense yourself, part of the problem is to decide just what question we're asking and what would count as an answer. Start with space. One way of claiming that space is real is to say that it's a thing -- a "substance", as the jargon of philosophy would have it. (In this sense, a substance is something that _has_ properties or qualities and stands in various relations, but isn't a property or a relation. An atom is a substance in this sense; so is an animal.) The "substantival" view of space-time has its adherents, but also has its detractors. There are many philosophers who don't think space is real if that would imply that it's some kind of thing. Typically such philosophers would say that instead of talking about space as such, we should talk about spatial relations. Things can be between other things, or beside them or above the, or longer than them or a certain distance away from them. What's real, on this view, are the things that stand in the various relations; space isn't...

There are lots of questions we can ask about this argument, but I'd suggest that trying to shoehorn the issues into specific named fallacies isn't as helpful as just looking for places where the argument raises questions.. (It's interesting that in my experience, at least, philosophers invoke the names of fallacies only slightly more often than the average educated person does.) That said, here are a couple of quick thoughts. The first sentence offers two broad reasons for being altruistic: because in the long run it benefits both society and yourself. Take the first bit: if someone didn't already think they should be altruistic, how persuasive would they find being told "You should be altruistic because it benefits society"? If you want to turn to fallacy lists, is this a case of begging the question? (Don't be too quick just to answer yes. Think about the ways in which wanting to benefit society and acting altruistically might differ.) Turning to the next reason, is it incoherent to think someone...

On the substance of your question, it may well be that different philosophers will respond differently, though I'd guess that naturalist/determinist/compatibilist more often goes with a view of punishment as having broadly utilitarian goals rather than retributivist ones. But I was struck by your last sentence: you find it disturbing that compatibilists would be willing to punish people whom incompatibilists see as innocent. Isn't this really just a way of siding with the incompatibilists? Compatibilists argue at length that we can be morally responsible even if determinism is true. Indeed, some compatibilists have argued (Hobart is a famous example from many decades ago) that we can't be responsible unless determinism is true. If compatibilists can make their case, then their point of view is only superficially disturbing. The apparently disturbing character, they would argue, is an illusion borne of misunderstanding what's required for moral responsibility. The compatibilist, in other words, thinks...

As a sociological matter, I'd guess that most, though certainly not all philosophers don't find any of the usual arguments convincing. (There are exceptions, not least among panelists here at askphilosophers.org) That said, a couple of caveats are in order. The first is that in most intro classes, what one gets are bare-bones versions of the arguments. This is particularly clear for the ontological argument, where the most powerful versions are sufficiently complex that most intro courses avoid them, but in my experience it's true to some extent for all of the arguments . For example: there's a good deal more than can be said on behalf of versions of the cosmological argument than one tends to find in the intro to philosophy presentations. The second point is that even though arguments are important, it would be a mistake to think that most serious believers are believers because they find some argument or arguments convincing. Their reasons are broader and more diffuse than that. I'd suggest...

I agree with Andrew: the dog/pig distinction won't get us anywhere. And I might even be persuaded that we shouldn't eat animals at all. But there's a sliver of a distinction that may be worth noting. If a stranger asks me to drive him to the grocery store, I don't have any obligation to say yes. If my friend asks me (and if it's not a lot of trouble to do it) then it's not so clearly okay for me just to say no. If my daughter asks me, the obligation seems even stronger. Our relationships with people can make a difference to how we ought to treat them. We can and do have relationships with our companion animals. And those relationships could make a difference to how we should treat them. I have an obligation to feed my dog, for example, but not to feed yours. Now it may very well be that it's wrong to eat animals at all. But even if it's okay to eat animals in general, it doesn't simply follow that it's okay to eat my own pet and the fact that it's my pet is the reason why it doesn't follow....

I'd say that you don't have the Big Bang theory down correctly if by the Big Bang Theory you mean what physicists mean. Whether a physicist accepts some version of the Big Bang account as a piece of physical cosmology and whether the physicist believes that nothing is real except for the physical are two different questions. Some physicist (perhaps even most for all I can say) believe that there's nothing outside the physical, but that's not a claim within physics. It's a metaphysical claim that the Big Bang hypothesis doesn't settle. But suppose we're physicalists (i.e, suppose we think only the physical is real.) Is the combination of physicalism and the Big Bang inconsistent? I don't see why. You say that to speak of a beginning implies an occurrence within time. Let's concede that; it's logically harmless. The first moment, if there was one, was, of course, a moment in time. If time began, it began with the beginning; we can agree that this is circular (or better: a tautology.) But ...