Is existence a property? The way I became confounded was an example like this: a phoenix is a bird, it has feathers, and it is born from ashes, but it does not exist, whereas a penguin is a bird, has feathers, exists, and is born in snow. As in, existence and being born in snow are properties of penguins, but not of phoenixes. I feel there might be some mistake, but I certainly lack the expertise to puzzle through this on my own.

Look at what I just read in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "2. You could not have been born of different parents. (Someone born of different parents wouldn't be you.) (...) Each of these claims appears to have a true reading." Do you all think this way? A son of my paternal twin-uncle and my maternal twin-aunt could easily (so to say) have exactly the same DNA as I have. He could have been born on the same day. He could have been told that his parents were my actual parents. He could have been given my name. My actual parents could have had no biological child. Things in the whole world could have been exactly as they actually were and are since then. So, in what reasonable sense wouldn't this person be me?

Why would any one think this question is meaningful? (below) Surely morality is only objective when your current language community agree on its precepts; I don't know any atheists that would claim an "objective morality" is a viable claim beyond this, and most lean towards accepting that moral systems are contingent upon cultural norms, as such they are relative. "In conversations with Christians (and members of other religious groups), more often than not I'm asked on what grounds atheism can claim to have an objective morality. This isn't a new question, but it is one I don't feel properly equipped to answer well. I think reason and our intuitions can aid us in finding objective moral truths, but I often find myself at a loss articulating a good defense. I do not find the theist's claim that morality depends on God's existence a good one, but I want to advance a better argument for why secular morality works out, and not just knock down their view. What's the general consensus among philosophers? Is...

What is the difference between justice and morality? Evidently, the concepts overlap each other, and in many cases they appertain to each other. I have made some observation, though I am not quite sure whether they are of any relevance, in terms of difference. Firstly, it appears to me that morality deals with the means of an action, in most of the cases, rather than the ends, where the motive of your action is of major, if not absolute, significance (whereof Kant suggested good will as the basis of morality, or something done out of reverence of law). In justice, however, the means are scarcely ever mentioned, and all we hear about is the ends. It appears to me that some ends are in themselves the measure of justice, independent of intention. Also, the word justice, apparently, from the word "jus", which means law, which certainly does make it easier to approach. However, it does not appear to be the case that law is equal to justice. Laws can, supposedly, also be unjust. It really bothers me that I...

Why is Buddhist philosophy consistently ignored by contemporary Western philosophers, especially when there is so much truth and logic to the epistemological and metaphysical systems of the traditions, such as the Madhyamaka school?

What part does emotion play in the acquisition of knowledge? Does the role of emotion vary across the different areas of knowledge (Natural Science, Human Science, History, The arts, Ethics and Maths) ? Thanks a lot for responses

I am writing a book dealing with Alzheimer’s disease for young people. The protagonist, a boy in the 8th grade, is grappling with his grandmother’s progressing AD. I would be interested on your thoughts about identity/mind and Alzheimer’s disease. Is a person with progressive AD the same person that they were without the disease? Any resource suggestions would be appreciated. The boy is in a philosophy class at his Catholic school and much of his questioning will come through class discussions

Is terrorism worse than conventional warfare? My initial response is "yes," but on reflection I'm not sure. A soldier's life is surely worth no less than a civilian's, so why should it be preferable that the former die instead of the latter?

The assertion that consciousness is a property of certain individuals and not others--rather than of the entire universe--implies a very special moment in the ontogeny of those individuals. This is the moment of individual consciousness origination, before which the individual (e.g., a gestating human) is not conscious, and after which it is. Would anyone disagree that this moment is implied by most theories of mind given merit in academia? By consciousness I mean nothing vague but quite simply "the subjective character of experience," a no-nonsense definition as worded by Thomas Nagel. In light of that implication, a physical theory of consciousness must either: (a) address the nature of that moment, describing a physical arrangement that gives rise spontaneously to consciousness; or (b) deny such a moment's existence and ascribe consciousness to the entire universe (some sort of pan-psychism). While (b) is typically considered the mystical and unacceptable stance, as a naturalist I find (a) to seem...

Is there a term for the logical fallacy that other people have it worse, so you should be happy? Example: I fall down a staircase, breaking my leg. The next day I go into work, and someone (inevitably) says "Phfeh! That's not bad! Let me tell you about the time *I* fell down the stairs!" I suppose this also covers the 'third world problems' saying. "You didn't get your last paycheck? Phfeh! First world problems. In Isreal they are shooting at each other!"