If you show all signs of loving someone, how can you figure out why you love someone? How do you know if it's just in your head, how they make you feel, their looks, how their hair is, or personality? And what justifies the right reasons of loving someone?

I have recently seen references to a "branch" of philosophy (or perhaps a discipline unto itself) called "metaphilosophy." Apparently, metaphilosophy is the examination of the nature of philosophy itself (e.g. what questions it addresses, how it answers questions, etc). The existence of such a branch or discipline is surprising to me, though. I had always thought philosophy was open to every possible question in some way, and so how could anyone justify such a new discipline? Isn't philosophy itself "metaphilosophy"? And, of course, what happens if someone wants to ask what question should be addressed in metaphilosophy? Do we then need a "meta-meta-philosophy"? Is "metaphilosophy" taken seriously in professional academic circles, or is it just a budding internet fad? Is such a branch of study really necessary?

Is a "slippery slope" argument the same as a reductio ad absurdum?

Is there anything of value philosophically in the contentious politics of the day?

I'm really struggling to comprehend soft determinism/compatibilism. How can free will be compatible with determinism? Surely by definition, they both necessitate exclusivity to each other?

Hello, do you think experiences of the world are structured by gender? If you have read Young's 'Throwing Like a Girl,' that is what I'm getting at.

I am interested in the philosophical implications of the two competing views of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. It is often contended that an "individualist" view of what equal protection requires can't explain why only classifications based on race or sex require "heightened scrutiny," instead of the ordinary rational basis test. In some sense, this objection seems dead on. If what equal protection prohibits is the use of morally invidious classifications by state actors then certainly race and sex can't be the only two that we ought to be concerned about. On the other hand, it seems like the "hierarchical" view is fraught with similarly serious problems. Who counts, nowadays, as a "discrete, insular minority" that equal protection ought to help? Does the fact that women are a majority mean that they should not benefit from heightened scrutiny, but men should? Or, if "discrete, insular minority" is just short-hand for politically handi-capped, how do we know how politically handi...

Does the "ethics of care" have a special relationship with Feminism? It seems that Feminism can be justified under lots of ethical theories. A Utilitarian could argue that since women experience pain and pleasure, their welfare should be factored into our felicific calculus. A Deontologist could argue that women have rights, and it is wrong to violate those rights. So what makes the ethics of care a more Feminist theory than other moral theories, like Utilitarianism and Deontology?

Many people will say that such and such a poem or book or movie taught deep truths but then they never say what exactly they learn and I rarely challenge them since I suspect that they don't know. But I don't think they are kidding me since I have had the same impression from reading a great literary work. So is great literature more like music than actual philosophical discourse in its ability to convey ideas about life?

Are there any good critical discussions, if not refutations, of communism, especially its philosophical concepts, e.g. theory of knowledge, communist materialism, dialectics etc.?