Is it, in general, better to take actions that could be described (variably, according to your moral temper) as sinful, or wrong, or regrettable, "in your stride", rather than feel guilt if it is the case that guilt will not diminish the probability of its happening again? Is guilt something irrational in the sense that we would really be better to (i) rid ourselves of it (ii) discourage aspects of the upbringing of children which conditions this response in them, so long as there are other ways to disincentivize harmful behaviour?

How do consequentialists justify what the consequence of an action is? If you save a man from drowning who goes on to become a serial killer, I don't think it's right to say that your action had this consequence. Where do you draw the line between action-consequence pairs? Don't consequences of actions lead to actions themselves?

I was recently pulled into an office at work with a couple of loss prevention agents and they proceeded to let me know that they are talking to all managers about what exactly their role is. I am a manager at a very big retail brand. After we discussed what exactly their role is (which I already know), I felt like they were getting to something. They suddenly started talking about trust and how the company trusts all of their employees, sometimes that trust is broken when some employees decide to steal. I got very uncomfortable and asked what this is about and they let me know that a week previous $20 dollars was missing out of our petty cash and that they have me and another person who was our lead cashier. Any manager that opens the store must count petty cash with our lead cashiers, so there are always two people present. They proceeded to ask if I have ever taken any money from the company or put anything in my pocket. I said absolutely not. I have no reason to steal. They said that they have video. I...

Will good things happen to a person if they do good? Does karma exist? So in other words: If one share with the world everything they have without expecting good to happen to them in return, will great things happen for them anyways?

Even though it has been strongly argued that divine foreknowledge doesn't negate free will, allow me to ask the question another way. How could God know our decisions if they are truly free? To know the outcome of something is to imply contingency (and determinism). To put it another way, if a third party can know the nature of an individual then that individual cannot be the author of his nature.

How can an object or thing that is not physical (like the mind or the soul) be located in space? Is it actually located in space? If it is not, then where is it located?

I've recently been following the debate between proponents of evolutionary theory and those of intelligent design. It seems to me that the crux of their disagreement is around the existence of chance. Both parties seem (more or less) to agree on the mechanism (incremental development of species over time through selection of beneficial traits); but evolutionary theory states that these changes are random, the product of chance uninfluenced by God, while ID seems to think that God directs what we think of as chance, in effect denying the existence of randomness. But the question arises: if God doesn't influence chance, if true randomness occurs in nature, then what *does* God influence? Can a belief in evolutionary theory, or any theory that relies on chance occurrence, be compatible with a belief in God?

How do philosophers or even lay people deal with conflicts or direct contradictions in their beliefs and values? For example I would be against the principle of torture, yet I feel there is a conflict as in some cases it could be possible to save more lives by torturing an individual. Hypothetically, if intelligence led to the capture of one of the perpetrators of the London Bombings before they had occurred, would people condone the use of torture if it meant we could get information as to where the other bombers were and thus potentially save lives? Is there any moral or ethical stance that doesn’t in some way have a “difficult” side with the potential for conflict/contradiction of beliefs? Again as an example is it possible to justify a vegetarian belief, yet be pro-choice and in favour of allowing abortions? C Anders

Why do people who study language put so much attention on the speaker's intentions? Isn't it obvious that we often don't say what we want?

Why do people (especially philosophers) engage in arguments which cannot be resolved?