Many people would say that it’s nearly always wrong not to act, whilst someone suffers an unnecessary death that could have easily been prevented. For example, simply watching a child wander onto a busy road, and not acting so as not to loose ones place in a queue at the post office. It’s difficult to see how this could be morally permissible. Many people would also say that they don’t feel any moral obligation to donate their spare money to charity. For example, the money that’s required for me to have the internet access I need to ask this question, could be used to pay for life saving medication which could spare many children in Africa from a needless death. On the one hand we’re morally obliged to help when we can, on the other it’s morally permissible not to help even though we can. Is there any way to make these seemingly conflicting beliefs compatible? Should we sell up and give the proceeds to the needy? Or should we admit to ourselves that we’re not prepared to live up to our own moral...

Quine's Paradox (“yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation” yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation) doesn't seem to me to be a paradox. Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems to me like it's asserting nothing but the fact that it's false. For something to be true OR false, there must be some other claim made. When I look at the statement, it seems to me that it's not talking about anything but itself -- like an indirect self-reference. It seems to me to have no content but its own claim that it yields to falsehood, and would therefore neither be true nor false. Have I made a mistake in my reasoning/logic?

I’ve run into a problem in philosophy recently that I do not completely appreciate. Certain sets are said to be “too big” to be sets. In Lewis’ Modal Realism, the set of all possible worlds is said to be one such set. These are sets whose memberships is composed of infinite individuals of a robust cardinality. I (purportedly) understand that not all infinities are equal. But I don’t quite see why there can be a set of continuum many objects, but not a set of certain larger infinities. Am I misunderstanding what it is to have “too big” a set?

I have a question about getting an advanced degree in philosophy: I hold an undergraduate and master’s degree in political science. Instead of getting a doctorate in political science I would like to switch gears and move into the realms of philosophy. In short, the more I investigated the philosophical underpinnings of my research in political science, the more I had a hunger to study philosophy as my first academic objective. (Even my doctoral prospectus (which was originally outlined during my Masters program), I have been informed by various political and social science faculty members throughout the country, is one that fits more appropriately within the realms of philosophy.) After completing the Masters (Virginia Tech), I began inquiring with various departments of philosophy (US) and found that it was going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be accepted into a graduate program in philosophy as a result of my lack of background in philosophy at the undergraduate and graduate...

If I say, "the probability of landing heads in a coin toss is 50%," have I made a mathematical statement or a scientific one?

I am browsing your site and I noticed that there do not seem to be any panelists who specialize in Continental Philosophy. What do the panelists here think about the seeming divide between Analytic and Continental specializations in the field? Why hasn't this been addressed in any of the responses, especially in terms of methodology and the relation of Philosophy to other discipines?

Why is it so easy to define "island" and so difficult to define "dog"? Both terms refer to quite "natural" and well-known things. We can say that an island is an area of land surrounded by water, but we can't say, for instance, that a dog is an animal that barks, since a sick dog that can't bark is still a dog. It is also curious that we all know what a dog is without knowing the zoological definition of this species. Is there a name for this difference between the two words?

Can you create a fictional object that knows more than you do? For example, suppose I imagine a man, Physicsman, and I imagine that Physicsman knows all the laws of physics. I conceive him to be someone who knows all of the laws of physics. But does he know all the laws of physics? I mean, I don't, and he's my creation. Plus, if I tried to describe, in explicit detail, Physicsman articulating the laws of physics, unless I got lucky (guessing or whatever), I'd end up making him say stuff that's false, I expect. Something related: can fictional objects know *anything*? Is, "Obi-Wan knew that Anakin Skywalker turned to the Dark Side," true? If it is, how?

Why is the Law of Contradiction so important to Philosophers? Can its truth be proven? What are the consequences for philosophy of an answer to the question, what's at stake? Thanks so much for your help. Krystle

If by my death I could save another's life (like falling on a grenade) do I have a moral obligation to do so? Are there circumstances when this might or might not be true? Are their schools of philosophy or specific works that address this question?