Hello. Reading a bit of Wikipedia, a bit of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Hello. Reading a bit of Wikipedia, a bit of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Hello. Reading a bit of Wikipedia, a bit of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and a bit of your site, I got this impression about moral theories: (1) Traditional moral realists claim that there are (universally binding) moral facts. (2) Traditinal moral anti-realists claim that there are no (universally binding) moral facts. (3) So called "moral externalists" claim that (perhaps universal) moral facts are not binding (that is, they are *morally* binding, but people may ignore morality without being irrational, and so people may ignore such "bindingness"). Did I get it right? What I mean is that sceptics about morality always assume that morality should in some way be "absolutely binding". But some philosophers are half way between realism and scepticism because they accept morality and just deny its necessary bindingness. My question is whether these philosophers are really *between* realism and anti-realism.

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