The AskPhilosophers logo.

Mind

When we deliberate, we often make note of pertinent constraints as we form our opinion. For instance, a jury member might arrive at a different recommendation than she would have otherwise if she observes a judge's instructions to ignore a particular piece of testimony. Does the ability to determine our beliefs by considering some factors and not others show we can in some sense control what we believe?
Accepted:
November 19, 2009

Comments

Mitch Green
November 20, 2009 (changed November 20, 2009) Permalink

Nice question. I suggest that cases like the one you consider do show that in some sense we can control what we believe. The important thing is the 'in some sense' qualification. Many philosophers have argued that we can't "directly" change our beliefs at will. For instance, even if you threaten me with death, I won't be able immediately and just as a matter of will to make myself believe that the Earth is flat. I'd at least have to do something more roundabout, such as surround myself with a bunch of flat-earthers, ignore contrary evidence, and so on. Similarly, I might have to go to some efforts to ignore a piece of testimony, perhaps with the aid of hypnosis or of someone who could make that testimony look specious.

More generally, then, I would suggest that we can indirectly control what we believe if we are determined to do so: If for instance I am convinced by Pascal's "Wager" argument that it's reasonable to believe in God, I won't be able to become a theist just by snapping my fingers. However, if I surround myself with believers, listen to a lot of Creed or Lifehouse, and ignore the various skeptical challenges to theism, I'll have a good chance of cultivating belief after a while. As William James once said, after a while, belief will come and "stupefy your scruples."

Mitch Green

  • Log in to post comments

Jennifer Church
November 28, 2009 (changed November 28, 2009) Permalink

I agree with Mitch Green's response with regard to the possibility of controlling our beliefs indirectly. But in the case of a jury member instructed to ignore certain evidence, it is not really belief that is at issue. The jury member is asked to reach a conclusion following certain legal guidelines, but there is no requirement that the juror believe that conclusion -- and thus no requirement that the legal guidelines constrain belief. A jury member can wholeheartedly believe that a defendant is guilty yet confidently cast a "not guilty" vote -- because her belief is based on impermissible evidence.

Some philosophers (Jonathan Cohen and Michael Bratman, for example) use the term "acceptance" as opposed to "belief" to refer to an attitude of endorsement that is restricted to certain contexts or concerns. In the case of a jury member, the endorsement is restricted to legal contexts; in the case of an actor, the endorsement is restricted to a theatrical context; and in the case of an athlete, the endorsement might be be restricted to certain performance contexts.

  • Log in to post comments
Source URL: https://askphilosophers.org/question/2975?page=0
© 2005-2025 AskPhilosophers.org