Philosophers

Did Hume commit the genetic fallacy when he argued that one of the reasons we should not believe in miracles was because they derived from "ignorant and barbarous nations"?

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Before I address your question directly, it would be worth just running through Hume's main argument in section 10 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, for the sake of those readers who might not have come across it before. Hume is concerned with the credibility of testimony concerning miracles. When we receive such testimony (in any form, whether received orally from one of our own contemporaries, or read in an ancient book), Hume asks us to weigh up the credibility of two competing hypotheses. (1) That the testimony is true, the laws of nature were violated, and the miracle really did occur as described. (Hume regards the violation of the laws of nature as being an essential, defining feature of a miracle. Others would define 'miracle' in other ways, and Hume's argument might not apply to them: but he is concerned with miracles as he defines the term). (2) That the testimony is false (whether through deliberate deceit or just through honest error), the laws of nature were not violated, and the miracle didn't occur. But Hume observes that an entire lifetime of experience has constantly reinforced in us the belief that the laws of nature do not admit of exceptions: so hypothesis (1) is not looking very plausible. Whereas our experience of receiving testimony from other people, far from leading us to believe that it is never false, actually leads us instead to believe that it is quite often precisely that: so hypothesis (2) is very easy to accept. Weighing things up dispassionately, the only plausible conclusion is that (1) is false, (2) is true, and the miracle didn't occur.

As to the phrase you've cited in your question, it is worth just noting that this is only a tiny part of his overall argument. As you quite rightly acknowledge, it's only one of the reasons for not believing in miracles, just one among many other considerations that we might take into account when making that assessment of the relative credibility of hypotheses (1) and (2). It's also worth remembering that, at the precise point where he uses this phrase, he is limiting his discussion to the miracles recorded in the Pentateuch (i.e. the first five books of the Old Testament). And perhaps disbelief in individual cases could then lead on to a wider disbelief about miracles in general, which is certainly what the section as a whole is driving at: but, at this point, Hume is only concerned with the individual case. The reason why this is important is because, in the specific case of the miracles recorded in the Pentateuch -- as Hume himself observes in this very passage -- there is no corroborating evidence beyond the Pentateuch itself. If there was, and if we were to disregard it because of our prejudices about the source, then that might well compound any genetic fallacy involved in the case. But, in the absence of independent corroboration, all that we have to work with is the content of the testimony itself, plus what we know of its source, considered against the backdrop of our knowledge of how the world works. So the real question is whether we should treat what we know of its source (e.g. that they're ignorant and barbarous, supposing that we conclude that they are) as having any bearing on the credibility of the testimony itself, or else exclude it from our considerations altogether.

Now, you've asked about a conjunctive phrase, so it might be a good idea to break it down and consider the two parts separately. First, would it be a fallacy to disbelieve accounts of miracles on the grounds that they derived from barbarous nations? If by 'barbarous' we mean something like 'morally unrefined', then I can see that an argument could be made for that. When the content of the testimony has nothing to do with morality, it's not obvious that the moral character of its source should have any relevance at all... except perhaps in one respect. For the counterargument here would be this: we've already concluded -- by characterising it as barbarous -- that this source has several moral vices. So maybe that does give us reason to worry that, among their various other vices, they might well also have the vice of dishonesty. I don't think Hume himself would have drawn that conclusion about the author or authors of the Pentateuch: but it's a possibility that we should at least consider.

Second, would it be a fallacy to disbelieve accounts of miracles on the grounds that they derived from ignorant nations? Here, I'm much more confident in saying, no, it wouldn't be. Hume's argument is all about laws of nature, the kinds of things that scientists investigate, so the scientific sophistication of these sources is directly relevant to the credibility of their account. Less scientifically advanced people and nations simply aren't going to be in as good a position to make a reliable assessment what really happened. For maybe something amazing really did happen back then. But, for Hume, to describe this event as a bona fide miracle goes much further than just saying that it's amazing. If you describe it as a miracle, you are additionally asserting that the laws of nature have been violated. But then, if you have no idea what the laws of nature are, you're in no position to make that call. I suspect that Hume would allow that the authors of the Pentateuch were making an honest attempt to make sense of their experiences. But, because they were doing so from a position of scientific ignorance, they ended up mischaracterising events as miraculous when in reality they were merely unusual, and there was a natural, scientific explanation for them after all, one that these people just couldn't see. And so, however much we might still continue to regard these people as sincere, we shouldn't place our credence in what they're telling us about miracles, because we now know so much more than they did about how the world really works.

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