Ethics

It seems to me that if I am morally responsible for X and if I know that X causes Y (with 100% probability) then I'm also responsible (in the same degree) for Y. So, if I know that we all die, and if I accept that I am morally responsible for having created a new human being, does it mean that I have to consider myself responsible for the (future, but certain) death of my child? I know there's a whole nest of problems there with causality, choice, consequentialism, but I think the assumptions can be made very weak and very "reasonable" in order to provide a valid "prima facie" argument. What do you think?

Comments

You're right, of course: there's a tangle of problems here about causation, consequence and the like. It seems a little odd to my ears to say that by fathering a child, I am a cause of its eventual death, but that may just be me. Perhaps we can avoid the issue about "cause" by simply noting this: a foreseeable -- and inevitable -- consequence of fathering or conceiving a child is that the child will eventually die. And so we can put the apparent principle another way: I'm morally responsible for the foreseeable, not to mention inevitable consequences of what I do. If this is right, then when my children eventually die, I will be morally responsible for their deaths.

But what about that "if?"

Let's agree: If I didn't feed my children, or didn't get them needed medical care and they died as a result, I'd be morally responsible for their deaths. I'd also be morally responsible if they died as a result of my negligence -- because, for example, I let them play by the swimming pool at the age of two while I went inside to watch TV. But it sounds bizarre to say that when my children eventually die (not anytime soon, I hope!) I will be morally responsible for their deaths simply because I fathered them. It sounds bizarre enough that I'd guess most people simply wouldn't agree.

What of the principle that we're responsible for the foreseeable consequences of our actions? The "principle" is often a useful rule of thumb. But the very case we're considering should make us doubt that it's an exceptionless rule.

So how do we "fix" the principle to take account of the apparent exception? I'm not sure. I'd guess that the breakdown has to do with a variety of things: connection too remote, inevitable though it may be; extreme lack of linkage to our intentions; procreation being the sort of thing that we think is often a good overall, even though procreated beings aren't immortal. No doubt there are other potential problems. Sorting all this out might well teach us some useful things, but there's another lesson closer to hand: moral responsibility is a subtle and complicated business. It may turn out that simple generalizations that go beyond rule of thumb status are hard to come by. And if that's right, then we shouldn't worry too much about the fact that this particular generalization seems not to get all the cases right.

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