Mind

Why do some philosophers say that how something feels, what it is like to be something, cannot be identical with any physical property, or at least any physical property which we know anything about?

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One might argue for this conclusion as follows: the way things look, sound, taste, feel, etc.--what some philosophers call 'secondary qualities'--cannot be identical to any physical properties, because physical properties of things are either what philosophers have called 'primary qualities'--e.g., size, shape, motion, and the like--or they are more fundamental properties of physical systems, to which secondary qualities are not identical; consequently, secondary qualities are not reducible to physical properties. (Admittedly, this is a highly schematic argument. It should, however, be noted that someone who endorsed an argument like this might of course admit that although secondary qualities are not identical or reducible to any physical property, of course secondary qualities are related to physical qualities, perhaps even in a lawlike way, that admits of scientific investigation.)

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