Over a year ago, I read Quine's Two Dogmas for a philosophy class. One part in it makes the step from talking about meanings to abolishing meanings and talking only about synonymy. I never quite got that. I mean, if there are two things similar (or the same) about something, don't they each have to have those things? If two pieces of string have the same length, they have each have a length, and they happen to be the same. Likewise for any other properties I could think of, such as color, volume, mass, etc. I don't see how sameness could not imply those "intermediary entities" which are the same. Thanks.

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Consider an example from Frege: the direction of the line L is identical to the direction of the line M if and only if L is parallel to M. That's true. But how should we read it? Do we read it as explaining the notion of being parallel in terms of the identity of two abstract objects, i.e. two directions? Or do we take it the other way about, as partially explaining talk about two abstract objects, directions, in terms of the already-understood notion of lines being parallel? There's lots to be said for taking it the second way, as introducing reference to certain abstract objects in terms of something more familiar.

Likewise: the meaning of "gorse" is identical to the meaning of "furze" if and only if "gorse" and "furze" are synonymous. That looks true too. But how should we read it? Do we read it as explaining the notion to synonymy in terms of the identity of two abstract objects, meanings? Or do we take it the other way about, as (hopefully) partially explaining talk about two abstract objects, meanings, in terms of an easier-to-understand notion, the idea of two words being synomymous (something like: functioning the same way). Again, there's lots to be said for taking things the second way, if we are going to talk about meanings-qua-entities at all.

Certainly a Quinean will want to press the case for taking things the second way both times. But then he makes a further move: at least in the second example, he will want to go on to press the claim that, on reflection, the notion of synonymy is actually pretty murky and problematic. So now our supposed explantion of the notion of meanings qua abstract entities is actually, for that reason, not in very good shape after all.

In the questioner's terms, then: it may be that where we do have a genuine sameness we can introduce "intermediary entities", but those entities needn't be doing any explanatory work, but rather are being explained via the sameness-claims. Further, Quine insists that synonymy is in fact not well-behaved enough to be a kosher sameness relation.

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