Recent Responses
How would a person who believes that musical works are universals account for instances of musical works which seem to imply that each performance of the same piece is always different, not only in the sense that all performances are different interpretations of the same score, but taking the examples of the arab "maqam", the indian "raga" or western jazz music, in which improvisation and sometimes a radical "mutation" of the work plays an important role, not accidental but essential to the performance of that work? Victor G.
Allen Stairs
January 29, 2009
(changed January 29, 2009)
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Any performance of a musical work will always differ in some ways from other performances. And universalist theorists know that. What's required is that the performance nonetheless have the characteristics that the relevant universal call for. (Or have enough of them; we'll set issues about... Read more
If someone is forced to do something, but they do not realise that they are being forced, and believe that they are acting freely, are they being forced or are they free?
Eddy Nahmias
January 29, 2009
(changed January 29, 2009)
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You likely have in mind something we might call "covert coercion." I might hypnotize you to vote for McCain-Palin but do it in such a way that you feel like you really want to vote for them (and if I ask you why, you'll come up with lots of reasons--they're "mavericky!" Assume you would oth... Read more
Is it true that "Things fall because of gravity?" "Gravity" is just a placeholder word for the tendency of things to fall. So to say "Things fall because of gravity", is to say "Things fall because of their tendency to fall." Which is vacuous. A better explanation would be "Things fall because they have mass and are nearby another massive object (the earth)." Am I right here?
Jasper Reid
January 29, 2009
(changed January 29, 2009)
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This sounds like an accusation that was regularly thrown at Medieval Aristotelian physicists. Aristotelian physics was built around the "teleological" principle that things have natural tendencies to strive to achieve certain goals or destinations. Why does a stone fall? Aristotle would say t... Read more
Is it rational to both maintain that abortion is entirely morally permissible (on the grounds that a fetus is not a person, let's say) and to regret having had one?
Richard Heck
January 28, 2009
(changed January 28, 2009)
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And for yet another persepctive on this, it seems as if it is morally permissible not always to be a "good samaritan". But of course one might reasonably regret not having been a "good samaritan" on some particular occasion, i.e., regret not having gone out of one's way---beyond the call of... Read more
Is it rational to both maintain that abortion is entirely morally permissible (on the grounds that a fetus is not a person, let's say) and to regret having had one?
Richard Heck
January 28, 2009
(changed January 28, 2009)
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And for yet another persepctive on this, it seems as if it is morally permissible not always to be a "good samaritan". But of course one might reasonably regret not having been a "good samaritan" on some particular occasion, i.e., regret not having gone out of one's way---beyond the call of... Read more
Is it rational to both maintain that abortion is entirely morally permissible (on the grounds that a fetus is not a person, let's say) and to regret having had one?
Richard Heck
January 28, 2009
(changed January 28, 2009)
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And for yet another persepctive on this, it seems as if it is morally permissible not always to be a "good samaritan". But of course one might reasonably regret not having been a "good samaritan" on some particular occasion, i.e., regret not having gone out of one's way---beyond the call of... Read more
Can we learn anything from fiction?
Eddy Nahmias
January 27, 2009
(changed January 27, 2009)
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Yes. Lots.
That's the easy answer. The hard answer isexplaining how we could possibly learn anything true from a series offalse statements. One answer is that good works of fiction use falsestatements to describe deep truths about human nature, emotions,relationships, morality, and the... Read more
Do any professional philosophers disagree in a huge way with Wittgenstein? If so, are there any works on the subject? If so, can someone please tell me the basic ideas behind these disagreements? Thanks!
Peter Smith
January 27, 2009
(changed January 27, 2009)
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Oh yes, lots disagree profoundly.
For a start, recall that around half of what Wittgenstein wrote after the Tractatus period was about the philosophy of mathematics (indeed, he wrote in 1944 that his “chief contribution has been in the philosophy of mathematics”). You can find a useful though... Read more
Can there be a moral duty not to help? Suppose two persons, A and B. A suffers from an illness that makes him behave antisocially, at times constituting a danger both to himself and to others. B, a close relative, has been caring for A for many years, preventing A from the most serious consequences (jail/psychiatric clinic). However, A's state of health is not improving. Doctors suggest that B's help may indeed be counterproductive - they suppose that A needs to feel the consequences of his acts to find the strength to fight his disease. How to act in this situation, from a moral point of view? Imagine A, not 'supervised' by B anymore, injured another person. Even if the punishment helped A, what about the damaged person? And what if the punishment did not help?
Thomas Pogge
January 24, 2009
(changed January 24, 2009)
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I think you are using the verb "help" in two different senses. When you talk about B helping A, you mean something like B intervening in A's situation with the intent of improving it. When you speak of the punishment helping A, you mean the punishment actually improving A's situation. Either... Read more
A couple of months ago, I had an experience which spawned an ethical dilemma which I find fascinating. I had been in a healthy relationship with a girl for some time, but after meeting and getting to know someone else—a girl in my class whom I got to know in a perfectly platonic fashion, so I can't see any wrongs committed on my part at that stage—, I fell in love with this other girl, whilst my feelings for my girlfriend withered and died. Understandably, our relationship could not go on after that, and so we broke up. I think we are both better off now than we were. However, assuming that I had an actual choice between (a) 'giving in' to my infatuation and breaking up with my old girlfriend so as to be happy with the other girl (it seems that we're also assuming no independent will on the part of the 'other' girl!) or (b) resisting my developing feelings for this other person to preserve the relationship I was already in, also assuming that I would, in fact, be as happy as I initially was with my old girlfriend, would you say that I did have a moral obligation to opt for (b), given the probability that our breaking up would render my ex unhappy, at least for a limited period of time? Do I have an obligation to seek out the most happiness for myself in all my endeavours, or should I prioritise the happiness of others?
Jennifer Church
January 23, 2009
(changed January 23, 2009)
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You assume (1) that you can, to a large extent anyway, choose whether or not to let yourself fall in love with someone new versus sustain the love you already feel for the person you are involved with, and (2) that you have no reason to think the new relationship will be any happier than... Read more