Is there a handy rule for determining which questions can be resolved with a correct answer, and which questions cannot? I get caught up in trying to answer questions like, "What is love?" and "Is justice a beneficial value?" No matter how satisfied I am with the answers I come up with, I find other people who offer equally satisfying answers from other perspectives. For instance, I generally argue that artistic merit exists in the relationship between an audience and a man-made production. A statue of Adonis is just a statue of Adonis, but it becomes art when I see it and I am inspired by it in some way. One of my buddies hates this view of art. To him, artistic merit exists in the independent spirit of the artist, striving against conventions. So we both dig The Velvet Underground, The Beatles, and Miles Davis, but we cannot agree on James Taylor. He thinks Taylor's music is banal and devoid of artistic merit because it panders to a mainstream sensibility, whereas I find some of his albums to...

What a great question! Post world war two, the movement of positivism tried to shut down all questions that could not be resolved with empirical verification. This movement would have shelved questions about justice (positivists took a non-cognitive approach to ethics and assumed moral judgments were mere expressions of emotions that are neither true nor false) and questions about beauty and such. But the movement ran into serious problems in the late 1960s, early 1970s, self-destructing in some cases (as when positivists claimed that only empirically verifiable statements are meaningufl, even though their claim about meaning could not itself be empirically verified). Plus the questions about love, justice, art, and so on seem irrepressable. Two things you might consider: First, I suggest that some substantial terrain is of profound importance even if we lack the common tools to reach a consensus. Questions about the nature of justice and love seem to fit that category and I believe that even...

What can make a philosophical theory "trivial"? Is triviality different from circularity?

Great question! I do not believe that "trivial" is a technical term in our discipline, unlike the notion that an argument may be circular. A circular argument is one that assumes what it sets out to establish, rather than providing independent reason for thinking the conclusion is right. A textbook example would be if two persons are arguing whether God exists, and "the believer" argues that God exists on the grounds that the Bible asserts God's existence and the Bible is a revelation from God. Presumably the interlocutor is not going to concede that the Bible is God's revelation if (s)he is in doubt whether God exists. A non-circular argument might take a related, but different form in which "the believer" argues (for example) from religious experience or from the contingent cosmos that theism is more reasonable than the best alternative (e.g. secular naturalism). Some famous philosophical arguments are the subject of great controversy over whether they are circular (the ontological argument, the...

I am a philosophy student in my second year and was disturbed by a conversation in my "philosophy of mind" course. The students were bashing philosophy as a discipline: "a fun waste of time", "sitting and thinking" for a living rather than finding a real job, etc. I'm sure you get the picture. I was discouraged by this. rather than being surrounded by others with a deep passion for philosophy, i am surrounded by shallow thinkers. My question is, how should one go about handling criticisms of this kind, both internally, as well as in social situations as mentioned above? it seems useless to defend myself to those who hold such opinions, but that doesn't mean i want the majority (and it really is most people i meet) to be holding on to those negative stereotypes. How often do you find yourself in these kinds of situations?

One way to respond is to point out the integral role philosophy has played in the history of culture, education, and in the context of other modes of inquiry. Philosophy as a discipline involves the exercise and refinement of skills that are essential for a democratic culture --a culture in which change can be brought about nonviolently through argument. Education is very difficult to conceive of without a philosophy of education. And it is difficult to imagine any sustained marketplace for jobs without there being an overall philosophy of values, of responsibility, and of governance. So, insofar as having a worldview and values is having a philosophy, the practice of philosophy is virtually inescapable. And insofar as we want to think about freedom and determinism, the nature of consciousness, desire and reason and so on, philosophy also seems unavoidable. The alternative would appear to be the mindless acceptance of the status quo or simply trying to shut down fundamental questions about what is...

Is there a point at which a person can rightly dismiss a philosophical statement or even an entire philosophical system because it originated with a person of dubious character or intent, but (here's the catch) without committing the ad hominem fallacy in doing so? I am thinking of extreme examples, such as (alleged) philosophical systems created by, say, New Age healers, cult leaders, etc. Or, conversely, would it be necessary even in these extremely examples to address only the philosophical claims made by these movements -- one by one -- instead of addressing the character of the founders themselves in order to avoid the ad hominem?

Great question! I am afraid that at the end of the day one does need to consider the merits of the philosophical system or position on its own terms, however from a practical point of view time is precious and it is virtually impossible to fully assess all the claims that may come your way. If you have good reason to believe that your New Age healing cult "philosopher" has been producing complete nonsense in the past and has a quite dubious character (on top of all that nonsense), you seem to be reasonable in not taking his or her next claim seriously. Still, it is (perhaps remotely) possible that this rather odd chap might have come up with a new, compelling theory of human agency or an account of perception, and so on.

Does worthwhile Philosophy start with good questions or can it start with the proper mood? I am an International Relations major and have decided on writing my honors thesis on a question of political philosophy, not because I have a burning question, but rather because it was the subject I enjoyed the most and because I want to understand whether or not it is something I'd like pursuing in the future in the form of a postgraduate degree. I often find myself in what I - and some friends- call a "Philosophical mood" -though the friends are not without irony when the employ the term- i.e. in the mood for thinking and discussing dispassionately about what I am passionate about. I think Heidegger privileged moods as a way to knowing. I've decided researching the nature of power and the use of this concept in twentieth-Century political thought because I want to satisfy my mood, not because it seems like a burning question. Can real philosophy come from this? Is it (I know it is unscientific) silly to pursue...

Great questions! In a way, it is difficult to begin philosophy without there being some kind of mood --whether this be openness or inquisitiveness. It has been said that philosophy begins in wonder, and I suppose one may think of wonder as a mood. Some philosophers have interpreted this as philosophy beginning with puzzlement and understood the goal of philosophy to be the dispelling of puzzlement. But I suggest "wonder" might also be fascination or awe or even reverence. I suspect that when you get in a "philosophical mood" you probably are prepared to set aside distractions and work from a whole host of what might be called moods: fascination, awe, reverence, inquisitiveness.... but also possibly anger, love or hate and more. If we follow Socrates and the Platonic tradition generally, there are certain moods or emotions that can aid or that can hinder philosophical reflection. Those impairing philosophical inquiry include jealousy, envy, impatience and vanity. I believe the majority in the...

Why has philosophy been marginalized by society?

If "philosophy" refers to a person's worldview or values, I am not sure philosophy can ever be marginalized. It is hard to imagine a civic culture without this being built on (and defined by) some kind of philosophy. Moreover, insofar as a culture includes reflections on worldviews and values, the practice of philosophy as a form of critical inquiry is again hard to marginalize. The philosophy in play may be pretty bad (involving incoherence, contradictions, based on bad history or science...) but bad philosophy is still philosophy. If, instead, by "philosophy" you mean the institutional practice of philosophy as carried out in most universities and colleges, then the presupposition of your question (the assertion that philosophy is marginal in society) has some purchase. There have been a few universities that have dismantled philosophy departments. The University of Glasgow in Scotland is currently merging the philosophy faculty with faculty from other fields, for example (this event is on...

What do you professionals think of when the common person thinks about philosophy? I often look around book stores, and see tarot cards in the 'metaphysical studies' section, a section that separates itself from the 'philosophy' section but it's right next to it. In the 'philosophy' section, I see many books on existentialism, Nietzsche has an unofficial row to himself, lots of Ayn Rand in some stores, it has many of the classics, a few postmodern works, and there's many books on pop culture and philosophy. Perhaps this is just my experience in my section of the United States of America, but in the book stores I go to, this is what I see. Does the public have the right perception on what philosophy is or should be? What is the general reaction of people when you say you're a pro philosopher? What do most people think philosophy is? What are your general thoughts on what us layman think of when we think philosophy?

Interesting set of questions! I am not sure of my fellow panelists but I do find it quite depressing when the philosophy section of a bookstore is severely limited and I am in heaven when I find bookstores that are brimming over with philosophy, classical and contemporary. In my mind, the best bookstore in the English speaking world is Blackwells in Oxford (UK). Fabulous. As for the philosophy and popular culture books, I think these are outstanding, and they demonstrate the ways in which professional philosophers have been able to do philosophy in reference to television, film, sports, and so on. What do professional philosophers think of non-professionals or the "common person"? I am not sure, but I suspect that most of us who are professional philosophers think of ourselves as quite lucky or fortunate. You mean, we can earn a living doing philosophy? I think most of us delight in what we do some may not be happy with their specific university or college but I don't think I personally know...

Does it put me in any particular philosophical camp to believe that most questions taken as philosophical questions could be made more tractable by first settling (or agreeing not to settle) issues of definition and acceptable evidence?

You would be in very good company, as the pursuit of careful definitions was key to Socrates' philosophical dialectic. Great care for the definition of words is also a key part of Confucius' philosophy. In the 20th century, the practice of focussing on definitions and conceptual clarity was key to what is commonly known as analytic philosophy. Represenatitives include G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell and, more recently, Roderick Chisholm. While the tools of analytic philosophy are (in my view) essential, these can be over done (hence a book came out in response to extreme analytic philosophy called: Clarity is Not Enough).

Is there a proper role for faith in philosophy, or do they function in distinct realms?

Interesting question! Please forgive me for replying with what is probably the classic philosophical response: it depends what you mean by "faith." If by "faith" you mean something like trust, then I think philosophy must involve trust. One must (at a minimum) trust one's own faculties / thinking / reflection. Linda Zagzebski has been arguing recently for the essential role of self-trust in all thinking. This is also an area that Keith Lehrer has contributed to. If by "faith" one instead means a body of religious beliefs or convictions, then a lot of philosophy does function independent of faith though not all philosophy. For many medieval thinkers and some contemporaries Anselm (1033-1109) and Nicholas Wolterstorff today philosophical reflection can take place from the standpoint of faith. This does not mean such philosophers thereby cut themselves off from philosophers who are not working from any faith perspective. Rather, it means the scope of what counts as philosophy becomes broader. And...

In one hundred years, will an accomplished philosopher also have to be an accomplished neurologist, or does the subject have something to say independent of advances in brain science (posed another way, if we become ultra intelligent humans/machines with thinking capacities far in excess of our current brain, will we still partake in philosophy)?

I suggest that no matter how developed our brain sciences become, we will still have philosophy because the sciences themselves rest on philosophy, a scientific worldview. Without a concept of ourselves, causation and explanation, concepts of observation, and so on, we would not have any science. As for whether philosophers will have to be accomplished neurologists, I think that those philosophers working on human nature will at least need to have a general understanding of the methods and findings of the brain sciences and the general state of play in physics, chemistry, biology and psychology, but not to the point of actually being a scientist in any one of these domains. There are many issues that cannot be settled within the brain sciences themselves, including the nature of thought, emotion, desire, sensation, and so on. I suggest that whether or not machines can think or that human thinking is identical with brain processes is a philosophical matter that cannot be determined scientifically.

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