This is more of a scientific question perhaps -- not sure -- but how is it possible that we can close our eyes and still see light i.e. how is it possible we close our eyes and think of images or memories in which the sun is shining and objects can be seen as if the real sun were shining? To see a postcard or a picture with our eyes open requires an outside light source, the sun or a lamp. But then I can close my eyes and see the same postcard and picture without any outside light source. How is that possible? Erik

Hello, do you think experiences of the world are structured by gender? If you have read Young's 'Throwing Like a Girl,' that is what I'm getting at.

Some people have criticized consciousness-altering drugs on the basis that they effect our perception of reality, but what is actually wrong with wanting your perception of reality to be altered? Don't all forms of art, music, theatre, etc. present us with a transformed version of reality? And in other sense, isn't the hallucinatory experience of a drug-user just as valid and genuine as the sober experiences of another person. Is it fair to say that the sober person's experiences are in some way "more real"?

What is there to say/suggest that truth is nothing more than an agreed common perception of reality? I would really appreciate any type of response to this question, whether it be a reply, some suggested reading material on the matter or whatever it may be. Thank You, Christopher

Can our social perceptions or cognition be subject to ethical judgement? I am thinking of a particular case here; let's assume, for instance, that in a certain country black people are extremely negatively portrayed by the media, in a stereotypical way. If somebody sees a perfectly innocent black person who has never done him harm, but because of widespread stereotyping sees him as dislikeable/dangerous/guilty, can we argue that he is morally responsible/guilty for such perceptions? Is the act of perceiving an innocent person as guilty immoral or, in terms of virtue ethics, unfair? What I'm wondering here especially is: since we can only be morally responsible for what is within our control, do we have enough control over our perceptions to consider them subject of moral judgement?

We always say that "is" or "doing" instead of "looks" or "I think". For example, when I am cold I say that it is "cold". Would not it be more correct to say that "I feel cold"? When we say that a car is green, is it because we see it green - but who says that there will be another who sees it blue? Siempre decimos "es" y "hacer" en vez de "parece" y "me parece". Por ejemplo, cuando tengo frío digo que hace frío. ¿No sería más correcto decir que "me parece que hace frío"? Cuando decimos que un coche es verde, es porque lo vemos verde, ¿pero quién dice que no habrá otro que lo vea azul?

Can a person who was born blind know what "red" looks like? Is there any way you can explain it to him/her so that he/she can perceive it the way we do?

The visible spectrum of light starts at red and moves to violet. Wavelengths of E.M. radiation slightly longer than red are infra-red and shorter than violet are ultra-violet, neither of which is visible to humans. My question is then: why do we see the spectrum of visible color as a cycle moving seamlessly from red to violet and through violet into red again (think of a color wheel)? Why do we not see the visible spectrum the way it would seem to make the most sense, i.e., fading in from invisible infra-red and fading out to invisible ultra-violet? This has been bugging me for some time now, hopefully one of the panelists here can give me a satisfactory answer or point me in the right direction. Thanks, -Liam C.

All the empirical objects that I perceive around me are structures of sensations: sensations of color, tactile sensations such as hot and cold, hard and soft, and rough and smooth. But sensations are supposedly manufactured in the brain, out of neural signals delivered from the sense organs. This leads to two questions: how do they get out there, into the real world; and if sensations are unreal --- they exist only as long as they are perceived --- and the real world is composed of sensations, is the real world really real?

I was looking at earlier questions in your Perception section and was intrigued by Prof. Moore's answer to the one of the car driving down the road and appearing to get smaller with distance (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/548). He said that the size of the real car is an intrinsic property of the car, but the size of the apparent car is a relational property of the real car, and subtly so. I wish he would explain this subtlety, because I just don't get it. I can see that the distance between the car and the observer is a relational property: the relation is the distance, and its terms are the apparent car and the observer. But how can the apparent size of the car be a relation? The apparent car has an apparent size which, it seems to me, is just as much an intrinsic property of the apparent car as the real size of the real car is an intrinsic property of the real car. I am also fascinated by the question that he did not answer: at what distance must the car be for us to see its real size?...