If something cannot be defined, can it exist?

Can something with attributes not have a definition?

How important is translation in the study of philosophy? It seems like, in certain areas of philosophy, precise definitions and subtle nuance can have significant impact in outcomes. I was curious how a difference in translation might affect it. One example: I have three different translations of the Tao te Ching , and for some of them, the same original comes out so differently one wonders what each translator thought they were reading at the outset! Another example: when I first read Das Kapital (in English), I was initially confused by the recurring term "means of production." Finally, it dawned on me, that term meant "technology" and serendipity! it all clicked. thank you for your consideration.

Person A receives a large amount of money. Being selfless, he doesn't want to keep the money and sends it to person B. Unfortunately, B is also selfless, and sends the money back to A. A then sends the money to C. Fortunately, C is selfish and keeps the money. Can there be selflessness without there being selfishness?

how many branches of philosophy are there, and why is language picked apart so meticulosly?

I've been wrestling with this problem for some time. My question concerns the concept of 'possibility'. When one says that something is possible, they are saying that something might be but may not be as well. There is an uncertainty. And of course whatever it is cannot both be and not be at the same time. Now, when we say that something is 'not possible', we are saying that something is not and cannot be. There is no uncertainty and the term as used does not seem to be a true negation as is usually meant when the term 'not' is used. What confuses me, is that in when actually trying to negate the concept of possibility, such as when saying 'not possible', aren't we on the one hand saying that 'that which might be' is not, and on the other hand that 'that which may not be' is not as well, and therefore is (or could be)? What may be is not and/or what may not be is. Saying that something is not possible, in this sense, is the same as saying that it is possible, thus making the negation of the concept...

My dictionary's definition of "definition" is an "exact description of a thing". The definition doesn't contain an exact description of a thing, it only mentions it, so it doesn't qualify as a definition. Paradox?

In a recent response to a question, Michael Lacewing writes: "Blackburn’s quasi-realism argues that ethical language is rather more complex than either emotivist theory claims [Ayer's and Stevenson's]. First, ethical language does express propositions, such as ‘what she did was courageous’ or ‘his remark was unkind’ as well as ‘murder is wrong’. The predicates ‘was courageous’, ‘was unkind’, ‘is wrong’, attribute a property to something (what she did, his remark, murder). However, second, these predicates aren’t genuine descriptions of what she did, etc. but ‘projections’ of our evaluations. In using ethical language, we don’t speak of and think in terms our personal evaluations, but in terms of the properties of things in the world. We treat our evaluative commitments (to courage, to kindness etc.) as though they were judgments about how the world is. This is enormously useful, because it is much easier to coordinate our attitudes with other people if we think in terms of an intersubjective world of...

It seems that one characteristic of the present Western culture is redefining anything. The unborn has now been defined as a human being who is not a person. Marriage is no longer just between a man and a woman. Homosexuality is no longer a mental disorder. With all these redefinition, it is confusing whose testimony is to be believed. My question is: is there any correct criteria for defining anything, or is it simply the case that the definition of something depends on what people thought about it?

My question is about real vs. nominal definitions. It is generally, though not universally, held that to come up with a real definition, one needs to investigate the world to discover the properties of the entity denoted by the term. So for example, to provide a real definition of the term "tiger," one would need to look at tigers to determine their characteristics. My question is: does this characterization of real definitions imply that one can make assertions about real definitions that are true or false? Consider the following: I fix the denotation of the term "tiger" (pointing to several large cats), and then provide the following real definition of "tiger": an eight-legged invertebrate. Can I accurately say that the real definition I provided for "tiger" is false? Likewise, is the correct real definition of tiger: a large four-legged cat, true?