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Ethics
Philosophers

I'm having trouble appreciating Kant's moral philosophy. According to him an action is bad if we can't universalize it as a maxim of human behavior. Under that way of thinking being gay is bad because if everyone was gay nobody would have any babies and that means you are willing the non-existence of the human race which would be a contradiction if you want to exist. So I guess bisexuality is okay but being a monk isn't. The reasoning seems absolutely bonkers if you are gay whether from choice or from nature there is no reason to surmise that you think everyone has to be gay. If Kants moral philosophy is so lame I must admit that it prejudices me against his whole philosophical system. Is there any reason why I should give Kant's ethics more credit?

The nice thing about the Kantian approach is that it does not allow for exceptions in just my case. Of course, this result stems from the fact that the Kantian approach doesn't allow for exceptions in any case, which many philosophers regard as a reductio of the approach. For example, Kant famously prohibits lying to a murderer even to protect an innocent potential victim. Most people have strong intuitions to the contrary: lying is presumptively or defeasibly wrong, we say. A false theory can imply true consequences; it's the false consequences that are its undoing.
Ethics
Religion

Why would any one think this question is meaningful? (below) Surely morality is only objective when your current language community agree on its precepts; I don't know any atheists that would claim an "objective morality" is a viable claim beyond this, and most lean towards accepting that moral systems are contingent upon cultural norms, as such they are relative. "In conversations with Christians (and members of other religious groups), more often than not I'm asked on what grounds atheism can claim to have an objective morality. This isn't a new question, but it is one I don't feel properly equipped to answer well. I think reason and our intuitions can aid us in finding objective moral truths, but I often find myself at a loss articulating a good defense. I do not find the theist's claim that morality depends on God's existence a good one, but I want to advance a better argument for why secular morality works out, and not just knock down their view. What's the general consensus among philosophers? Is...

Your question concerns Question 4929 , which you quoted. Have a look at the Morriston and Wielenberg articles that I linked to in my answer there. In the case of Wielenberg, you have an atheist who emphatically rejects the idea that "morality is only objective when your current language community agree on its precepts." Another example is Russ Shafer-Landau ( Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? , 2004; Moral Realism: A Defence , 2004). A great many atheist philosophers think that truth in ethics isn't relative to culture or community. It's a topic of much contemporary debate, as you'll see if you search the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy under "moral realism" and "moral anti-realism."
Ethics
Religion

In conversations with Christians (and members of other religious groups), more often than not I'm asked on what grounds atheism can claim to have an objective morality. This isn't a new question, but it is one I don't feel properly equipped to answer well. I think reason and our intuitions can aid us in finding objective moral truths, but I often find myself at a loss articulating a good defense. I do not find the theist's claim that morality depends on God's existence a good one, but I want to advance a better argument for why secular morality works out, and not just knock down their view. What's the general consensus among philosophers? Is there a firm foundation for morality without God?

The literature on this topic is huge. Much of the work in theoretical ethics and metaethics in the last 200 years has been an attempt to provide a non-theistic foundation for morality, whether a foundation within ethics or a foundation outside ethics. If you look under "ethics," "metaethics," and "moral" in the table of contents of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (linked in the right sidebar of this site), you'll find dozens of entries that give non-theistic treatments of ethics and ethical issues. Two good recent journal articles on the non-theistic grounding of ethics are this one by Wes Morriston and this one by Erik Wielenberg . You might also find this forthcoming paper of mine to be relevant. Best of luck in your research!
Ethics

In one famous trolley case, it seems clear that the driver should divert the trolley to the spur, killing one while saving five. In another, it seems clear that a bystnader should not push the fat man off the bridge, again killing one to save five in the trolley's path. But what is the justification for my intuition? Do you see any relevant, principled difference between the two cases that would explain why I should divert the trolley yet refrain from pushing the fat man?

I think it should be noted that Professor Pogge's reply invokes, or alludes to, the controversial Doctrine of Double Effect (or else something close to that doctrine). For an account of the doctrine and of some of the controversy surrounding it, see this SEP article . One problem for the doctrine emerges when we consider a reply that B2 might make: "I didn't intend the trolley to hurt the fat man. I intended only that he stop the trolley (although of course I foresaw that his being harmed would be a side-effect of his stopping the trolley). So I didn't intend harm any more than B1 did." B2's reply seems lame, no?
Ethics

Is it ethical to kill someone in self-defense? My instinct was yes at first, but upon further reflection, in a situation where it's "you or them", I can't seem to think of a reason to kill someone in self-defense, other than the fact that you simply want to live. After all, you're still taking a human life. (Also if you could explain why it is or isn't ethical would help me out a lot thanks!)

By "Is it ethical to kill someone in self-defense?" I take it you mean "Is it ever morally permissible to do so?" Consider a tidy case, in which you're morally innocent and in which, for all you can reasonably tell, it's certain you'll be killed unless you kill your attacker. If it's not morally permissible for you to kill the attacker, then it must be morally obligatory for you to allow yourself to be killed: permission and obligation are two sides of the same coin. Hence, unless it's morally obligatory for you to allow yourself to be killed, it's morally permissible for you to kill your attacker. I can't see how it could be morally obligatory for you to allow yourself to be killed in that situation, so I readily conclude that you're morally permitted to kill your attacker. (I recognize that some prominent figures have taken the opposite view, apparently including Jesus in Mt. 5:39 .)

My colleagues' examples show me that my intuitions aren't thoroughly consequentialist. I think an innocent person (and maybe any person) always has a right to lethal self-defense if needed to avoid a lethal threat. An innocent person's (and maybe any person's) sacrificing his/her life is always morally supererogatory.
Ethics

Is all suffering morally relevant, even if brought upon oneself? If a person takes part in an activity where they might expect to suffer and that they could choose to abandon at any time, but persist because they think that the suffering will stop and the activity will become engaging, does their suffering still matter?

One common view is that suffering is always morally relevant, in the sense that there's always a moral presumption against knowingly allowing suffering that you could (easily enough) prevent, especially when you're uniquely positioned to prevent it. But often this presumption is overcome, as when parents rightly allow their children to suffer painful vaccinations for their own good, or a coach rightly allows athletes to suffer during a grueling workout that improves their performance. We sometimes (although not always) respect an autonomous agent's choice to suffer for reasons we don't think are good reasons, as when we allow adults to try particular stunts from "Jackass" just because someone dared them to. All of this is compatible, I think, with the claim that suffering is "loaded" in the morally negative way I sketched above. You may find something useful in this SEP entry .
Ethics

I don't drink alcohol. I have a few reasons - I rarely enjoy the taste, it's expensive, it's not really healthy, and I don't like letting my behavior be influenced by the substances I drink - but mainly I've just never felt any kind of desire to drink. Yet when I am out with people I don't know particularly well, they tend to be insistent that I drink alcohol with them - remarkably insistent. I've even had people get frustrated with me because I won't drink, frowning and telling me "Stop making a big deal about it, just have a drink!". I've had to make up excuses such as "I used to be an alcoholic," "I'm taking medication" or (if I am desperate) "My religion forbids me from drinking alcohol" - only then will people finally, grudgingly, leave me to my tea. Is it wrong of me to insist not to drink alcohol, or should I, for the sake of not offending my colleagues, suck it up and drink? Is it acceptable for others to insist so strongly that I do so? Why does it even matter? I've occasionally had to...

I think these questions are as easily answered as you seem to think they are. You're clearly within your rights -- to put it mildly! -- when you decline alcohol despite being pressured. Is it acceptable for others to pressure you? Morally acceptable, yes, in that it's not morally impermissible. But I'd say it's unfriendly and rude, at a minimum, when you've made it clear you don't drink. If drinking is an important social norm among a particular group of people, I'd suggest you socialize with different people -- and I'd say that even to someone who does drink occasionally. Given the enormous harm caused by alcohol abuse, the moral presumption is, if anything, against anyone who pressures people to drink.
Ethics
Happiness

Who´s happiness is most important? My own or my family´s wich I have a responsible for as a mother and a wife? I´m used to, and it´s a part of my personality to always make sure that everybody around me is happy and content.But I suddenly realized that I forgotten all about me and what I want and need to be happy. I´m now facing the fact that in order to be happy and content, I need a divorce. Our marrige with two teenagers, is OK, but nothing more- we are like best friends. I suppose that my action will come as a complete surprise to everybody around us. And it will cause a lot of anger, tears and questions. And the only answer I have is- I have to do this for me. Do I really have the ethic right to hurt everybody around me in order for me to be happy.

Your questions are important and obviously deeply-felt. I hesitate to offer answers to them because I don't think I'm particularly qualified as a philosopher to do that. But there are philosophers who hold themselves out as qualified; they're known as "philosophical practitioners," and you can find out more at this website . I don't know enough to say whether they're any good. But a couple of responses do occur to me. You say that you're "responsible" for your family's happiness. If by that you mean "solely responsible" or "more responsible than any other member of the family," then I'd respectfully disagree. I don't see why one parent in the family has more responsibility for the collective happiness of the family than the other does. You also ask if it would be ethically OK for you to divorce if it hurts others. Unless you have reason to think that your divorce would be more hurtful to others than most divorces are, then really you're asking whether divorce, period, is...
Ethics

Are all non-self-contradicting ethics systems equal? Say I don't physically discipline a child because I believe it is unethical to intentionally harm another human. Do I have any reason to say that another person ought not to physically discipline their child if they believe that there is nothing unethical about harming another?

Good question. You ask if all self-consistent ethical systems are equal, by which I take it you mean "equally plausible," "equally likely to be true," or "equally defensible." The crude sample principles you gave might suggest an affirmative answer to that question, but only because they seem about equally implausible. The first principle implies that I can't justifiably harm another even to protect myself or an innocent third party from harm. The second principle implies that I can justifiably harm another for any reason, or no reason, at all. Both conflict with widely and deeply held moral intuitions that are more plausible than the principles themselves. Adherents of each principle could simply reject those intuitions, but we don't have to regard that as a successful defense of those principles. More generally we might ask, "Are all self-consistent descriptions of reality true?" Logic gives us a straightforward answer: No. Two self-consistent descriptions of reality can be inconsistent...
Animals
Ethics

I read somewhere that a human being's DNA is almost the same as a rat's. (I think the percentage of similarity is 90%.) In other words, we're animals. If I saw a group of grey squirrels killing a group of brown squirrels in a park, I wouldn't judge the actions of the grey squirrels as "immoral." I would just wait for a biologist to give me some explanation. (There is a limited supply of nuts in the park; the grey squirrels have a mutation in their brain that makes them overly aggressive; etc.) So when one group of human beings commits genocide against a different group of human beings, why do we label it as "immoral" when we wouldn't do the same for squirrels (considering that humans are merely animals in the end.)

The knowledge that human beings are animals didn't, of course, await the discovery of DNA. We've known it for millennia. But your question puts enormous weight on our being merely animals: the word "merely" is being asked to do all the argumentative work. I take it you're suggesting that anything that's merely an animal can't act immorally. It's open to someone to reply that either we're not merely animals or else some mere animals can act immorally. Indeed, if there's anything we know of that can act immorally, it's an animal -- rather than a plant, bacterium, or fungus. The capacity to act immorally arises from ongoing self-awareness, rational agency, the ability to reflect on one's actions, and the like -- features possessed by some animals (including but probably not limited to our species in this vast universe) and lacked by other animals (such as squirrels). On Earth anyway, the ability to philosophize seems to be restricted to human animals. Why not, then, the ability to act...

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