How malleable is meaning? Example: can we take a word that is commonly understood to mean/refer to a specific thing and give it an entirely new meaning (or at least one that, despite its slight similarity is still significantly removed from the original)? Example: referring to a traffic light as 'autistic' (given that it operates in one way, without change) without meaning this metaphorically.

For any given term or concept, is it possible to formulate a correct definition? Some people claim all definitions are equally valid and subjective. I can't believe this though because if we can't agree on a definition, then you can't transmit your exact meaning to me through words, and the whole idea of communication is shot. How can definitions be rooted in reality and truth?

This is in response to the question about Hellen Keller and whether or not there is thought without language [http://www.amherst.edu/askphilosophers/question/459]. How could a thoughtless person ACQUIRE language? It seems that the process of learning a language (or anything else, for that matter) would require thought. Doesn't this argument prove that thought exists prior to language acquisition? The same can be said of babies. Not many would argue that pre-verbal babies are incapable of thought. Otherwise they would never learn anything.

Do men need speech in order to think? In other words, can we do the act of thinking without "speaking" to ourselves consciously or unconsciously? For myself, I use colloquial English, the language I am most fluent in, when I think in my mind. Does it have to be the case that one would use his or her most developed language to think?

Can "God" be used as a name for whatever created the universe, while not actually meaning the "God" that exists in religion? Just a quick example, if the Big Bang was caused by a massive black hole that eventually absorbed all existing matter before imploding, could we call that process "god"? Or is "god" a defined word?

Given the difficulty (or perhaps impossibility) of reaching a solid and uncontested 'definition' of art, can it be talked about? More generally, must we know what a thing 'is' in order to talk about it, and if so how do we go about finding out what it is?

To what extent do our words influence our perceptions? Is the whorfian hypothesis completely wrong? Does referring to "mail carriers" or "mailperson" (as opposed to "mailman") contribute to the increase of woman mail carriers? Or, does a change in our thought result in a change our words?

Is it fair to say that analytic philosophy of language has been more concerned with language as (actual) use and language as (actual) knowledge than with the problem of correct interpretation? When I say "the problem of correct interpretation" I mean the problem of giving good reasons to justify the claim that some interpretation (a paraphrase or a translation) is correct or the correct one. I am aware that much has been written on the "indeterminacy of translation", but isn't it possible to give arguments for or against the correctness of a certain interpretation in spite of such "indeterminacy"? Where can I read about it?

Do we think in our native language? Can we speak German but think French? My French friend insists that we cannot as his native language is French yet when he speaks English he thinks in English and vice-versa.

Why do people who study language put so much attention on the speaker's intentions? Isn't it obvious that we often don't say what we want?