In philosophy terminology, what is the difference between the self and the soul? When philosophers argue against the existence of the self, are they really doing something much different than when they argue against the existence of the soul? Can you recommend any books that make this clear?

I need a thorough explanation on what the term 'qualia' defines. How would I use it in an expressive way? It's hard for me to formulate it in a sentence. In order to fully comprehend -- I'll need for the word to be deconstructed. Please and thank you.

Is it considered possible to be consciously aware of an object or thought without experiencing feelings, or is "feelings" just another word for conscious awareness?. If this question can't be dismissed, which philosophers have explored it?

What is conciousness? what causes it? is it an external processs or an internal process? (sorry this is a weighty question, and I know there are no concrete answers, but are there any interesting theories out there?) What are your thoughts? Is conciousness a part of the environment as well as a "bodily" process? where does the trigger start? I find this subject matter very confusing, Thanks so much for your help!

I'm currently preparing for my A-level philosophy exam and am stuck on how a logical behaviourist would respond to the problem of qualia? The problem being that the 'what-is-likeness' of experience fails to be accounted for as there is no behaviour which reflects this sensation. So how would the behaviourist respond? or would they even deem qualia as a problem for their thesis? Thanks.

I am currently studying Existentialism and have come across a statement by Sartre that appears to suggest that consciousness or being- for- itself is not determined in any manner by being-in-itself (which presumably is absolutely determined). However, the question arises that if the world of objects (being-in-itself) represents the total environment then how it is possible, in the light of recent neurological, genetic and psychological findings (e.g. questioning volitional aspects of freewill) can being-for-itself (i.e. consciousness) not interact with being-in itself? Have I misunderstood the meaning of this idea? All the best Paul C. Clinical Psychologist

Is it possible to perceive something unconsciously?

Is it a common belief among philosophers that the external world does not exist independently of consciousness? That consciousness creates the material world rather than the other way around? How can anyone believe this?

I recently read a story in the news about near death experience...People seeing dead relatives, bright lights etc. The article mentioned that the science community is currently researching and one of the things they are doing is placing objects in operating rooms and/or taping pictures to the ceilings to understand if this is purely something the mind makes up to deal with the situation it finds itself in or if this is an indication that conscienceless can survive outside the body. I've never had such an experience but it poses an interesting question... Does philosophy have a perspective on consciousness surviving outside the body and/or does it have an opinion on this kind of experience?

Why is it so difficult to accurately discuss consciousness? People have been fumbling around with strange thought experiments and neologisms like "qualia" for a while now, yet there still doesn't seem to be any clear language to use while discussing the "hard problem of consciousness". The closest I can get is to frame the question using a computer analogy. A computer can compute, and then it can provide output to show a human user what it's computing. Our minds seem to be providing "output" that we might call consciousness or experience; why isn't it just computing in the dark? Yet even this analogy seems clumsy and inaccurate. So what makes consciousness so uniquely impossible to discuss in a clear fashion? I've never come across any other topic where language itself failed to grasp the subject of discussion.