My first thought in response is that you ar raising an empirical question about human psychology that philosophers aren't in a very good position to answer. It is very hard to tell what is true of human psychology, in general, without looking at lots of different humans in different circumstances, etc. (Of course we do generalize about some aspects of human psychology from our own case all the time...the particular question you ask seems tricky to answer because it isn't exactly clear what sort of need you have in mind. We don't need faith like we need air and water, surely, i.e., we can live without it. Is the question whether it is necessary for something other than life itself?) A related question might be whether it is possible (or desirable) to live with only well-justified beliefs, or whether sometimes we have no choice but to believe things without sufficient evidence. There are (at least) two kinds of case: (i) we might believe things for which it is possible, in principle, to gain...

These are really good questions and there are definitely many empirical issues that should be settled before we can adequately evaluate a proposal such as global vegetarianism, or a ban on animal products by the EU. First, it is worth noting that not all vegetarians are utilitarians, or even consequentialists, and some may think that animals have rights that should be considered even at the expense of some degree of human suffering. How much human suffering is a hard question for such views. Second, for the reasons you suggest, those who support global vegetarianism should probably not support the immediate end to all use of animal products. The goal would be, I think, to find alternative ways to feed and clothe ourselves in ways that are consistent with the well-being of animals. This won't happen over night. But we can take steps every day to reduce the pain, suffering, and death we cause to animals. (A nice statement of this "do your best" approach is in Sue Donaldson's Foods that...

That's interesting. I would be inclined to say that necessarily nothing can both be a human hand an a parrot, so even if the skeptic is right, we can still know that the hand in question is not a parrot. Rather than skepticism, I think the worry would be how we can know that the concept of human hand is incompatible with the concept of parrot. I agree with Allen, however, that in order to answer this question we'd have to get clearer on the notions of "objective" and "prove" etc. But parrots are a kind of bird (the quickest web definition states: " usually brightly colored zygodactyl tropical birds with short hooked beaks and the ability to mimic sounds") and human hands aren't birds at all. So either you're wrong that you're talking about a human hand, or you're wrong that it is a parrot. And even a skeptic could grant this....

I can't comment on the law, but I would argue that one does not have a moral obligation to have sex with one's partner in marriage. In fact, I can easily think of cases in which one has an obligation not to have sex with one's partner, e.g., if one's partner doesn't want to have sex. Another case is one in which one's partner's health is such that one would cause harm to him/her by having sex. You might be wondering, though, about cases in which one partner wants sex and the other doesn't. Does the undesiring partner have an obligation to have sex with the desiring partner? I would argue that there isn't such an obligation or anything even close. Certainly there is no obligation to have sex with someone you don't desire outside of marriage, so the source of the obligation must be marriage. And I have never heard a marriage vow that includes: "and I promise to have sex with you even if I don't want to." It may be that assumptions around the institution of marriage make it plausible that...

I take it the question you're curious about is whether we use the term 'depression' differently now than it was used, say, 50 or 75 years ago, and whether such change in the criteria for depression explains an apparent increase in diagnoses. An answer to this seems to me to depend on empirical investigation thatphilosophers are not (mostly) in a good position to undertake. It would be important to look at the studies that purport to show an increase in depression and determine whether the criteria have changed over the period of the study. Another factor affecting diagnosis is the availability of medication to treat the disorder: if there is no effective treatment, there is less motivation to get a diagnosis. The recent availability of effective anti-depressants may have had a substantial effect on the numbers diagnosed. Determining whether there has been a real change in the overall emotional/psychological states of people in the West would have to take many different possibilities into account. ...

The question presupposes that some people are philosophers--in some special and perhaps deep sense--and others aren't. (Of course some people are professional philosophers and others aren't. But I don't think that's what you're asking about.) I don't believe that there is a group of people who are philosophers in a deep sense. Philosophy is something that people do. Some people do it more than others. Most people can do it if they encounter a philosophical problem. Some people love to do it, others hate it. People tend to do it better if they are coached by others who have done it a lot. People who have done it a lot, love it, and have gotten good at it get called 'philosophers'. Likewise, people who run a lot, love it, and have gotten good at it, get called 'runners'. I can run if I want, but I'm not a runner in this sense. Just as it seems odd to ask whether someone really is a runner, I find it odd to ask whether someone really is a philosopher. Perhaps you are wondering if...

Hi Kobe: There are a lot of interesting issues packed into your question. Let me try to unpack a couple of them. Philosophers tend to think that knowledge just is a special kind of belief, e.g., a belief that is true and that one is justified in holding. So for most philosophers to conclude that knowledge is nothing more than a belief isn't that worrisome. What is more worrisome is whether knowledge is nothing more than "mere opinion" or "unjustified belief". This may be what you have in mind. But then the question is why you think that the argument you give leads to the conclusion that knowledge is nothing more than mere opinion. To begin, most philosophers think that we have lots of knowledge that is not based on axioms. For example, when I believe that there is a pencil on my desk based on my perception of the pencil, this belief counts as knowledge even though it wasn't derived from an axiom. The domain where it is more plausible that knowledge is axiomatic is in logic and math ...

It isn't clear to me exactly what the tension is. It will, no doubt, depend on the religion in question. Some religions do not hold that the non-believer will be punished or that there is a special religious basis for morality. In my experience, many who do believe that the non-believer will go to hell make an effort to "save" souls; those who don't may be shy or preoccupied with other things. Being uninterested in converting others is not the same as being opposed to it (though more on this below). On the broader issue of morality, I'm not sure why the religious person is in a position any different from any moral person. If believe that eating meat is morally wrong (for whatever reason), should I try to convince others to become vegetarian? Well, one's answer will depend on the broader moral theory one subscribes to. If I'm a utilitarian, I'll have to determine whether trying to convince others to be vegetarian will have the best consequences; maybe I'm terrible at such efforts and...

I'm not sure what you have in mind by "moral harm" but one thought would be that moral harm to someone results when a moral obligation to that person is violated. So if I have a moral obligation to respect your bodily integrity, then if I assault you, I violate that obligation and not only cause you pain and suffering, but moral harm. If this is the idea, then the question really turns on whether we have moral obligations to ourselves. It seems plausible that we do. One might argue that just as it would be wrong for another to violate my bodily integrity, it would be wrong for me to do so as well, e.g., by chopping off my own hand. Here it might be worth asking: if I am morally entitled to a certain kind of treatment, e.g., say that there is a moral requirement that persons be treated with respect, can I ever legitimately exempt myself from the rule, even when my action is directed towards myself? If not, then it seems one can morally harm onself by not according oneself due respect.

Strictly speaking creationism says not just that life on earth was created, but that it was created by God; and evolution says not just that life has evolved, but that life emerged through evolutionary processes (and not God's act of creation). So they aren't strictly speaking compatible. One could, however, articulate similar views that are compatible. Some have suggested, for example, that God was responsible for the Big Bang, but things have proceeded according to natural processes since then. Compatibility or incompatiblity depends on the details of how you spell the views out.