If God exists and he knows it all, even the future, then he knew Hitler would go to hell before Hitler was even born. Why would God give someone life, just to send him to hell for all eternity? Is this fair to Hitler and all those doomed to go to hell or is this proof that God doesn't really know it all, not the future at least?

Is it possible, within the freewill/determinism duality, to posit a third pole - namely 'chance' in which spontaneity is possible albeit within a set of limiting conditions?

Believing that once all factors have weighed in the construction of any individual (genetic disposition, cultural programming, the expectations of family and friends, the influences of the magazines on your coffee table...) that free will and freedom of choice are nothing but a comforting delusion, could anyone point me to a philosopher I might study who shares this thought?

Why do we imagine that one may/should compensate for a lack of skill with hard work? Do we really have any reason to believe that one's capacity for (or at least one's inclination to) "hard work" is any more under our control than one's "skill" level? - ca$h money hobo

I am having trouble with the classic problem of free choice vs. determinism specifically in the sphere of human responsibility. While I often recognise that there are external factors that can and do bring people to act in various ways, I also find myself impatient with those who are unwilling to admit to a certain degree of responsibility. My problem seems to be that I recognise both not just as possible, but true simultaneously. Philosophically speaking, can this be so?

Since all decisions are made from our brains and we do not get to choose what brain we are born with, do we really have control over our decisions and are we really responsible for these decisions?

I find the distinction between compatibilism and determinism to be incomprehensible. Suppose that determinism is true and incompatible with moral responsibility. Then, person A might hold person B morally responsible but according to determinism, person A was hardwired to do this, so we can not hold A morally responsible for holding person B morally responsible (and even if we were to hold A morally responsible, our holding A morally responsible can not bear moral responsibility). In other words, A can hold B morally responsible. So, then, is there really a distinction between compatibilism and determinism?

Hello, I was wondering if Greek author Nikos Kazantzakis' epitaph, "I hope for nothing, I fear nothing, I am free" holds philosophical weight? Do any philosophers support the idea that if you hope and fear nothing then you are truly free?

Even though it has been strongly argued that divine foreknowledge doesn't negate free will, allow me to ask the question another way. How could God know our decisions if they are truly free? To know the outcome of something is to imply contingency (and determinism). To put it another way, if a third party can know the nature of an individual then that individual cannot be the author of his nature.

If a man held a gun to your head and told you to go downstairs, would you have a choice?