I think science can probably tell us lots of things about how people reason morally, that is, how they think about what they ought to do. And it might well be interesting to look at cross-cultural differences, and perhaps even more interesting to look for cross-cultural similarities, that is, "moral universals", in the sense of moral principles, or forms of reasoning, that are in some sense universal. Psychologists and philosophers have been doing just this in recent years. But it seems important to recognize the contrast you cite at the end of your question: No such investigation could possibly tell us what moral behavior ought to be, that is, tell us what one actually ought to do. Suppose there turn out to be certain "moral universals". It would be a coherent position that these are just wrong, that is, that, by reasoning in accord with them, one will not typically arrive at the thing one ought to do. One cannot just assume otherwise. That is not to say that it would not be interesting, even on...

That all seems right, to be sure. But I'm not sure we're thinking about the question whether hypocrisy is wrong in quite the right way. For note, first of all, that, even if hypocrisy is wrong, that does not mean that the solution should be to cease advocating what is right. It might, rather, be to stop doing what is wrong. But there are other options you might consider. The case you suggest has it that what is being advocated is good, but is privately violated. There seem to me to be other cases, however; and even this case has different versions. Here are some cases: Fred might vociferously advocate that one ought to do X, when, indeed, one ought, but not himself do X. Fred might wholeheartedly insist that one ought to do X, when it is morally permissible but not obligatory to do X, and himself not do X. Fred might repeatedly claim that one ought to do X, when it is morally im permissible to do X, but himself refrain from X-ing. Fred might strenuously argue that one must not...

Let me ask a view questions. Is it clear that viewing child pornography is always wrong? Consider a detective who is viewing it in an attempt to establish the identities of the participants. Is it clear that any photograph of children being sexually exploited by adults is ipso facto wrong? Consider a reporter who takes pictures of some politician in bed with a pre-pubescent boy. What is distinctive of the case in which we would intuitively regard the viewing as wrong? What attitude towards the participants does such viewing involve? In particular, what attitude towards the children does it involve? Does viewing child pornography as a way of achieving sexual gratification seem compatible with a compassionate attitude towards children and a proper respect for their interests and their autonomy? Does it seem compatible with a proper appreciation of their suffering? The wrong might lie less in the viewing than it what one's viewing such things as a means of sexual gratification says about...

No, they are not. They are violating the legitimate rights of the people who are applying for the license. This is the sort of place that a comparision to inter-racial marriage is worth making, even though there are lots of differences between the two cases. It really did happen that inter-racial couples were denied marriage licenses to which they were legally entitled, and the clerks who refused to issue such licenses may well have been, and probably were, acting out of "strong beliefs about the immorality of [inter-raical] marriage", beliefs that may, just like some people's beliefs about gay marriage, have been founded on their religious views. Unless we can find some relevant difference between these cases, then, we shall have to say the same thing about them. People nowadays seem to me to forget how widespread opposition to inter-racial marriage once was. States had and enforced "anti-miscegenation" laws because very large portions of the populations of those states wanted to have such...

The notion of "intellectual property" is fraught with difficulty, and my first reaction to this kind of argument is to question whether there is any such thing. Indeed, there are intelligent and thoughtful people who do precisely that. See, for example, this post by Richard Stallman. But one does not have to go that far to think, as many more people do, that copyright (and especially patent) law has gotten completely out of hand. Most people seem to think that copyrights and patents exist to protect the rights of the creator of the work in question. This is questionable. One might hold instead that they exist to further society's interest in encouraging creativity and innovation, and that the laws governing so-called "intellectual property" ought to based upon an understanding that this is, indeed, the sole legitimate purpose of such laws. So, if we value the creation and production of music and wish to encourage it, we would do well to think about what a sustainable and rational ...

Well, the first thing that's bad about it is that it flies in the face of the obvious evidence. But that's not what you meant, presumably. Merely believing something false isn't usually held to be morally objectionable, the way Holocaust denial is. So why is that morally objectionable? Well, I think we have to look at the moral surroundings. People who deny the fact of the Holocaust are not normally historians with a detached interest in the matter. Holocaust deniers do not have good, independent reason to think things are other than the rest of us believe. Rather, they want there not to have been a Holocaust, or for it not to have been as bad as is usually thought, and so they flatly disregard the obvious evidence or invent reasons to discount it. So one thing one might say is that those who deny the Holocaust (almost?) always have an ulterior motive, and it's not so much the denial itself that is problematic as the motives behind it. Indeed, I don't myself see that there would be anything...

I don't know if it mitigates it, but I think it's important to understand that, even people who do things as horrific as what Hitler did, very often do not think of themselves as doing anything wrong. Maybe Hitler is a bad example, as he is known to have been pretty nuts, but take Osama bin Laden. From what I've read, he is often described as quite charming and intelligent, and for all I know he's very kind to his various wives and children, generous to strangers, and so forth. But the dude has an axe to grind, and he thinks of himself as justified in grinding it. As for the innocents who die, collateral damage, you know? Or maybe they're not all so innocent, really. And what of the people in the United States who condoned and even encouraged torture? They clearly didn't think they were doing anything wrong, and yet what they did was horrendously wrong. Vice President Cheney, so far as I am concerned, is guilty of war crimes, and he ought to be tried, convicted, and imprisoned forthwith. And yet,...

There are several different questions here. The first is whether, in the circumstances imagined, one would have a right to kill the developing ovum, or whatever. The second is whether a negative answer to this question would invalidate arguments in favor of the the permissibility of abortion. Let me answer the second question first. I think the answer here is "No": At least, I don't see that there are any very plausible arguments it would undermine. If you consider, for example, the central argument of Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous paper "A Defense of Abortion", it depends crucially upon the fact that the developing fetus is dependent upon the woman's body and that the woman's body is affected by the presence of the fetus. Thomson then argues, largely by analogy, that a woman is not morally obligated to carry a fetus under those circumstances. It's this kind of argument that I take to be summed up by "a woman should have control over what happens in and to her body". Thomson actually does...

Are we entirely sure that religious people do tend to be kinder and more compassionate than secular people? And are we sure of this, especially, when we do not set aside the notable exceptions?

It is not at all obvious that captial punishment used to be morally permissible. What is obvious is that most people, or some powerful people, or something along those lines thought it was morally permissible (that is, "right" or "OK"). It may well be that it was always morally impermissible (that is, "wrong"), but people didn't realize this. That would certainly be my view. There's nothing peculiar about what I'm suggesting. People used to think the earth was at the center of the universe. It wasn't. They were wrong. People used to think it was OK to leave babies on the sides of mountains to die in the noonday sun. They too were wrong. Maybe the same goes for capital punishment. And even sex outside of marriage. So philosophy can at least contribute that sort of clarification. And maybe a bit more: By examining our presumptions carefully, perhaps philosophy can help us realize that what we think, even what we really, firmly believe, isn't right, after all.