You can't create something out of nothing can you! And yet, here we exist. Is this not the most relevant question we can't answer?

What question are you referring to? I'll hazard a guess that you are talking about why there is something rather than nothing. Then your idea seems to be that, because something can't come from nothing, there is no explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. But does this really follow from the claim that something can't come nothing? Perhaps there was always something and this allows us to explain why something exists in the following way. There is something now because at an earlier time there was something and it is a physical law that the earlier something developed into what exists now. You might ask, Why was there something at that earlier time? But we could then employ that same style of explanation at this earlier time. You might also ask, Why was there something rather than nothing at the first moment? But suppose there is no first moment to the universe. Would this explanation then have provided an answer to why there is something rather than nothing? After all, for any...

I was reading an argument for Metaphysical Solipsism and while most of the premises were ultimately meaningless, one of them store out to me and I still am unclear about its value. “Occam's Razor This is a form of ontological parisomony which deems a competing theory a priori most likely if that theory has less ontological commitments than the other theory [4]. If two theories X and Y have the same ontological commitments, but X is ontologically committed to Z and Y is not, it would deem Y as more parsimonious than X. Thus, this argument is frameworked by the fact that metaphysical solipsism posits the fewest ontological assumptions. To promote an alternate ontology would be to assume that qualia represents a physical reality, external to the mind. It has been shown that such a fact is dubious and unjustifiable via the Trilemma, thus metaphysical solipsism ought to be deemed a priori most likely. ”Endquote Is it true that Occam’s razor seems to support Solipsism, or does it reject solipsism on the...

The version of Occam's Razor quoted above seems to support solipsism, the view that only one's conscious experience exists, over a view which also admits the reality of the external world. After all, solipsism is committed to fewer entities than the latter view, which also countenances the existence of stars, atoms, and rollercoasters. I'll interpret the quote that explicates Occam's Razor as holding that the following is a priori: if we have two theories, X and Y, and Y says that fewer kinds of things exist than X does, then Y is more likely to be true, on some given some body of evidence, than X. This principle does indeed indicate that we should take solipsism to be more likely to be true than realism about the external world. The problem is that the principle isn't quite right. As it stands, the above principle says that the theory on which nothing exists is more likely to be true than any other theory, given our current evidence. No matter what you take our current evidence to be, even if you...