Interesting question(s)! I'm afraid that it will be very difficult to replace arguments and the different "tools" philosophers use with neurological data. First, I assume that in identifying a subject as "deluded" we would have to know the falsehood of her belief and perhaps identify which fallacies she has committed. We would also need to think through ideas of mental causation and the degree to which a person's beliefs may be linked to neurological events (are we going to assume a reductive account of the mental? or are we going to allow that propositions, mental acts such as 'believing' are irreducible to the physical, in particular, brain states and processes?. We also need more than neurology to identify and define what is a 'religion.' You seem particularly interested in theism, but some important religions are non-theistic (most forms of Buddhism), and some theists are not religious (Richard Taylor may have been a good case of this). Still, there are some common sense ways in which...

Thank you for this inquiry! The idea that all our beliefs, religious or not, must have sufficient evidence is sometimes called "evidentialism." It is much debated today: some philosophers think there is no uncontroversial domain of what may or may not count as evidence nor, if we did agree on what counts as evidence, how much evidence one needs in order for a belief to be justified. I am inclined to think that all or most of our beliefs are in fact backed up by some evidence (reasons for thinking our beliefs are true), however modest and elusive. And I also suggest that the belief in God is rarely without some evidence, even if it only amounts to 'it appears to me that God exists.' But four things might be noted in reply to your question(s). First, not all evidence for a belief need involve "physical manifestations," a "physical form," or the natural and social sciences. Part of the problem with these claims is that we do not have a clear, universal concept of what counts as physical. Second...

Actually, all the classical and most contemporary arguments for the existence of God are each based on (or involve) a conception of God and divine attributes. So, every version of the cosmological argument I know of as used to support theism relies on the idea that, if there is a God, God exists necessarily or is not causally dependent on other beings, God is without beginning or self-explaing, and so on. Most versions of the ontological argument begin with the idea that God is maximally excellent (or God is such that no greater reality can be conceived) and that thesis is used to argue that a maximally excellent being would be necessarily existing, essentially good, omnipotent, omniscient, and so on. For a fuller picture of how arguments rely on divine attributes see the Philosophy of Religion entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy or see the book published by Continuum: Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide. In terms of the philosophical concept and conviction that there is a God, it may be...

Much appreciate! I believe that the assessment of whether any particular event is the result of God's provident will rest on one's background beliefs. If, for example, one has plausible reasons for thinking theism is true (based on any of the classical or contemporary arguments, for examples of these see the entry, Philosophy of Religion in the free and online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), then there will more openness to accepting a theistic account of, say, a healing than if one has independent reason for thinking theism is false and naturalism is true. However, I suggest that it would be best to see any argument for (or against) God based on ostensible miracles as a component in a comprehensive case for theism based on religious experience. There are a host of defenders of such an argument: Kai Man Kwan, William Wainwright, Caroine Davis, William Alston, Keith Yandell, Richard Swinburne, and others. Of course, as in all interesting matters, there are serious critics, but my point is to...

Yes! While I am not myself an atheist, the idea of "spirituality" or "being spiritual" can describe someone who approaches life with reverence and reflective care regardless of whether they recognize the reality of God. While the idea of "spirituality" emerged with the idea of "spirit" and thus conjures up a background of the supernatural (as in the idea of there being a "Holy Spirit" as part of the Trinity in Christian theology), someone may engage in many of the better or ideal practices we associate with religious tradition (meditation, compassion...) without belonging to any religion. On philosophers who are what I would call spiritual and atheists, you might look at the volume Louise Antony edited: Philosophers without God. Also, see work by Owen Flannagen and Robert Solomon. Keep in mind, too, that most forms of Buddhism are readily recognized as "spiritual" and yet are non-theistic. If you are open to the theistic side of the fence, you might check out Stewart Goetz's latest book with...

Good question and set of concerns. I gather you are dismayed by how some persons' faith may seem irresistible to counter-evidence. I suppose an analogy would be a case when I continue to trust my husband is a good man on the grounds that he sometimes demonstrably cares for me and I explain the times that he neglects or seems to injure me on the grounds that he must be so very wise that his action or inaction is actually good for me. That's a problem. When it comes to reflecting on God in response to your concerns, perhaps three points are worth considering. First, according to the major theistic traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, God is a reality that is omnipresent and immanent to creation, but also the transcendent creator and sustainer of the cosmos. So the concept of God seems vastly to outstrip any ordinary, finite agent. So, when reflecting on God we should think not of the ethical ways of finite creatures but, as it were, the values that would be in play if there is a Creator...

I am probably the only one on the panel who does defend the ontological argument, so I suppose I better reply! There are various versions of the ontological argument, in fact one version (that one can find in the work of Spinoza) does not at all rule out suffering as part of reality and, indeed, Spinoza's God is not theistic and so not purposive. But that aside, I accept a version of the ontological argument that is theistic (God is essentially good, omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily existing, and the like) and so I do need to face up to the problem of evil. Two things to consider: first, the ontological argument (at least the one I accept you can find a version in my book Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide and on the free online Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy entry "Philosophy of Religion works from the possibility that God exists, to the conclusion that God necessarily exists. Now, if you think the evils in this world show that it is impossible that there is the God of theism, then...

Great question, and I feel sure that what I will suggest in response will not strike you as adequate, but let me offer seven things to bear in mind in assessing the force of the challenge you are raising for traditional theists who believe God to be all good, omniscient, and omnipotent:: First, a very minor point, not all of what we call "mental illness" involves the subject suffering. Someone with an illness involving severe cognitive impairment might even have less suffering that most mentally healthy persons. Second, when we consider cases of illness that do involve undeserved suffering it is not clear to me why this stands out as a special case from other instances of undeserved suffering. Is it worse to be born or develop bi-polar disorder through no fault of one's own than for a healthy, mentally fit child to be killed in an auto accident, etc...? Or consider the suffering of non-human animals whose suffering is not out of their sin or mis-use of freedom, and the like. Third, on the...

Your argument and questions are excellent. Some things to consider: I do not think any religions that acknowledge that God acts miraculously (that is, God brings about events of religious significance that would not have occurred if God had not acted) entails that miraculous events could not be repeated. There is nothing conceptually odd given the concept of a miracle if God were to miraculously lift the state of Texas 15,000 feet every Monday in December, though perhaps the event would seem to fall short in terms of other factors: such a feet would seem pointless and scary and perhaps make people think God is more like Zeus or a clown or a Texan than a God of justice, love, and goodness. Still, there is an interesting issue in play if God were to repeatedly and comprehensively act to bring about something that would not occur by "nature" alone or without God's will. Some Christians believe that the emergence of consciousness in each person is partly due to God's willing that when biological organisms...

Thank you for this inquiry! I believe an excellent book to check out is The Believing Primate published by Oxford University Press and edited by Jeff Schloss and Michael Murray. There is a great deal of material there on the projects of accounting for the emergence and continuation of religion and the philosophical presuppositions of these projects and their philosophical implications. You also might enjoy The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion which considers the study of religion from different scientific (including the social sciences) points of view and it includes a chapter on the philosophical investigation of religion (a second edition is in the works), edited by Robert Segal. Three is also a fascinating book just published called The Routledge Companion to Theism which is a massive, impressive work that includes reflections on the sciences and cross-cultural philosophical work on theism and its alternatives. You may (like a number of others) find the moral implications of the Judeo...