I agree with the two other replies, that neither theists nor atheists need be dogmatic. I would, however, like to offer a brief word on behalf of certain convictions that one seems to know (with or without argument) and such convictions are beyond negotiation. For example, I think all of us know that it is morally wrong (I am going to use a grotesque example) to skin and salt babies. However, I can imagine a utilitarian argument justifying this under extreme (though perhaps quite implausable) conditions. In such a case, I think a person might well retain her moral integrity by simply holding her position that such an act is wrong and not justified, even if she can think of no good objection to the utilitarian argument. By analogy, I think we can imagine the following: a person has had what she takes to be a compelling, even miraculous experience of God. I happen to think that there are good versions of arguments from religious experience (see work by Jerome Gellman, William Alston), but let's...

Good points. Moreover, some adventurers appear to want to have "no-rescue zones." This topic sometimes comes up under the general heading "a wilderness without hand-rails." Still, cases arise when persons set out on ventures without renouncing rescue efforts and this does raise troubling issues. We routinely don't blame persons for not rescuing those in peril if the rescue is highly dangerous and is likely to lead to even greater dissaster. But in cases such as the one you are referring to other factors seem to come into play. Perhaps the American sailer comes to symbolise or represent more than herself: she is not merely Jane Doe, but she comes to represent American youth or teenage ambition or female courage or all three. And how we respond to her in a case of distress seems to reveal, in part, the value we attach to youth, courage, and so on. I agree with you that there is a sense in which it would appear to be more ethical to use funds to buy food or medicine for those who are in peril due to...

Great question. A huge amount of thought is being devoted to the assessment of the mental life of nonhuman animal. Some (but I don't think a majority) philosophers still deny that we can rightly recognize (morally relevant) pain in beings without language, but I think it is quite reasonable to think that cows feel pain (given what appears to be pain-avoidance behavior, their brains and nervous system) even in the absence of language. So, let us grant that a human being and a cow can be hurt, they both can feel pain, and then ask whether if the hurt causes equal pain, then hurting the human and cow is equally wrong. There is some reason to think that we cannot draw that conclusion, because of factors that go beyond pain. Imagine a cow feels the same intensity of pain, you feel when someone slaps you (hard). The pain felt by the cow and you may be equal, but there could be more serious harms going on in your case (you have just been insulted or been betrayed by a friend or ..) that is not undergone by...

Great question. In a sense, the claim (or assumption) that there is a link between a major aesthetic category beauty and ethics / morality goes back to Plato. From a Platonic point of view, is some act is wicked, it is evil, and if some act is ethical it is beautiful (or, in difficult matters), the least ugly act possible. The close link between beauty and moral goods and virtues continues on up through the Renaissance. Today, there is disagreement about the extent to which ethics and aesthetics conflict; some argue that the two realms are altogether different (a standard claim by those who believe in the separation of ethics and aesthetics is that Leni Riefenstahl's film Triumph of the Will is an excellent film aesthetically but morally horrifying) whereas some of us still seek to bring them together. You can get a good overview of the state of play in this debate in the collection Aesthetics and Ethics edited by Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge University Press). In terms of systematic defenses of the...

Interesting situation! The Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca tells us that the most important thing we have is time, and the most important decision we will make in life is how to spend our time and with whom. I suggest that you may want to go to that school which (after you have completed four years) you can look back upon with proper pride (proper pride as opposed to vanity or egoism). Insofar as skills and adventures (intellectual and otherwise) often involve risk-taking and moving against the line of the least resistance (in other words, not taking the easy route), I suspect it would be better to opt for the college or university community that would most challenge you. Where I teach, there is a tremendous (growing) stress on students discovering their vocation. A vocation is not just a job, but a sense of calling or having a goal of pursuing a fulfilling profession. I would recommend finding a college or university which takes vocation seriously.

Excellent question! You are right that utilitarianism or other ethical theories may well be able to advance causes that are central to a feminist outlook. The reason why an ethics of care has been historically associated with feminism is largely because it was seen as an important contrast to the mostly male dominated field of ethics in which justice and impartial rationality were seen as central. So, at one point John Rawls was seen as the leading architect in post-world war two ethics of a rational political theorist (celebrating a thought experiment in which one imagines oneself behind a veil of ignorance). When Carol Gilligan then came of the scene with an ethics of care, it was supposed by many that Gilligan was the feminist response to the more male oriented Rawlsian framework. But really there is no reason in principle why one could not embrace Rawls' outlook and feminism (or many or most feminist ideals), and one could embrace some versions of an ethics of care and yet (because of some...

An excellent question! I think that the answer lies in terms of the urgency of the relevant decision-making. Insofar as some issue (take energy policy) is being determined in the next election, and your vote or not voting will give an advantage to one policy over the other, I think you have a duty to form as sound an opinion on the topic as possible. If you honestly think you lack the competency to vote either way, perhaps you should refrain from voting (even if that has the foreseen consequence of giving one side an advantage), but insofar as you can form a responsible (though fallible) judgement, I think you should act on that basis. In matters that are not urgent (e.g. should the USA seek to colonize Mars) I suggest there is no civic duty to become informed on the topic.

This is an important question. Most philosophers today probably think that an overall metaphysical framework (theism or karma...) is not necessary to secure universal ethical codes or to preserve their authority and normative force. And assuming a stable world order in which there is wide agreement on what is just or unjust (and a willingness to enforce principles of justice with force), it may be thought than an appeal to a supernatural or sacred reality is not necessary. But in a case in which there are no human or natural guarantees that justice will prevail, matters shift. Consider Darwin's situation. He remained confident till the end that it will always be in our general self-interest to be kind and just, etc, but he did not think this was necessarily so and he also thought it quite natural that stronger races would seek to exterminate weaker ones. If one is a theist, one has an account of why such exterminations are wrong (they are cosmic sins, and contrary to the will and nature of the...

Good question! It might seem harmless to think of a person objectively or even to think of him or her as an object (e.g. "she is the object of my love and attention"). But when it is used derisively, it seems that to objectify someone is to not take their subjectivity or character seriously as important for its own sake. In this sense, one objectifies a person by treating him or her merely as an object, and possibly an object to be used for one's self-interest, e.g. a man may objectify a woman by thinking of her merely as an object of desire or arousal and not as important and worthy of respect for her own sake.

Good question(s). A range of philosophers have sought to argue that one should be moral out of self-interest. Some philosophers who argue that morality must lead to fulfillment (the virtuous should be happy) combine their ethics with a moral argument for God. Kant thought that for morality to make sense we need to have a kind of moral faith in God as an ideal judge who will insure that the good are rewarded, and the vicious are not. Still other philosophers will question the intelligibility of your question: asking why one should be moral may be likened to asking you should do what you should do. Questions like 'why is the sky blue' make sense, whereas 'why is blue, blue?' do not.