Great set of questions. Certainly, these are matters that involve psychology and have an application in medicine, though philosophers from Ancient GreeK though onward have found it important to reflect on responsibility, habits, and determining when actions are truly voluntary. I suspect voluntariness is the key. The more we become habituated to a pattern of behavior, it seems that the more will power is required to break the pattern. I believe that Aristotle was right when he described the path to virtue in terms of habituation or the developing good habits or dispositions (to act justly, temperately, etc). In a sense, the virtuous person is someone who has developed a character so that they naturally and without struggle seek to do what is good. And the opposite would be true of a person in terms of vice; their character is such that they naturally and without struggle do what is cruel, destructive, and the like. Speaking more directly to your question(s) it seems that voluntary action is a...

Perhaps one might well claim that one has to have some prior experience ("experience" being broader than "perception") in order to have memory. One might remember prior thoughts, abstract propositions or a sensation rather than a full perception. Memory seems (by definition) to be about the past (I cannot remember the future, though I can remember that I believe or know that something will occur in the future) and so if there is no experience in the past to recall, it is hard to see how one might have any memory at all. In this sense, memory appears to be a dependent cognitive power --it depends on the exercise of other cognitive powers. I suppose someone might claim that they remember remembering, but this begs us to ask the question: remember remembering what? While that is my proposal (one needs prior experience in order for memory to function), the issues can be stretched a bit... Imagine God or some super-scientist made a creature (Skippy) on Monday at noon full of ostensible memories of a...

Wonderful question! There are some philosophers who are very committed to a form of determinism that rules out free agency and a thesis that seems quite contrary to common sense, namely that the self is an illusion or construct and not a real, substantial individual thing. For some of these philosophers, the idea that one might freely control one's body or one's agency is the equivalent of thinking we can do magic. I think Owen Flanagen believes that radical free will (in which a person could engage in libertarian free will) is like magic, and Daniel Dennett as well. But many of us are on the other side and believe that it is natural and plausible to think that we can act and have the power not to act in ways that are morally responsible or blameworthy. For a great book on this, check out Mawson's Free Will; A Guide for the Perplexed or Daniel Robinson's book On Praise and Blame. Going on a bit further on the themes in you question magic and control I suppose the concept of the magical today...

There are a few points to consider: first, the challenge of understanding another's point of view. Second, knowing without any doubt whatsoever another's point of view. The later is sometimes connected with what philosophers call the problem of other minds or, more recently, it has been called the zombie problem. How do you know that all of those around you who appear to be thinking, feeling, conscious persons are actually mindful, conscious beings? Could they all be zombies? Few philosophers worry about this as a real possibility but there are philosophers who think that such a state of affairs is logically (or metaphysically) possible (however unlikely) and this leads them to certain conclusions in their philosophy of human nature (sometimes such thought experiments have been used to argue that consciousness is something more than anatomy and behavior). In any case, I suspect it would be quite rare to come across someone who could not understand the points of view of other people. If we were...

Interesting! The historical relationship between "philosophy" and "psychology" is a bit complex. Some in psychology tend to see themselves as principally working from within the sciences or an applied science such as medicine, but some philosophers tend to see psychology as something that emerged historically from philosophy. In any case, the claim that human beings have a basic motive or drive to gain power is a bit abstract. I wonder if the professor meant something specific, such as the power to dominate or control other persons or something less sinister such as the power to think, feel, grow, act justly, and so on. In any case, theories of human nature are (in my view) naturally described as philosophical. Hobbes thought we fundamentally desire power and safety (social bonds are based on our shared fear of premature violent death). And this seems to be properly described as a philosophy that is distinct from, say, Thomas Aquinas' or John Locke's, both of whom thought we had a fundamental...

Yes, there is a book just out that you might like, called Philosophy for Everyone: Cannabis: http://www.amazon.com/Cannabis-Philosophy-Everyone-Talking-About/dp/1405199679 The sub-title is quite fun: "What were we just talking about?" That book, just published last year, should give you lots to consider. Probably the most positive treatment of psychotropic drugs by a philosophically minded author is Aldous Huxley's The Doors of Perception.

Strange, isn't it? Maybe the key is to appreciate that not all "containment" or things with an inside are physical or spatial. So we might talk about how a theory of justice should contain or include an account of property rights or a theory of what the mind is should contain an account of the origin of mind. And we might talk about what is inside or included in a concept or theory we might even speak of trying to get inside someone else's mind --which (I hope) is not a literal matter but a metaphorical way of speaking about understanding someone else's thoughts and feelings! Pointing out that we use the language of "containment" and "Inside" in nonphysical, non-spatial contexts may make things seem more mysterious than ever! But perhaps we need to appreciate that our language and ways of thinking about ourselves invovles more than speaking of concrete spatial things that contain things, like the way our brain is contained in our head!

Great question. Some philospohers have been quite firm that thought cannot exist without language, but this has always struck me as quite implausable. One problem is that it is hard to know how one might even begin to learn a language unless you had thoughts. But the case you raise is another reason to be suspicious of such a linguistic account of thought. There might be a middle position, however, in which one recognizes that in expressing thoughts in language we can achieve greater clarity; a poem may help crystalize in sharper terms what had, until you read the poem, only been vague hunches. Your language even suggests this, for the poem seems to be something more concrete than "thoughts ...that had been floating in" your mind. Good wishes! CT

Perhaps the problem lies in our current use of the term 'empathy' --which suggests not just understanding for caring. On that definition, I am not empathetic with you if I understand your suffering but I care nothing for your recovery or health. But if by 'empathy' and 'sympathy' too we just mean 'feeling with' then a sado-masochist might be said to be very empathetic and sympathetic over his victims. On a related matter, there is some current debate over the ethical status of understanding. If we say we understand why a sadistic crime was committed, have we in some way granted that the crime "made sense" or was in some way excusable under the circumstances? I believe Martha Nuusbaum has addressed this concern recently. One way this might connect with your original question is that we might ask ourselves whether the sadistic criminal really understands (understands fully) what he is doing? Yes, he (or she) must understand that pain is being inflicted, but can the criminal still do the act if he or...

Great question! As it happens, just this fall a new book has come out: Cannabis and Philosophy edited by Dale Jacquette with multiple articles, mostly in favor of the use of cannabis in moderation. Michel LeGall and I (under the title "The Great Escape") actually defend the permissibility of moderate cannabis use in response to some moral and religious (mostly Christian and Islamic) objections. In the world of philosophy, there has been little explicit attention given to mind-altering substances except with respect to alcohol and then mostly wine. Most philosophers who do discuss drinking wine defend it or seem to assume it is acceptable in moderation. Pascal comments somewhere that if you do not drink wine you will not find the truth, but if you drink too much you will wind up in the same state (without truth). Cicero and Erasmus both wrote against excessive drinking. Although perhaps more of a novelist and free thinker than philosopher, Aldous Huxley does offer a case for psychotropic drugs in...