I would also recommend Daniel Dennett's recent book re religious belief "Breaking the Spell" -- he has an excellent treatment of the relationship between religion and morality, which you might find useful. Another thing to consider -- not what you asked about -- is whether there is any genuinely coherent way to ground morality in religious belief, for if there isn't, then the theist has no advantages over the atheist and they both have to find alternative frameworks. And there is plenty of precedent for challenging the religious basis of morality, dating back to Plato's Euthyphro dialogue -- where Plato explores the question "are the morally right things right because the gods approve them [basing morality in religion], or do the gods approve them b/c they're right [thus basing them in something else]?' ... In my recent book "The God Question" I present a number of philosophers' views on the precise relationship between religion and morality ... and finally let me add: there is a TON of literature on...

What fun! But there are disanalogies -- the Christian view doesn't quite hold there ever was nothing, for there always was God -- and also I don't think it's exactly accurate to describe the Big Bang as 'first there was nothing then there was something' (it's rather: everything in the universe can be traced backwards to a singularity/explosion but nothing can be said about what if anything preceded that moment) -- but more importantly I would take issue with your claim that they have equivalent 'epistemological status' (if you m ean that in any technical sense): for scientists believe in the Big Bang as a result of a tremendous amount of empirical evidence while religious belief in divine creation is based on no such thing. So even IF both were versions of 'first nothing, then something,' the reasons for believing in them are extremely, profoundly, and fundamentally different -- hence they differ in epistemological status. hope that's useful -- best, Andrew Pessin

Great question -- and in fact you have your finger on a version of what is ultimately perhaps the strongest argument for a mind-body dualism -- ie the view that mind and body/matter are completely distinct sorts of things. One way to put it is this way: with eyes closed I am seeing (say) a shining sun; but it isn't the real physical shining sun I am seeing (b/c my eyes are closed); therefore I am seeing some non-physical thing, a mental thing, a mental image or representation OF the physical shining sun. Therefore there exist mental things which are distinct from all physical things .... So the phenomenon you invoke is at least strongly suggestive that there are two kinds of seeing, or two kinds fo things seen: mental and physical .... Now, having said that, there are various ways phlosophers have resisted these kinds of arguments -- you might want to look up a philosohper named JJC Smart, and his work on the "identity theory" (denying dualism) to see how he resists these arguments .... Also one...

I worry that framing the question this way begs the question -- you seem to assume that any 'choice' comes from or out of 'desire', but isn't that precisely what's at issue? I think we'd need to get a lot clearer on what a 'desire' is before we could answer the question in a satisfactory way ... For example, you seem to consider 'desire' a kind of 'emotion', but philosophers of mind typically would distinguish the two in various ways -- perhaps desires share a kind of 'qualitative character' or 'qualia' with emotions, but desires are typically characterized by having an object or content, one often expressible in words, in a way emotions are typically characterized as 'raw feelings' that may or may not have a specific object or content -- Once you separate desires from emotions, you then need to define desire in such a way as to make it clear that every choice comes from some desire ..... (Charles mentions Spock -- consider this thought. Suppose you could program a computer to do all sorts of complex...

I'm no Wittg. expert -- that said, if all you mean by 'advert' is 'refers to', then it wouldn't be at all surprising if Wittgenstein did, since (I gather) crucial aspects of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning would be critical of a competing "Platonic" theory -- ie, part of his point in introducing 'games' is to deny that there are any necessary/sufficient conditions for falling into certain categories, rather those categories are characterized by 'family resemblances' -- so what allows a particular activity to count as a 'game' is not that it displays the 'essence' of Game (participation in the Platonic Form of 'Game'), not that it satisfies a particular set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but merely that it shares an adequate number of salient characteristics with other things which count as 'games' ..... So does he explicitly refer to Plato? I don't recall -- but it would be a Platonic theory he is criticizing there .... AP

Hm, are you asking an ethical question here? (ie it might be wrong to use your 'connections' to get into a 'better' school than you 'deserve'? I put all that in scare quotes because I think a lot of work would have to go into posing that question clearly, as an ethical question.) Or are you really asking the more practical question, "what would be best for me overall"? Re: the latter, I'd say get into the "best" school you can legitimately (ie ethically) get into -- for being surrounded by very bright people, not only faculty but especially your peers, would stretch you as far as you are capable of being stretched ... Of course you can get an excellent education in lots of different places, esp. if you are motivated and dedicated and go out to acquire it yourself -- but unless you are the type to be cowed by very accomplished peers, to feel diminished by them, then you ought to surround yourself with the best you can in order to become the best you can ....

Well, I'd say philosophy is pretty infinitely deep -- there could be no such thing for any ordinary mortal to learn "the whole history of philosophy" -- not least because there wouldn't be agreement on just who the "notable" philosophers are (so you'd have to study EVERY philosopher to learn the "whole" history), and also because there's no clear distinction between who counts as a "philosopher" and who doesn't (so you'd have to study every thinker in every field ....) -- in fact what's most important is to recognize that philosophy is a process or activity, it's the act of philosophizing itself, and so it's not all that important to learn the "whole history" as to engage in the process -- and that you could do by studying, in depth, even just one or a few great thinkers .... spend your life studying just Plato (say), and you will be well-served, and probably end up being a better philosopher (and better served philosophically) than someone who has read hundreds of books by hundreds of different authors ....

Well THAT'S a big question, I won't attempt to answer. But I might phrase it differently: 'should' they have that right ... since I prefer to assume that we get to decide which 'rights' to apportion, rather than that we somehow discover the 'rights' that already exist .... And to begin an answer to such a large question you'd have to begin working out very general views on the nature of morality in general, as well on the relationship between public and private, and more -- and no doubt you might like to distinguish between such cases as "purely" elective abortions v. those which are in some sense medically-motivated or "necessary" (eg threatening the life of the mother) ... Even more interestingly, esp with respect to the latter distinctions, you might want to explore exactly how it is that abortion has come to be so vehemently opposed by the Catholic hierarchy -- in fact I recently was reading that until the 20th century the Church's opinion on abortion in general was far more liberal and lenient...

I can't answer wrt Wittgenstein in this case -- I don't know his specific views here -- but the general question IS an old one, and received some very provocative treatements in the early modern period (esp 17th-18th century, esp. in the work of the Idealist George Berkeley) -- I'll merely answer the point as your friend made it -- namely, anyone who argues that such a tree does NOT make a 'sound' is (a) definitely referring to sensation, not vibration as you put it, and (b) tends to allow that any "mind" or "any" perceiver would be sufficient for the "sound" to exist in addition to the vibration -- so the presence of a bird would suffice! I don't know of any philosopher who would hold that ONLY human perceivers work here ... However: the latter does raise the discussion to the next level: does a given vibration 'sound' the same to us and to the bird? does it sound the same even to different human perceivers? if not, what does that show? (maybe that sound IS subjective, exists only in the mind...

What a deep and important question! Obviously a detailed answer might look at the detailed tenets of various religions and evaluate them individually ... But a briefer reply would offer both something in support of, and something at odds with, your own way of thinking. First, in support: there's no question (it seems to me) that human beings vary along every possible dimension, and that there are both 'good' and 'bad' (and 'great' and 'horrible') people to be found both within any major religion and outside them. For many individuals, their goodness/badness may well be prior to, independent of, their religions -- and in no way dependent on the religious belief. (They may even choose their religion because it best expresses their pre-existing goodness.) Moreover, in further support, it's not very clear just what ARE the specific official tenets of any particular religion -- each individual believes some particular set of beliefs which may overlap little, much, or almost not at all with...