I agree with Sean's response, but I'd like to add a few, um, opinions of my own. Some students believe that only "authorities" (e.g., teachers) know the "correct" answers to all questions. And they believe this until these students meet "authorities" who disagree. Such disagreements are not usually about mathematical or scientific questions (after all, everyone agrees that 2+2=4, and any math teacher who says otherwise is not really an authority on math). Rather, such disagreements are often about topics in the humanities, social studies, or philosophy (" Huckleberry Finn is the great American novel", says one; "No, it isn't", says another. "Mental states and processes are identical with brain states and processes"; "No, they're not". And so on.) After encountering "authorities" who disagree, these students often decide that there are two kinds of questions: those about which "authorities" know the answers and those about which "authorities" don't know the answers yet (but the answers...

The opinion that all opinions are equally good is one that is usually held by people whose attitude toward knowledge is what some psychologists call "Multiplism" or "Subjective Knowledge". This is the view that, because there are often conflicting answers to questions (or conflicting solutions to problems), people must trust their "inner voices", rather than external authorities (like teachers or professional philosophers:-). In particular, many "Multiplists" believe that most questions (or problems) are such that we don't yet know what their solutions are, and that this is why everyone has a right to their own opinion. Although I like Allen Stairs's counterargument--if all opinions are equally good, then so is the opinion that all opinions are not equally good--I'm not convinced that a Multiplist would find it convincing! In general, Multiplists are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with logical argumentation. A better way to get Multiplists to see that proposed solutions to problems (call them ...

There are 2 ways to interpret your question. One way is as a request for information about the philosophy of engineering. If that's what you're asking, I can suggest two good books to start with: Florman, Samuel C. (1994), The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin's Press). Davis, Michael (1998), Thinking Like an Engineer: Studies in the Ethics of a Profession (New York: Oxford University Press). The first was written by a practicing engineer, the second by a philosopher. Both deal with questions like: What is engineering? How should engineers behave? You might find some other references on the webpage "What Is Engineering?" for my Philosophy of Computer Science course . There is also a branch of philosophy called the philosophy of technology, which deals with related issues. Check the article with that title in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The other interpretation is as a request for information about how to apply...

Peter Smith's use of the deflationary theory of truth to answer this question is just one way of approaching it. Another is to use the correspondence theory of truth. According to (a highly simplified version of) the correspondence theory, truth is a relation between beliefs (or sentences, or propositions) and "reality": A set of beliefs (or sentences, or propositions) is true if and only if they correspond to reality, i.e., iff they "match" or accurately describe reality. Now, a (scientific) theory is just a set of beliefs (or sentences, or propositions). So, a theory is true if and only if it corresponds to reality. But how do we access "reality" so that we can determine if our theories (our beliefs) correspond to it? How can we do the "pattern matching" between our beliefs and reality? One answer is by sense perception (perhaps together with our beliefs about what we perceive). But sense perception is notoriously unreliable (think about optical illusions, for instance). And one...

The American philosopher Gareth Matthews haswritten several wonderful books detailing his work withelementary-school kids on philosophy and has a website devoted to it: " Philosophy for Kids ".

Metaphilosophy is a perfectly legitimate branch of philosophy. After all, if there can be a "philosophy of X" for (almost?) any X, then surely there can be a philosophy of philosophy. As with any "philosophy of X", it studies the fundamental assumptions, methods, and goals of philosophy, investigating what philosophy is and how it canbe done. Some people might think that the philosophy of philosophy isthe height of "gazing at your navel", but it's really what's involvedwhen you think about thinking. So its existence shouldn't really surprise you. It's certainly not "a new discipline": It has probably been around at least since Socrates's (or maybe Plato's) time, though probably not so-named. The journal Metaphilosophy has been around for 40 years and is taken seriously, so metaphilosophy is certainly not "budding" or an "Internet fad". I wouldn't say that (all of) philosophy is metaphilosophy, though all of metaphilosophy is philosophy. (In fact, philosophy is one of the few academic...

Although the question is framed in terms of justice, fairness, and value, I would like to consider it in terms of attitudes towards knowledge and learning. According to the psychologist William Perry's "Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development" , students who have what he called an "early multiplistic" attitude towards knowledge believe that all questions have answers and that all problems have solutions, but that there are two kinds of questions or problems: those whose answers or solutions we know , and those whose answers or solutions we don't know yet . Such students see their task as learning how to find the "correct" solutions. And students who have what Perry called a "late multiplistic" attitude believe either that most problems are of the second kind (hence, everyone has a right to their own opinion) or that some problems are unsolvable (hence, it doesn't matter which--if any--solution you choose). (What I've summarized here is a vast oversimplification for present...

Another alternative is to read Kant's very own "Cliff's Notes" version of the Critique, namely, his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Again, there are numerous inexpensive editions, or go to your local library; it's also online at http://www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20306/kant_materials/prolegomena1.htm (and probably elsewhere). It's much shorter than the Critique, and much more readable. And well worth reading!

These are all good philosophical questions (as well as practical ones for translators!). I strongly recommend that you read a wonderful book on the subject by Douglas Hofstadter: Le Ton Beau de Marot: In Praise of the Music of Language

Although I try to use "he or she" or "she or he", and I do like "s/he" and even the allegedly ungrammatical "they" (though I read somewhere that it's not really ungrammatical), often the best solution is to rewrite the sentence to avoid the problem. The best advice on this appears on the American Philosophical Association's website: Warren, Virginia L. (2001), "Guidelines for Non-Sexist Use of Language" .