I recently read Louis Menand's article in "The New Yorker" entitled "Head Case." In it, he asks this question: "[W]hat if there were a pill that relieved you of the physical pain of bereavement--sleeplessness, weeping, loss of appetite--without diluting your love for or memory of the dead? Assuming that bereavement 'naturally' remits after six months, would you take a pill today that will allow you to feel the way you will be feeling six months from now anyway?" Is this a philosophical question? If so, how would you respond to it?

Menand asks whether we would/should choose to be relieved of the physical feelings of bereavement if we could do so without diluting our love for or memory of the dead. Greenberg claims that (a) thoughts, not feelings, are what is essential to emotions (the feelings being merely contingent accompaniments to those thoughts in humans), and (b) thoughts, not feelings, are what matters to us about emotions; thus, he would take such a pill on the assumption that it would not affect the thought component of bereavement. Even if we were to agree with Greenberg's first claim, about what is essential to emotion, we could still disagree with his second claim, about what matters about emotion. We could value the painful feelings that happen to accompany our thoughts because they serve to remind us of our humanness, because they force us to spend more time with thoughts that are important, or because they increase our capacity for handling other types of pain, for example. I disagree with...

Why is it that, in music, major chords, by themselves, isolated and without any musical context, sound bright and happy, while minor chords are dark and sad? How can arbitrary collections of frequencies elicit distinct emotions from people?

Even if the chords are not presented in the context of a music piece, they are heard in the (more backgrounded) context of music one has heard. Our associations with those pieces of music prime us to hear major versus minor chords in particular ways. There is also a physical reason for finding major chords to be more settled or stable than minor chords: the wavelengths of a major third match the overtones of the root of a chord more closely than do the wavelengths of a minor third . When we hear a C, for example, it is already producing secondary wavelengths that are those of an E (at a higher octave); the addition of a nearby E thus seems to fit in without added strain.

Is the feeling that God exists a sufficient reason to believe in God? Is there anyway of analyzing such a feeling to determine its validity? Can feeling ever give us profound truths about the world?

Generally, feeling that something is true is a reason to believe that it is true (since our feelings are frequently based on true observations and ideas), but it is not a sufficient reason (since our feelings may arises from wishes rather than observations, and since there are many observations and ideas that are not reflected in our feelings). Insofar as you want to arrive at a warranted belief, rather than trying to analyze your feeling (which is extremely difficult to do honestly, and well), you should consider a wider range of feelings, and observations, and ideas in relation to each other. This is not something that can be done in a moment, and it cannot be done according to a rule; but it is the only way to be fully reasonable about your beliefs. It is certainly possible for feelings to reveal profound truths -- even if their truth cannot be established or confirmed by feeling alone. A feeling of horror, for example, may reveal the deep immorality of certain...

Why are some emotions considered 'negative,' like hate and envy while others are held as the pinnacle of human achievement, like happiness or love? Who is to say happiness is any better than fear or rage or sorrow? Is it merely a question of personal choice, or are we naturally or artificially inclined towards one emotional state over another?

Usually, when philosophers identify certain emotions as negative emotions, they are referring to emotions that include or result from a negative judgment -- such as the judgment that something is bad, or unjust, or harmful. Since there are many things that are bad, or unjust, or harmful, there is nothing wrong about making such judgments or having such emotions. Indeed, it would be worrisome if people never made negative judgments and never felt negative emotions. It is widely assumed that a happy life is preferable to an unhappy life; certainly most people, given the choice, would choose a happy life over an unhappy life. But negative feelings can actually contribute to our overall happiness insofar as they are a sign of meaningful connections to one's surroundings (the cheery but deluded life is not as happy as a wise but sometimes sad life). Happiness may not be as important as we think it is, though. A recent book by Barbara Ehrenreich, entitled Bright-Sided , makes several good points...

Are women more "emotional" than men and if so is this a bad thing?

I am not sure why you use quotation marks around the word "emotional". Certainly there are cases where one person is more emotional than another -- in a given situation, or in general -- so there is nothing suspect about the word. Perhaps you are marking the fact that "emotional" can be used as a term of disparagement, and you do not want to accept this usage. Or perhaps you are thinking of the difference between having emotions and showing emotions, realizing that those who show their emotions are often considered more emotional, whether or not this is true. Your question, in any case, concerns a possible difference between the amount or intensity of emotions in the lives of (most) women lives versus the lives of (most) men. It is hard to design a study that would settle your question since it is not clear how best to measure the presence of an emotion (self-report? bodily changes? facial expression?) and because it is not easy to create situations that have the same significance for many...