Karl Popper thought that theories (hypotheses) could be tested by using them to deduce testable consequences. Many theories and hypotheses are quite abstract (physics and economics are good examples of abstract theories) and other assumptions are often needed in order to use them to deduce testable consequences. That's fine--the assumptions just need to be stated in advance and to be plausible. Popper would say that when e.g. economic theories are used to make predictions about the market, they are indeed testable, because the predictions can fail. Popper would have trouble with economists who make predictions which fail and who then don't take the failure seriously enough. Failed predictions point to the falsity of either the theory or the assumptions. Dogmatic scientists (those who want to defend their pet theories past the point of plausibility) always blame the assumptions, even when this is implausible. Popper urges scientists to consider blaming their own theories for failed predictions. If...

Karl Popper thought that theories (hypotheses) could be tested by using them to deduce testable consequences. Many theories and hypotheses are quite abstract (physics and economics are good examples of abstract theories) and other assumptions are often needed in order to use them to deduce testable consequences. That's fine--the assumptions just need to be stated in advance and to be plausible. Popper would say that when e.g. economic theories are used to make predictions about the market, they are indeed testable, because the predictions can fail. Popper would have trouble with economists who make predictions which fail and who then don't take the failure seriously enough. Failed predictions point to the falsity of either the theory or the assumptions. Dogmatic scientists (those who want to defend their pet theories past the point of plausibility) always blame the assumptions, even when this is implausible. Popper urges scientists to consider blaming their own theories for failed predictions. If...

There is a vast literature on reasoning and rationality that tries to understand what "good judgment" consists in. It includes Michael Polanyi's work, which is still very much respected among some philosophers, especially those influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. But the literature starts (in the Western tradition) with Plato and Aristotle's ideas about knowledge and continues through contemporary work on scientific methodology.

Since I was the one that introduced the concept of "good judgment" I feel I should explain. I am not introducing a mystical concept; just one that we currently don't understand very well. Deductive reasoning is lovely but it doesn't get us very far, as Hume discovered. I am all in favor of articulating good judgment. Some have already begun the project e.g. Nelson Goodman in the "new" (now about 60 years old) problem of induction. Another way of framing the issue is to say that the truth of the conclusion depends not only on the deductive logic used to get there but also on the premises. How do we know that our premises are true? The most we can do is exercise forms of good judgment in choosing them.

You ask an interesting question. If Philosophy was nothing more than deductive logic, then someone with skills in deductive logic but developmental issues elsewhere would probably excel in philosophy. But most people think that Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exercise of "good judgment" which in fact we do not understand very well. Good judgment may or may not be absent of emotion: the philosopher David Hume puts emotion front and center in his ethical theories. We have a very poor understanding of autism spectrum disorders (indeed the diagnostic category of Asperger's has recently been removed from the DSM ). It used to be thought that people with autism lacked emotion; that is generally speaking not true (although the emotions may be different from those of neurotypicals). On rereading your question, perhaps you see a correspondence between some philosophers' apparent detachment and some autistic behavior. There may be an overlap here but I doubt that it...

Your final statement expresses your views: "in my observation biased and otherwise problematic thinking patterns are typical of feminist organizations." You sound like someone who thinks that they are justified in being skeptical of the claims of feminists. Is that all you are asking?

Francis Bacon advocated the use of inductive reasoning in science. Inductive reasoning is going from particular observations to general conclusions. It is an empiricist method, and contrasts with the more rationalist methods of the time, such as the work of Descartes. Is there is a political dimension to the logic of inductive reasoning (or to its specific implementations)? You'd have to make that case; prima facie, going from specific observations to general claims is a logical/methodological rather than a political method.

Many analytic philosophers have written about sex and gender. An early collection that might be a good place to start is "A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity" edited by Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (1993). A more recent collection, a product of the Society for Analytical Feminism, is "Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy" edited by Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (2012). The website of the Society for Analytical Feminism is at https://sites.google.com/site/analyticalfeminism/home and has many useful resources.

An argument using conditional statements can be an argument of any kind (it depends on what other statements are used). There is one kind of well known argument--modus ponens--that uses a conditional statement and a premise stating the antecedent of the conditional. That argument is deductive.

The more theoretical and the more general a subject is, the closer it is to being considered "philosophy." I don't think that there is a definite point where theory leaves off and philosophy starts. So political theory and political philosophy blur together, as do theoretical biology and philosophy of biology, and theoretical physics and philosophy of physics. I think that we worry more about the distinction than we should for intellectual reasons, because we worry about departments and disciplinary categories.

Anyone and everyone can become a philosopher by asking questions about knowledge, existence and ethics. Being a philosopher is like being a writer--democratic in that the opportunity and the identity are available to all, but tough in that making a living at doing it is a privilege that most societies only support for a few people.