I think your argument is logically valid--that is, IF the premises were true, then the conclusion would be true. And I don't think it commits any formal or informal fallacies (except perhaps equivocation in the sense I'll explain shortly). The problem is that it is unsound , because it has at least one false premise; hence the conclusion is not "made true" by the premises. Premise 3 is false. The government does not tell us not to kill no matter what . As you point out, it tells us not to break specific laws against specific types of killing. Typically, citizens are not breaking the law (and are morally justified) in killing in self-defense or to protect others from an immediate and deadly threat. And (legal) killing in war and use of the death penalty (where it is legal) are also not forms of killing the government tells us not to commit. Now, we may have reasons to think that some or even all killing in war is morally problematic and even more reasons to think the death penalty is...

Sure! On the one hand, you see people presenting some strong arguments for competing political philosophies and different moral values, and ideally we get to vote based on a more informed understanding of these competing views, to the extent that different candidates (or referendums or amendments) embody those views. Democracy in action! On the other hand (and alas, too often, especially on cable news and talk radio), you see examples of really bad arguments and fallacies, so you get to practice your philosophical skills critiquing them. Ideally, of course, citizens would be educated well enough to find (and to appreciate, hence financially supporting) good sources of argument and information, and those sources would provide more substance and less heat than we see in our current media. And ideally, our politicians would be able to present their philosophies and policies in a way that allowed us to see their consequences and judge their merits, and that allowed them to make good...

The answers to your interesting questions depend on how we understand 'value' and 'fairness'. In some contexts we value outcomes more than efforts. So, if our goal is to target students who are most likely to understand difficult material, we may value the one who can understand it without too much effort (your Student B), especially if we think we can motivate her to work harder in the future. If we have reason to think that your Student A will be unlikely to understand quantum physics or Kant, no matter how much effort he puts in, and if, say, a graduate program is looking for students who can advance physics or philosophy, we will value B's abilities more than A's, and our grades may reflect that assessment of their respective value in these terms. Clearly, we will value student C, who has the capacity to understand these subjects and the hard work-ethic required to succeed more than A or C. But (perhaps mistakenly--see below) we tend to think that people can increase their work-ethic more...

I take a more pessimistic view than Professor Leaman. I think that an avowed atheist would have absolutely no hope of election to President or likely to any major office in any (or almost any) state, regardless of his or her other attributes or views, and that an avowed agnostic would have no hope of election to President or most major offices in most states, and that a candidate who did not strongly avow being a Christian (or perhaps Jew) would have almost no hope of being elected President. And I think that these facts are causes for concern for a number of reasons. For instance, it indicates a specific type of intolerance, one that I think is largely based on a failure to understand what atheists do (and can) believe. Though Professor Leaman's is correct when he says atheists are "believers in nothing" if he is referring only to supernatural deities, atheists can and usually do believe (often strongly): that life has meaning and purpose that there are moral truths or at least...

I can't be sure whether the pronouns in Richard's second sentence are supposed to refer to me or to Dawkins. If he (Richard H.) is referring to me, I'm not sure why. I don't see anything in what I said that suggests I believe all religious people share the same beliefs or that I am "ignorant of the varieties of religious belief." To clarify, there are some religious people in this country--I would say, too many--who act as though atheism (or perhaps any other failure to share their own faith-based beliefs) is a sign of moral terpitude (e.g., of the sort that disqualifies you for public office). Of course, it works the other way too. I certainly hold it against a political candidate if he or she avows certain religious doctrines (e.g., intelligent design). On that note, I think another potential concern of the influence of fundamentalist religious organizations and individuals on politics in America is their ability to undermine scientific research and science education.