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Freedom

Hi, I'm struggling to understand free will. I've been told that either of the following scenarios is commensurable with free will: (1) an omniscient being that knows all future events; (2) a block universe where future and past in some sense coexist with the present. But if free will is commensurable with these scenarios, would it be merely epiphemomenal? Would free will play any causative role if either of these conditions was true?

Your question suggests that you are thinking that free will must be something (e.g., a causal power) that is not a part of the rest of the universe, that it must be something that is (1) outside of the universe about which the omniscient being has complete knowledge, or (2) outside of the events that occur within the 'block' universe (an Einsteinian universe where there is no passage of time and the laws of nature describe the relationships between all the 'tenseless' events). If you think of free will that way, then yes, it seems like it cannot get a causal toe-hold on a universe that is already 'set in stone' like the block universe or one whose details are all already known by a god (who might be imagined outside the universe surveying it all at once). Free will, whatever it is supposed to be on this picture, would be cut out of the process, bypassed, epiphenomenal. However, perhaps there is a better way to understand free will, one that neither has these consequences nor makes free will a...
Freedom

I've recently been struggling with the idea of Fatalism, Determinism, Compatibilism, Libertarianism, etc., and from what I've been reading, the general consensus is compatibilism among most philosophers. If this is the case, then what sense is there in being proud of myself for anything good I do? Is there such thing as effort in my life, or am I just on an inevitable and programmed path? Truth is, I'm an artist. Online, I prefer images be sourced, so anyone who appreciates it enough can get to it easily, and credit goes to the artist. I like to believe that the drawings I make and images I create have something respectable behind them, effort, hard work, practice, time, determination, patience, fun.. but then this debate of Moral Responsibility comes up, and muddles me a bit. I've been experiencing alot of mental stuff for a while- and through all of this, philosophical questions, existential crises, all of it just comes and never stops. It's like there's always something for me to worry, or think too...

You should not let these thoughts get you in a rut or depress you (and if you're feeling depressed or suicidal, you should definitely get professional support to make sure the problem is not more serious than you think). Fatalism is not true if it's the idea that nothing we do makes a real difference to what happens--that what's fated is going to occur no matter what. Even if determinism is true (or false), what we decide and do makes a crucial difference to what happens in the future--if we had done something different, the future would be different. I'm a compatibilist, and you can see some of my answers at this website or short articles on my personal website to get more argument for why I think this (majority) view is the right one. But no position in the free will debate suggests that our efforts don't matter, that we are just programmed machines, or that everything is inevitable (in the fatalistic sense I mention above). Or none of them should. You sometimes hear scientific skeptics...
Freedom

why is the free will debate of interest to philosophers? i need to know why philosophers explore this question in the first place.

I think there are three primary reasons philosophers are interested in questions about free will, at least they are the ones that motivate me to spend most of my time on them. 1. Free will is often used (by philosophers and non-philosophers) to pick out the sort of control over decisions and actions that agents need in order to be morally responsible for what they do--that is, to deserve praise for the good things they do and blame, and certain kinds of punishment, for the bad things they do. If we lack free will--defined in this way--then we would not really deserve praise and blame, reward and punishment, and perhaps even gratitude, indignation, and forgiveness. Figuring out how to define 'free will' as relevant to these questions is one of the most significant debates in the current discussions. And figuring out whether we have such free will, in the face of the possibility of determinism or physicalism or certain scientific discoveries, is another. 2. Furthermore, some people think ...
Freedom
Logic

It has been said that if there is human freedom, then we are responsible for our actions. By this, it seems natural to suppose that "given that there is no human freedom (let's just suppose for the sake of argument) then it would follow that we are not responsible for our actions." But this seems an instance of what is called the "fallacy of denying the antecedent". Is this really an instance of the fallacy or is it an exemption to the case because personally I don't see any error in the form of the argument.

In the form you've presented the claims, there would be a fallacy of denying the antecedent. If free, then responsible. Not free. So, not responsible. But I don't think philosophers typically agree with the conditional claim, which says that having free will (or doing A freely) is sufficient for moral responsibility (or being responsible for A). And we should not agree with it. After all, I might freely decide to back my car out of the driveway and in doing so run over the sleeping cat I could not be expected to have seen. If so, I do not seem to be responsible (blameworthy) for killing the cat. There might be ways to fix up the terms, but there is likely an epistemic condition (a justified belief requirement) for responsibility that goes beyond the free will (or control) condition. However, it is more plausible to say that moral responsibility (being responsible for A) requires free will (that one did A freely, or did some earlier action freely that one should have known would lead to...
Freedom

I have begun reading Kahneman's Thinking Fast and Slow. He admits that system 1 can react before system becomes conscious of a particular behavior. Once system 2 becomes aware, however, it can modify system 1's response based on reasoning, additional evidence, past experience, etc. Is there any value in thinking of system 2 as the seat of free will (I choose not to accept system 1's acceptance of a "trick question" fallacy)? If so, and we agree that systems 1 & 2 are aspects of one mind, does it follow that we have addressed Harris's claim that free will is an illusion?

The brief answer is yes, I think it makes a lot of sense to think of something like system 2 as the seat of free, autonomous, and responsible action. And if we do--that is, if we think that our capacities for conscious reasoning and self-control are ultimately capacities instantiated in our brains--then the arguments by Harris and others lose a lot of force, since those arguments often play on the misguided idea that if our brains do it, then somehow we don't. I would not want to say that system 1 (or our non-conscious, more automatic processing) is in conflict with our free will, since often its functioning is crucial to our acting freely and we can also shape its functioning to some degree with system 2 processes. However, if we find that some of our actions are produced by system 1 processes (and situational influences) of which we are unaware and that we would not want to influence us, were we aware of them, then I do think our freedom and responsibility are diminished. And I think that...
Freedom

If someone makes a statement, and I not only disagree with that statement, but criticize or condemn her for having made it, do I infringe on her freedom of speech?

I don't see how. I think you have exercised your own freedom of speech. Speech acts can conflict with people's freedoms, including freedom of speech--for instance, if I threaten that I will harm you if you express certain opinions. But the beauty of freedom of speech is the idea that it will expose ideas to opposition with the hope that well-informed people will support the better ideas and reject, or if need be, condemn the others.
Freedom

Has the idea of responsibility for NOT having a certain thought been addressed in the free will literature? Certain forms of compatibilism seem to hinge on denying that we are 'bypassed', a term described very well by Professor Nahmias as referring to "the idea that our conscious deliberations, our desires, or our reasons play no role in what happens" (quoted from his response to question 3236 on 6/1/10). But what about thoughts and ideas that simply don't occur to us? There is no grand buffet of potential thoughts that I (whatever "I" means) get to choose from, I can't prevent myself from having something occur to me and I can't force something to occur to me. So how could I be responsible for the absence of a certain thought. Clearly there are uncountably many situations in which someone's failure to act or someone's decision to act lead to consequences that may not have happened had a different thought occurred to the person. But, in a certain sense, they were definitely bypassed in the ...

Great question. Here's a question for you: Suppose a friend asks you to pick her up at the airport (or water her plants while she's gone). Suppose you promise to do so. Suppose (scenario A) that you fail to put down your obligation in your calendar. Or suppose (scenario B) that you put it in your calendar but fail to check your calendar on the day of your obligation. Question: are you responsible for failing to honor your obligation? It seems to me that, unless there are some mitigating circumstances (e.g., you had a migraine that incapacitated you), you are responsible. But you might retort: "I simply never had the thought (A) to write it in my calendar or (B) to check my calendar that day. How can I be responsible for not doing what I promised when I didn't have a particular thought that [we can assume] is necessary for my doing it?" My response is that you should have had the relevant thoughts and (in the controversial compatibilist sense of "could") you could ...
Freedom

Recently I read a newly published very short book criticisng the concept of Free Will. I thought the book made some good points and some not-so- good points, but what really disturbed me is that the author didn't ever carefully define what he meant by Free Will. Is the definition of Free Will so obvious and clear that there is no need to define it in a book intended for lay readers?

It sounds like you might be talking about Sam Harris' new book, Free Will . If so, you might be interested in my review of it at The Philosopher's Magazine here: http://www.thephilosophersmagazine.com/TPM/article/view/15359/12081 Much of my response focuses on Harris' confused definitions of free will. The answer to your question is a definitive NO: free will does not have a single or obvious definition such that it need not be defined when discussed, especially in a book that claims we lack free will (what exactly do we lack? and do we care about the thing we are being told we lack?)
Freedom

I would like to be introduced to the theory of Action. Considering that I have a general philosophical knowledge, what should I read first, which concepts should I have in mind when readeing about theory of action? How can I go from the general concerns of theory of action to the specific sides of the discussion? Thank you very much.

In lieu of a detailed response, I'll suggest you start here: http://www.philosophyofaction.com/
Freedom
Religion

Greetings philosophers! I’ve always wondered if free will is a problem for atheism. In particular, if there was no designer (God), isn’t it unlikely that something as strange as free will would arise?

As always with questions about free will, the answer to this one depends on how one understands free will. If one defines free will as a God-given power, then yes, atheists who accept that definition would conclude that there is no free will. But that's not a very good definition of free will. If one thinks free will requires a non-physical soul, then atheists who believe there are no such souls, would also think there is no free will. Atheists could believe in such souls, however (just not that they are God-given). Some scientists who say free will is an illusion (I call them 'willusionists') seem to think that the materialist worldview that science seems to provide evidence for rules out free will, because they assume free will, by definition, requires non-physical powers. But I don't see any good reason to define free will as God-given or instantiated only in souls (and some of my work studying folk intuitions about free will suggests that most people agree with me). Rather, free will is...

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