Why don't philosophers clearly define their terms in relation to the "theist/atheist" debate. Surely before we begin a philosophical discussion we should clearly define our terms; but when it comes to the existence of "God"; both theists and atheists just assume that everyone knows what "God" refers to. Once we have established- when the debate takes place in a Christian context- that "God" refers to the mythological creator deity "Yahweh" of the Bible; is it logical for us to even debate his existence? I mean, we don't debate the existence of the creator deities of African mythology (who have similar properties to the Biblical deity). Could this be a large-scale unexamined cultural bias?

It certainly isn't the case that both theists and atheists just assume that everyone knows what "God" refers to. Reflective theists worry about what "God" refers to. And indeed, at least for some atheists, their problems start exactly here too: they listen to what their local friendly theists are saying about the God they supposedly believe in and they find they just can't make enough sense of it. For such an atheist, it isn't that they well know what kind of thing this God would be if he existed but don't think that there's anything that fits the role. Rather, rightly or wrongly, they think that the stories about the alleged being -- at least those told by believers who try to go beyond crude anthropomorphic myth -- fail to describe a coherent role that anything could fit. Round our neck of the woods these atheists of course mostly hear Judeo-Christian stories to be ultimately baffled by; it is the local believers who, as it were, set the agenda for the local unbelievers. It isn't so much a matter...

While reading through some questions in the religious section, I came across Peter Smith saying [http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2250/], "What is it with the obsession of (much) contemporary organized religions with matters of sexuality? It really is pretty bizarre. And for sure, if some of the energy wasted on pruriently fussing about who gets to do what with whom and where were spent campaigning on issues of social justice, say, then the world would be a better place. But I digress ...". Can any philosophers, including Peter Smith, tell me if my reasoning is valid regarding this (or come up with their own reasoning as to why an organized religion would have such rules): There are several reasons why organized religions could be "obsessed" about matters of sexuality, about "who gets to do what with whom and where" etc. 1. Disease: STD's are horrible, and the AIDs crisis in Africa is a good example as to why an organized religion might stress sexual relations with only one partner to whom you are...

Of course we might expect religions to take issues about sexual life and conduct seriously (though with some due sense of proportion, compared with other matters, like issues of social justice -- and it is the seemingly too prevalent lack of that sense of proportion that prompted my passing remark). What is quite bizarre is the kind of daft obsession that leads the Anglican communion to point of breaking up over the question of gay bishops. And what is simply vile is the kind of lunatic obsession that gets women stoned for adultery.

Why are there so many atheists in philosophy? Is this evidence that religion does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny?

Charles Taliaferro is, of course, right that there are philosophers who are serious theists. But noting that doesn't really answer the question why more aren't. (My guess about the proportion of serious theists in UK philosophy departments is no more than one in eight, probably less.) But I rather doubt that this is because "religion does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny": my non-believing colleagues mostly show no interest at all in the philosophy of religion. The reasons why they find no sustenance in theistic religion and it wouldn't cross their mind to attend church are more complex than explicit argumentative considerations. And so too for other non-believers. For at least in the UK, among the educated middle classes (as opposed e.g. to among immigrant communities maintaining a cultural identity), religion is in quite general and continuing decline, and the lack of belief among philosophers is matched much more generally. And not, surely, just because of how the arguments...

I have recently stumbled upon a short book written by the Catholic theologian named Peter Kreeft. He deductively argued for Jesus’ divinity through an approach he summarized as “Aut deus aut homo malus.” (Either God or a Bad Man.) Basically, his argument works only on the assumption made by most historians. Jesus was a teacher, he claimed divinity, and was executed. So, assuming this is true he says Jesus must’ve been one of three things. One possibility is that he was a liar. He said he was divine even though he knew it was not true. Another possibility is that he was insane. He believed he was divine even though he wasn’t. The final possibility is that he was telling the truth and he was correct. He was divine. He goes through and points out that Jesus shows no symptoms of insanity. He had no motive for lying. In fact, he was executed because of his claims. That gives him a motive to deny his divinity, which he apparently was given a chance to do by according to the Jewish and Roman sources on the...

Charles Taliaferro's third sentence could be read as saying that I "give no credence to theism". If that's what he means, he presumes too much. What I give no credence to are bad arguments for theism.

I agree with Alexander George: the argument is hopeless. As it happens, I came across the argument for the first time only recently: and -- when I'd stopped laughing -- I blogged about it, rather rudely. You can read what I said, and 33 comments(!) here .

I'm religious, but I'm also gay. My church teaches that homosexual relationships are immoral. They say that this is what God has told us and they back it up with scriptures and revelation from God given to my current church leaders. I have a hard time accepting that homosexuality is immoral. I don't see why people should be denied consenting, intimate, long-term relationships. So, here's the question that I need to find a solution to: Should I deny believing what I think is right to comply with what my church leaders say God thinks is moral?

What is it with the obsession of (much) contemporary organized religions with matters of sexuality? It really is pretty bizarre. And for sure, if some of the energy wasted on pruriently fussing about who gets to do what with whom and where were spent campaigning on issues of social justice, say, then the world would be a better place. But I digress ... You say that the proscription of homosexual acts is "backed it up with scriptures and revelation from God given to mycurrent church leaders". But the import of the few relevant scriptural passages is the subject of hot debate. And even if you think that the relevant passages should be taken seriously (Why? I'm sure you don't buy the more whacky or offensive proscriptions of Leviticus. Any grown-up believer picks and chooses), why accept your church leaders' interpretation as opposed to the readings of e.g. more liberal Christian sects? They may claim "special revelation from God", but then they would, wouldn't they? -- and no doubt so do some...

I'm a first year student of philosophy at UCLA, and I am interested primarily in philosophy of religion. I've just taken an introductory logic course which covered symbolization, sentential logic, and quantification. There are numerous other logic courses offered through the department, including metalogic, modal logic, etc, and I was wondering if AskPhilosophers could recommend a logic course to take? More specifically, I want to take a logic course that is related or will aid me in my studies in philosophy of religion. Maybe modal logic, since it deals with necessity and possibility? Thanks.

The short answer is: yes, you are right, a course on modal logic would be the one that probably will relate a little to a philosophy of religion course (it will help you understand e.g. modal ontological arguments). But I think it is worth saying a bit more. I'd be a little worried if one of my first-year students said "I'm primarily interested in the philosophy of X " for any X . After all, philosophy is a subject where topics don't compartmentalize easily but connect up in deep and unexpected ways. Beginners should be exploring widely, and leaving themselves open to being gripped by all kinds of problems -- what I like at this stage is a student who says "the philosophy of Y is really exciting: that's what I want to do " one week, and then comes back three weeks later and says "wow, this philosophy of Z course is amazing". And I'd be particularly worried if someone focussed too hard too early on a small area of applied philosophy like the philosophy of religion. This is a...

I suggested to a friend that atheists and theists were rather similar, in that they take a position on god's existence ahead of time and argue it dogmatically, whereas philosophers are willing to evaluate the arguments and to tentatively adopt the one that they prefer for whatever reason. It's not to say that philosophers can't have a deep faith in a god or a lack thereof, but they don't see their work as defending that belief in the face of any possible objection. But if this is true, and I think it is, how about someone who refuses to budge from what seem like moral truisms? Must a philosopher, in order to maintain integrity, put every principle on the chopping block: that if it's wrong for you to do something, all else equal, it's wrong for me to do it, or that causing people pain is wrong? Must a philosopher at least be open to the possibility that these notions are fundamentally flawed?

I posted a reply simultaneously with David's excellent one: it is perhaps just about worth leaving these two remarks here. (1) An atheist certainly need not "take a position on god's existence ahead of time and argue it dogmatically". Someone can reject theism because they come to think that we have no good reason to accept the theistic hypothesis, and very good reasons to reject it. In fact, that is a common enough intellectual trajectory for people brought up in some religion: their eventual atheism is (at least by their lights) the result of weighing up the arguments, pro and con. Such an atheist might be misguided in her assessment of the weight of the arguments, but is hardly being dogmatic. (Nor indeed need every theist count as dogmatic, either.) (2) "Must a philosopher, in order to maintain integrity, put every principle on the chopping block?" Well, certainly we should stand willing to revise cherished views, if that's where the preponderance of evidence and argument takes us....

I find the philosophy of religion immensely interesting. Recently I watched a YouTube video in which a well known Christian philosopher/theologian, William Lane Craig, explained how the Anglo-American world had been "utterly transformed" and had undergone a "renaissance of Christian philosophy" since the 1960s (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=902MJirWkdM&feature=related [starts at around the 7:40 mark]). Do you agree with these statements? Moreover, how well respected is Dr. Craig? Is he generally viewed as a top notch philosopher? I also wonder whether the very best arguments on the atheistic side are really being discussed. It seems there is some disdain among philosophers regarding the so-called "new atheists": Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, etc. Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today? I'd really be interested in reading some of their work. I would really appreciate multiple perspectives on these questions. Thanks a lot.

You ask for multiple perspectives: so let me start the ball rolling. "Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today?" Maybe it's because I'm working in England which is a pretty irreligious country, but most of the good philosophers I know well enough to have any clue about their religious views are cheerful atheists for whom religion just doesn't feature in their lives (except when dingbat religious fundamentalists of one stripe or another cause public mayhem). And most of these philosophers aren't very interested in religion as a philosophical issue (they might casually wonder what it is about us which makes our minds prone to gripped by supernatural stories of one kind or another, but they don't think the supposed philosophical arguments for taking such stories to be true are worth wasting much time over). So most of the "top atheists working in philosophy today" round my neck of the woods aren't working in the philosophy of religion but are getting on with what they think...

Religions are frequently criticised for the bad conduct of their members or office bearers. And some go so far as to say that this behaviour renders religious belief untenable. I have always believed that since their tenets do not support or encourage this bad conduct such bad behaviour is not a valid criticism of religion. That it is simply the normal outcome of behavioural variation in the human population which says nothing about the validity of religious beliefs. Is this a valid line of reasoning? Peter S.

We surely need to distinguish between (a) bad conduct that happens despite the professed beliefs of the sinner (well, we are all human and our actions too often fall short of our own ideals, whether religiously framed or more secular), and (b) bad deeds that result from someone following through the prescriptions of a loathsome form of religion. So when people behave vilely to homosexuals precisely because of some crabbed fundamentalist Christian beliefs, or think it is acceptable to kill apostates because caught up in some fundamentalist Islamic cult, then indeed we can rightly find the particular beliefs that lead them to appalling behaviour to be intolerable. By their fruits you shall know them.

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