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Philosophers
Profession

Philosophy is well known for its inquisitive, critical nature. Naturally, we as philosophers strive to see clearly the basis of common beliefs, while rejecting prejudices and stereotypes that are without justifiable foundation. Now this all sounds fine, if we were diving into some debates or books. But, the common way of life outside is wrought with statements and beliefs that are at best grounded in some transient trends or local culture. Take, for example, when we engage in social interactions (perhaps in a college student's perspective). People are seen swayed by their emotions, possessed by gossips, some wearing extreme makeups and perfume, some drenched in alcohol, making horrid comments on someone the moment without his presence, blurting their prejudices and misconceptions, and so on. Of course, these are very narrow generalizations, yet I am convinced one cannot easily deny that these make up a big part of people's social lives today. As I study through various philosophers and their thoughts, I...

"If philosophy is really about exercising one's reason and becoming inquisitive and critical, can philosophers ever be in harmony with an active social lifestyle without making everyone their enemy?" Well, exercising one's reason and being inquisitive and critical is hardly the unique province of philosophers: just for a start, most fellow academics in other disciplines are critically exercising their reason too. But set that aside. Why on earth should being prone to exercise reason and be critical spoil your social life? Lots of college professors, for example, are convivial souls with perfectly normal lives outside the classroom! There is a time and place for everything, and overdoing the critical reasoning on a heavy night out with your mates or when trying to get off with some attractive girl/boy (according to your inclinations), is no doubt quite inappropriate. But in some other parts of your social life -- the political discussions, trying to makes sense of the films and books that matter to...
Philosophy
Religion

Why are there so many atheists in philosophy? Is this evidence that religion does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny?

Charles Taliaferro is, of course, right that there are philosophers who are serious theists. But noting that doesn't really answer the question why more aren't. (My guess about the proportion of serious theists in UK philosophy departments is no more than one in eight, probably less.) But I rather doubt that this is because "religion does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny": my non-believing colleagues mostly show no interest at all in the philosophy of religion. The reasons why they find no sustenance in theistic religion and it wouldn't cross their mind to attend church are more complex than explicit argumentative considerations. And so too for other non-believers. For at least in the UK, among the educated middle classes (as opposed e.g. to among immigrant communities maintaining a cultural identity), religion is in quite general and continuing decline, and the lack of belief among philosophers is matched much more generally. And not, surely, just because of how the arguments...
Truth

From a philosophical point of view, what is the difference between truth and fact?

Some talk about facts is just a stylistic variant of truth-talk. For example, in ordinary discourse, to say 'It's a fact that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour' is to say no more than that 'It is true that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour'. And, arguably, both those in turn say no more than that the fast train to London to Cambridge does take less than an hour. However there is also a more substantive notion of fact that has a long history in philosophy and has in recent years made something of a comeback -- this is the notion of facts as not truths but truth-makers . The proposition that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour is true. And there is, plausibly, something worldly that makes it true, something that has to exist if the proposition is to be true, a truth-maker in short. And what kind of thing is a truth-maker? It isn't enough for London, Cambridge and trains to exist. And adding in the property of...
Logic
Religion

I have recently stumbled upon a short book written by the Catholic theologian named Peter Kreeft. He deductively argued for Jesus’ divinity through an approach he summarized as “Aut deus aut homo malus.” (Either God or a Bad Man.) Basically, his argument works only on the assumption made by most historians. Jesus was a teacher, he claimed divinity, and was executed. So, assuming this is true he says Jesus must’ve been one of three things. One possibility is that he was a liar. He said he was divine even though he knew it was not true. Another possibility is that he was insane. He believed he was divine even though he wasn’t. The final possibility is that he was telling the truth and he was correct. He was divine. He goes through and points out that Jesus shows no symptoms of insanity. He had no motive for lying. In fact, he was executed because of his claims. That gives him a motive to deny his divinity, which he apparently was given a chance to do by according to the Jewish and Roman sources on the...

Charles Taliaferro's third sentence could be read as saying that I "give no credence to theism". If that's what he means, he presumes too much. What I give no credence to are bad arguments for theism.

I agree with Alexander George: the argument is hopeless. As it happens, I came across the argument for the first time only recently: and -- when I'd stopped laughing -- I blogged about it, rather rudely. You can read what I said, and 33 comments(!) here .
Ethics
Religion

I'm religious, but I'm also gay. My church teaches that homosexual relationships are immoral. They say that this is what God has told us and they back it up with scriptures and revelation from God given to my current church leaders. I have a hard time accepting that homosexuality is immoral. I don't see why people should be denied consenting, intimate, long-term relationships. So, here's the question that I need to find a solution to: Should I deny believing what I think is right to comply with what my church leaders say God thinks is moral?

What is it with the obsession of (much) contemporary organized religions with matters of sexuality? It really is pretty bizarre. And for sure, if some of the energy wasted on pruriently fussing about who gets to do what with whom and where were spent campaigning on issues of social justice, say, then the world would be a better place. But I digress ... You say that the proscription of homosexual acts is "backed it up with scriptures and revelation from God given to mycurrent church leaders". But the import of the few relevant scriptural passages is the subject of hot debate. And even if you think that the relevant passages should be taken seriously (Why? I'm sure you don't buy the more whacky or offensive proscriptions of Leviticus. Any grown-up believer picks and chooses), why accept your church leaders' interpretation as opposed to the readings of e.g. more liberal Christian sects? They may claim "special revelation from God", but then they would, wouldn't they? -- and no doubt so do some...
Education
Logic
Religion

I'm a first year student of philosophy at UCLA, and I am interested primarily in philosophy of religion. I've just taken an introductory logic course which covered symbolization, sentential logic, and quantification. There are numerous other logic courses offered through the department, including metalogic, modal logic, etc, and I was wondering if AskPhilosophers could recommend a logic course to take? More specifically, I want to take a logic course that is related or will aid me in my studies in philosophy of religion. Maybe modal logic, since it deals with necessity and possibility? Thanks.

The short answer is: yes, you are right, a course on modal logic would be the one that probably will relate a little to a philosophy of religion course (it will help you understand e.g. modal ontological arguments). But I think it is worth saying a bit more. I'd be a little worried if one of my first-year students said "I'm primarily interested in the philosophy of X " for any X . After all, philosophy is a subject where topics don't compartmentalize easily but connect up in deep and unexpected ways. Beginners should be exploring widely, and leaving themselves open to being gripped by all kinds of problems -- what I like at this stage is a student who says "the philosophy of Y is really exciting: that's what I want to do " one week, and then comes back three weeks later and says "wow, this philosophy of Z course is amazing". And I'd be particularly worried if someone focussed too hard too early on a small area of applied philosophy like the philosophy of religion. This is a...
Ethics
Philosophy
Religion

I suggested to a friend that atheists and theists were rather similar, in that they take a position on god's existence ahead of time and argue it dogmatically, whereas philosophers are willing to evaluate the arguments and to tentatively adopt the one that they prefer for whatever reason. It's not to say that philosophers can't have a deep faith in a god or a lack thereof, but they don't see their work as defending that belief in the face of any possible objection. But if this is true, and I think it is, how about someone who refuses to budge from what seem like moral truisms? Must a philosopher, in order to maintain integrity, put every principle on the chopping block: that if it's wrong for you to do something, all else equal, it's wrong for me to do it, or that causing people pain is wrong? Must a philosopher at least be open to the possibility that these notions are fundamentally flawed?

I posted a reply simultaneously with David's excellent one: it is perhaps just about worth leaving these two remarks here. (1) An atheist certainly need not "take a position on god's existence ahead of time and argue it dogmatically". Someone can reject theism because they come to think that we have no good reason to accept the theistic hypothesis, and very good reasons to reject it. In fact, that is a common enough intellectual trajectory for people brought up in some religion: their eventual atheism is (at least by their lights) the result of weighing up the arguments, pro and con. Such an atheist might be misguided in her assessment of the weight of the arguments, but is hardly being dogmatic. (Nor indeed need every theist count as dogmatic, either.) (2) "Must a philosopher, in order to maintain integrity, put every principle on the chopping block?" Well, certainly we should stand willing to revise cherished views, if that's where the preponderance of evidence and argument takes us....
Religion

I find the philosophy of religion immensely interesting. Recently I watched a YouTube video in which a well known Christian philosopher/theologian, William Lane Craig, explained how the Anglo-American world had been "utterly transformed" and had undergone a "renaissance of Christian philosophy" since the 1960s (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=902MJirWkdM&feature=related [starts at around the 7:40 mark]). Do you agree with these statements? Moreover, how well respected is Dr. Craig? Is he generally viewed as a top notch philosopher? I also wonder whether the very best arguments on the atheistic side are really being discussed. It seems there is some disdain among philosophers regarding the so-called "new atheists": Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, etc. Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today? I'd really be interested in reading some of their work. I would really appreciate multiple perspectives on these questions. Thanks a lot.

You ask for multiple perspectives: so let me start the ball rolling. "Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today?" Maybe it's because I'm working in England which is a pretty irreligious country, but most of the good philosophers I know well enough to have any clue about their religious views are cheerful atheists for whom religion just doesn't feature in their lives (except when dingbat religious fundamentalists of one stripe or another cause public mayhem). And most of these philosophers aren't very interested in religion as a philosophical issue (they might casually wonder what it is about us which makes our minds prone to gripped by supernatural stories of one kind or another, but they don't think the supposed philosophical arguments for taking such stories to be true are worth wasting much time over). So most of the "top atheists working in philosophy today" round my neck of the woods aren't working in the philosophy of religion but are getting on with what they think...
Education
Philosophy

Are there page to page commentaries on difficult philosophical works that explain more simply what's being said so that the average person at least has a fighting chance of knowing what the work says. Where does a person obtain those sorts of commentaries?

Indeed, there are all kinds of commentaries written on the works of the Great Dead Philosophers, at various levels of sophistication. But it isn't clear to me why "the average person" would particularly want to read the works of the Great Dead Philosophers -- unless gripped by the idea that those works are somehow full of timeless pearls of wisdom. But that's not a happy idea. Those old works are, of course, very much creatures of their times, responding to intellectual concerns of their times (concerns which might overlap with ours, but which are also very different in subtle and complex ways), and typically bringing to bear all kinds of hidden assumptions of their times. That's why the Great Dead Philosophers can often be so baffling: they can seem to talking about issues that we half-recognize, but often in ways that initially make little sense. And that's why we need the commentaries, to help us see where our predecessors were coming from. (Think for example just how much philosophy over the...
Ethics
Sex

Are there any moral arguments against non-coercive incest between adults?

A footnote to Peter Fosl's sensible response. The trouble, of course, is in the talk of 'non-coercive' incest. Where different generations are concerned -- father and adult daughter, for example -- it would be naive to suppose that the younger party, who may think she is freely consenting, isn't in many cases subject to subtle coercion. And even if, leaving the issue of potential offspring out of it, there is nothing morally wrong with genuinely non-coercive incestuous relations between adults, it could well still be a bad thing if people generally believed that to be so (for the belief, by relaxing the received taboo, could have the bad effect of creating a context in which subtly coercive incestuous relations become very much more common). This is an interesting phenomenon in moral thought more generally, it seems. There can be cases where it might be permissible to do X but it would be a bad thing if people (including ourselves) generally thought it is permissible to do X -- e.g. because...

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