Since you said "literally anything", almost all philosophers would agree that the answer is "no, it doesn't follow from materialism". For one thing, there are facts about consciousness, memory, etc., that depend upon facts external to the body. So, for instance, whether I really remember an event is determined in part by whether or not it really occurred. But, if we leave aside these sorts of external facts - which is probably what you had in mind anyway - then there is a hot dispute in philosophy of mind over this very question. Some philosophers, like David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, have argued that if materialism is true then all the facts about consciousness, such as what it's like to have sensory experiences, should be in principle derivable from a complete physical description of the relevant person's body (or brain). Other philosophers, myself included, have argued that materialism, as a metaphysical thesis, is not committed to this consequence. The idea is that though mental states are...

If you just reflect on your own experience you can see that the feeling that the pain is in your hand is not merely a matter of having learned over time that certain feelings are caused by damage in certain areas; on the contrary, your hand, as we say, "hurts". Infants clearly show recognition of the locations of pains in their bodies, and yet they certainly haven't had sufficient experience to learn the requisite correlations. Also, notice that sometimes we're wrong. This happens with tooth pain a lot. We feel the pain in one tooth but it's actually caused by damage in a different tooth. How would this mistake even occur if there weren't something inherent in the feeling itself concerning which tooth hurt? One fairly simple way to account for the localization of pains is this: The relevant nerves in the damaged area send signals to the pain centers of the brain, which represent both the damage and the location of the damage. The identities of the nerves from which the message emanated, or their...

In some sense of course the nervous system is an extension of the brain, and precisely where one sets the boundary of the brain is somewhat arbitrary. However there is a point to distinguishing the function of the nerves in the hand that detect the damage in question - say, a cut - from the function of higher-level centers in the cortex that process the information and mediate responses (such as grabbing the hand, putting pressure on the cut, etc.). Rather than speak of "projection of the pain" by the brain, I would describe what's going on as the brain representing damage in the hand (that's the pain - it's represented as located in the hand) based upon the inputs received from the nerves in the hand. So long as the best explanation of cognitive and perceptual activity requires describing the mind/brain in terms of distinct faculties with distinct functions - and this is of course an empirical question, but I believe there is good reason to accept it - it would only undermine the explanatory project...