How far down into philosophy does the mysterian attitude penetrate? I realize it's nothing new, since Christian and other religious philosophers have thrown in the towel when it comes to describing Deity. The problem of consciousness is now producing the same helplessness. When is a problem decreed beyond human competence and when is it just beyond your and my current competence? Is continued frustration the deciding factor?

What you seem to mean by "the mysterian attitude" is captured by your later phrases, "throwing in the towel" and "helplessness". In this sense, I don't know that there are any philosophers who count as mysterians, though I suppose Colin McGinn, who holds the view that our mind just cannot entertain the concepts necessary to solve the mind-body problem comes closest. He calls his view "cognitive closure". The idea is that human minds, like those of other animals, have an innate restriction on the range of concepts available to them. But one needn't go as far as McGinn's idea of cognitive closure to acknowledge that the concepts available for framing theoretical hypotheses concerning conscious mental activity - whether based in neuroscience or computational psychology - don't seem adequate to capture the character of conscious experience. But rather than throw up our hands out of frustration, most philosophers, whether they agree with this assessment or not, are continually trying to articulate ever...

I have a theory which I would like to develop. I was wondering if it is possible that all human perception could differ from person to person. My reasoning is, if you are born into this world a seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, tasting individual, your senses learn to describe different perceptible things form that very time. The problem with this is, is that each individual has parents, who also had parents, who had parents and so on. If I was born, and I saw a completely different world, or tasted things very differently, I wouldn't be able to communicate these things because every description I can provide is synonymous to what it is called. For example. If I am looking at what is called an apple, I see a round, object with a stem. For the sake of argument it will be a red apple. The thing is, I could be seeing a spinning vortex, but because this is how I have always perceived things, I describe it at a red apple. I suppose this isn't a question, but what do you think?

Your view about the possibility that people perceive things radically differently is an old philosophical puzzle. The so-called "inverted spectrum" hypothesis is the most common variant. Assuming that color space is organized symmetrically, so that one can switch primary colors like red and green, or blue and yellow, while maintaining all the similarity relations among them, it seems someone could see red wherever others see green and yet there be no difference in their behavior. As you point out, they would learn to call red things "red", even though they looked green to them. Perhaps there could be inversions of other properties as well. So is this really possible? One way of approaching the issue is to distinguish between what we might call the "representational content" of a perceptual experience and its "qualitative character". The representational content is what the perceptual experience is "saying" about the world around you. So if you see a red apple, your visual experience is ...

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