Do humans have a greater right to live than other animals? If so, would beings of much greater intelligence and perception hold that same right over humans?

Good questions! I've been a vegetarian for 38 years and believe that humans should not kill animals for food, clothing or sport. One way to think about this is to ask what it is that makes life valuable. Some think that life itself is valuable, but that isn't plausible given that plants are alive and it doesn't seem to be morally wrong to weed your garden. Another possibility is that what makes life valuable is sentience. If that's true, then sentient animals (and not plants) would have a moral claim on us, insofar as we have a duty to protect what is valuable. (Though one needs to ask here: what is our duty to protect what is valuable? How far does that duty extend? Are there different sorts of value, some of which have a greater claim on us than others?) Even if sentience is valuable, however, some argue that humans have capacities that are more valuable still, such as the ability to reason, to value things, to create systems of norms, even morality itself. A challenge arises here,...

There is much written on veganism and vegetarianism and the morality of eating animals. The human animal is an omnivore; eating is basic to survival; our dentition and digestive tracts are adapted for meat as well as plants. This is our condition. There is an answer excusing peoples from agriculturally poor countries (and I would add the Inuit) yet, lacking suitable abattoirs, their trapping and/or killing of animals would be seen as cruel by our delicate western standards. If this is morally acceptable, what is "unacceptable suffering"? To whom is is unacceptable and what changes that it becomes acceptable? A vegan questioner suggested her omnivorous friend should witness the killing of an animal if he wished to eat meat. If he did and continued eating meat, would he then be exculpated? If so, where is the morality? Why should the vegan's morality be superior to the omnivore's? Should the vegan witness the grinding poverty and backbreaking work of 3rd world child agricultural labourers before eating...

Your question raises many issues. Here are three: 1) If something is natural for humans, isn't it permissible? 2) If someone performs an action, or a group has a practice, that enables them to survive under exceptionally harsh conditions, isn't it permissible? 3) If someone acts in a way that seems moral to them, based on the standards of their society at the time, isn't it morally acceptable? A full answer to (1), I think, should explore what it means for something to be natural for humans. Isn't it also natural for me to use my rational capacties to decide what I ought to eat rather than just going for whatever tastes good or is edible? Many things are edible, even nutritious, for humans, but we don't think it is appropriate to eat them under normal circumstances. Rational reflection on our relationships to each other and the non-human world is natural and acting in ways consistent on that reflection is too. Also, there are many things that people have argued are natural, but...

In a hypothetical situation I am a vegan talking to a meat eater who buys his meat from a supermarket and has no interest in where it came from. I say that I don't think people have the right to eat meat unless they are willing to learn about what it takes to provide that meat, witness it first hand or even produce it for themselves. He says that he doesn't want to know where it came from and is quite happy for someone else to do the dirty work if they are happy to and does not feel at all guilty. Is he morally wrong and do I have a valid argument?

Another issue here is whether someone "has the right" to eat meat, even if they know full well where it came from. Suppose Smith claims to "have the right" to eat a slab of beef because she killed the cow. I would strongly disagree. It was wrong of her to kill the cow and wrong of her to eat it. I'm not exactly happy using the notion of "rights" in this context. But the point is that doing wrong in full knowledge is still doing wrong. It may be even worse. If Smith is so insensitive to suffering that she happily kills the cow and eats the meat, I would say this is much worse than eating the meat without really knowing what suffering was involved in its death.

There is a strong enough moral argument for vegetarianism. However, it does seem that if applied globally, such a standard would cause a loss of livelihood (e.g for African nations that export tons of beef to Europe). In the dramatic event that a panel of EU ethicists decided to ban all non-vegetarian commodities (leather, meat, some forms of milk) on the grounds that these were borne from the undue suffering of animals, would the inevitable suffering of human beings that would result from such a move (through job losses, economic stagnation, etc. - assuming that in countries that thrive on the meat industry, e.g. Botswana, alternative livelihoods are virtually unsustainable, due to the poor agricultural space) provide a suitable argument for the continued non-vegetarianism of human beings on Earth, or is this a mere technicality?

These are really good questions and there are definitely many empirical issues that should be settled before we can adequately evaluate a proposal such as global vegetarianism, or a ban on animal products by the EU. First, it is worth noting that not all vegetarians are utilitarians, or even consequentialists, and some may think that animals have rights that should be considered even at the expense of some degree of human suffering. How much human suffering is a hard question for such views. Second, for the reasons you suggest, those who support global vegetarianism should probably not support the immediate end to all use of animal products. The goal would be, I think, to find alternative ways to feed and clothe ourselves in ways that are consistent with the well-being of animals. This won't happen over night. But we can take steps every day to reduce the pain, suffering, and death we cause to animals. (A nice statement of this "do your best" approach is in Sue Donaldson's Foods that...

I am thoroughly confused by the ethics of vegetarianism, which to my mind seems more of a religious objection towards eating meat than a scientific point of view. Recently I attended a lecture by Peter Singer ( Animal Liberation ) on the ethics of eating meat. One thing he did not address was differentiating between the 'killing' of the (sentient) animal and the 'eating' of it. OK- so here is my question: is it ethical to eat roadkill, or animals that have died of "natural" causes or of "old age"? Further to this, is being killed by a human primate not a "natural" cause of death of a cow? If humans shouldn't kill cows to eat (because we know better), perhaps we could let lions kill the cows, then we can eat them afterwards? Isn't it unethical to tell people in the developing world they shouldn't eat meat? - especially when a huge percentage of women in the developing world are iron deficient? Thanks, Grant M.

There are at least three different kinds of argument in favor of vegetarianism, and each of the arguments have slightly different implications for what is OK. One argument is concerned with human health (so is more prudential than moral). The idea is that eating dead animals is not healthy for humans, or at least a balanced vegetarian diet is more healthy. This view is not really compatible with eating roadkill, but would be compatible with eating meat if there was insufficient vegetarian food to keep one healthy. Another argument is concerned with the environment. The idea is that factory farming wastes precious resources (like water) and is inefficient in producing the nutrients humans need. (For details, see "Environmental vegetarianism" in Wikipedia.) This argument also doesn't preclude killing or eating animals where the practices used to raise them are environmentally sound (but it can be developed into a case for a qualified veganism, given the parallel concerns about the...