This isn't really an answer to your question but, rather, a point I find interesting about the framing of your question. (You could still ask your question in slightly different terms, of course...) Although the idea of a "placebo effect" is common, there is actually some reason to doubt that it is "well-documented". A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine by Asbjorn Hrobjartsson and Peter C. Gotzsche, (May 24, 2001) argues tha t the trials aiming to establish a placebo effect are, for the most part, not sound. http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/abstract/344/21/1594 For example, in some cases the studies don't take into account the fact that the condition of some percentage of people will improve without any medication at all. Although the studies compare people who take medication with people who take a placebo, they don't always compare people who take the placebo with those who take nothing. This, as you might expect, doesn't settle the question, but...

These are really good questions and there are definitely many empirical issues that should be settled before we can adequately evaluate a proposal such as global vegetarianism, or a ban on animal products by the EU. First, it is worth noting that not all vegetarians are utilitarians, or even consequentialists, and some may think that animals have rights that should be considered even at the expense of some degree of human suffering. How much human suffering is a hard question for such views. Second, for the reasons you suggest, those who support global vegetarianism should probably not support the immediate end to all use of animal products. The goal would be, I think, to find alternative ways to feed and clothe ourselves in ways that are consistent with the well-being of animals. This won't happen over night. But we can take steps every day to reduce the pain, suffering, and death we cause to animals. (A nice statement of this "do your best" approach is in Sue Donaldson's Foods that...

It isn't clear to me exactly what the tension is. It will, no doubt, depend on the religion in question. Some religions do not hold that the non-believer will be punished or that there is a special religious basis for morality. In my experience, many who do believe that the non-believer will go to hell make an effort to "save" souls; those who don't may be shy or preoccupied with other things. Being uninterested in converting others is not the same as being opposed to it (though more on this below). On the broader issue of morality, I'm not sure why the religious person is in a position any different from any moral person. If believe that eating meat is morally wrong (for whatever reason), should I try to convince others to become vegetarian? Well, one's answer will depend on the broader moral theory one subscribes to. If I'm a utilitarian, I'll have to determine whether trying to convince others to be vegetarian will have the best consequences; maybe I'm terrible at such efforts and...

I'm not sure what you have in mind by "moral harm" but one thought would be that moral harm to someone results when a moral obligation to that person is violated. So if I have a moral obligation to respect your bodily integrity, then if I assault you, I violate that obligation and not only cause you pain and suffering, but moral harm. If this is the idea, then the question really turns on whether we have moral obligations to ourselves. It seems plausible that we do. One might argue that just as it would be wrong for another to violate my bodily integrity, it would be wrong for me to do so as well, e.g., by chopping off my own hand. Here it might be worth asking: if I am morally entitled to a certain kind of treatment, e.g., say that there is a moral requirement that persons be treated with respect, can I ever legitimately exempt myself from the rule, even when my action is directed towards myself? If not, then it seems one can morally harm onself by not according oneself due respect.

There are at least three different kinds of argument in favor of vegetarianism, and each of the arguments have slightly different implications for what is OK. One argument is concerned with human health (so is more prudential than moral). The idea is that eating dead animals is not healthy for humans, or at least a balanced vegetarian diet is more healthy. This view is not really compatible with eating roadkill, but would be compatible with eating meat if there was insufficient vegetarian food to keep one healthy. Another argument is concerned with the environment. The idea is that factory farming wastes precious resources (like water) and is inefficient in producing the nutrients humans need. (For details, see "Environmental vegetarianism" in Wikipedia.) This argument also doesn't preclude killing or eating animals where the practices used to raise them are environmentally sound (but it can be developed into a case for a qualified veganism, given the parallel concerns about the...

From Socrates' point of view, doing wrong harms the soul. Since on his view the soul is the most valuable thing there is, it is important to protect the soul from this harm. Suffering evil, in contrast, doesn't harm the soul. It might harm the body. It might be psychologically difficult. But it doesn't harm the most valuable thing. So doing evil is worse than suffering it. Is it possible to make sense of this without accepting that there is a soul? You might think that there are different sorts of value: aesthetic value, moral value, individual well-being, etc. You might also think that some of these can "trump" others. So, for example, occasionally I am required to sacrifice some amount of well-being in order to do what is right. There may also be times when I must suffer at the hands of others in order to do what is right. When there is a conflict, fulfilling one's moral obligations is more important than achieving individual well-being. But this comes close to what Socrates was...